The impact of non-technical issues on decision-making by coal mining incident management teams by Fuller, Ruth Grace
  
 
The impact of non-technical issues on decision-making by coal mining incident management teams. 
Ruth Grace Fuller 
BEng Hons Civil Engineering 
Grad Dip Psychology 
BSc Hons Psychology 
Grad Dip Secondary Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at 
The University of Queensland in 2014 
Sustainable Minerals Institute 
Abstract 
A serious incident in an underground coal mine can claim many lives in an instant. The lives of 
those who survive the initial moments can be dependent on the decisions made by the incident 
management team (IMT). The IMT is a team of mine employees assembled immediately upon the 
discovery of an incident to manage the response.  Evaluations of annual emergency exercises 
conducted at underground coal-mines in Queensland have indicated that IMT decision-making is 
generally sub-optimal. This finding was echoed by the Royal Commission into the New Zealand 
Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy that occurred in 2010.  In many other high-reliability roles technical 
and non-technical issues have been found to impact decision-making. The goal of this research is to 
explore the role of non-technical issues in emergency decision-making following an underground 
coal mining incident. A review of the Queensland emergency exercise reports, direct observation of 
emergency simulations, and interviews with twenty-five mining personnel with real-life incident 
management experience at underground coal mine emergencies has led to the development of a 
non-technical skills taxonomy for decision-making in mining IMTs. The decision-making process 
in a mining IMT has been shown to be a broad socio-psycho-technical process within which 
technical and non-technical issues cannot be separated. Technical, social and cognitive skills are 
imperative to maintain adequate communication, situation awareness and optimal decision-making 
throughout the emergency management process. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
At quarter-to-four on the afternoon of the 19th November 2010 at the Pike River
Coal mine (NZ) the lights flickered in the statutory mine-manager’s o ce. Alarms
sounded in the control room indicating that power, ventilation, pump and gas data
were no longer being received. Daniel Duggan, who was operating the control room
on the surface of the mine at the time, was cut o↵ whilst speaking to a miner who
was working underground. Daniel sought re-connection for four minutes, eventually
asking if there was ‘anyone underground’. No-one answered.
Daniel had ‘a real bad feeling about this’. He told the statutory mine-manager
that power and communication in the underground mine had been lost. At 3:52 pm
Daniel asked if he should call mines rescue, to which the reply was, ‘Oh, we won’t go
there yet, we’ll get someone up there’. Shortly after this, the mine-manager spoke
with two other senior personnel in the car-park and they noticed an unusual smell.
The mine-manager then returned to his o ce to work on unrelated emails.
An electrician, Mattheus Strydom, was asked to investigate the outages. Mattheus
requested confirmation that both power and communication had both been lost, a
significant combination in his experience, as it is typically associated with a ma-
jor incident destroying the underground infrastructure. Before entering the mine at
4pm, Mattheus commented ‘I hope this isn’t bad’ to a contractor. Upon entering
the mine he reported that ‘something just didn’t feel right’ but he continued, easing
his concerns by finding rational reasons for the missing reflector sticks, the missing
fire hose signs, and the altered position of items on the walls of the mine. He also
detected a cordite smell and recognised that his mine vehicle was starting to struggle
due to a lack of oxygen. However, it was the sight of a man lying in the roadway,
in a position which Mattheus had been taught indicated that he had been killed in
the blast of an explosion, that made him rapidly retreat from the mine. During this
time senior personnel had met at the mine portal, satisfied themselves that there
was a ventilation breeze entering the mine, and had left. At 4:25pm Mattheus called
Daniel and said ‘You better call the mine rescue, we’ve had an explosion and I’ve
seen a man lying on his back in the road’.
At 4:26pm, forty-one minutes after the explosion occurred, the statutory mine-
manager authorised Daniel to call the mines rescue service and the St John Ambu-
lance. The general manager activated the emergency response management plan at
around 4:30pm, 45 minutes after the explosion.
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This account of the first 45 minutes following the explosion at the Pike River coal-mine
in New Zealand has been constructed from evidence presented at the Royal Commission into
this tragedy which killed 29 miners [162]. The Royal Commission found that the simultaneous
outages of power and communication systems should have been recognised as indicative of a
serious incident, and that the mine’s emergency response management plan should have been
activated immediately. The emergency management process used throughout the rescue and
recovery stage, including the decision-making was found to have ‘serious failings’[162, p. 344],
‘the emergency response was hampered by a lack of information’ [161, p. 26] and the commission
recommended that ‘Emergency Management in underground coal mines needs urgent attention’
[162, p. 354].
However, the problem of poor decision-making is not isolated to the Pike River incident.
Similar concerns have been raised by the assessors of 16 annual mine emergency exercises held
in Queensland, Australia. This suggests that Incident Management Teams (IMTs) established
at underground coal mines generally encounter di culties making timely and e↵ective decisions.
This thesis aims to explore the non-technical issues that may be contributing to these decision-
making deficiencies.
Many mines rescue personnel have been killed whilst attempting rescues in underground coal
mines. Consequently, decision-making by those managing the emergencies has been scrutinised
in formal investigations. At two relatively recent incidents in the U.S.A, both the decision to
allow rescuers underground; and the alternate decision to delay sending rescuers underground
until the rescuers’ safety could be assured, have received criticism, because in both cases the
decision resulted in further fatalities. At the Crandall Canyon Mine in Utah (2007), three
men attempting to rescue six others who were trapped in the mine following a ground control
failure were killed by a subsequent failure [200]. On the other hand, following an explosion at
the SAGO mine in West Virginia, the IMT delayed activating rescue crews contributing to the
deaths of 11 out of the 12 miners who remained underground to await rescue [130].
These two examples highlight a number of issues. Decision-making following an incident at
a coal mine is technically complex because of the inherent instability of a coal mine’s structural
and atmospheric environment. Decision-makers must deal with competing goals (the safety of
the rescuers versus rescuing those underground); extreme time pressure (there may be limited
respirable air underground meaning rescuers have a limited time to rescue them); and the fact
some decisions can be a matter of life and death.
To appreciate the physical di culties decision-makers in an IMT must manage following
an underground incident at a coal mine, a basic understanding of the working environment is
required. The hazards in an underground coal mine include: the threat of water infiltrating
the mine (this could result from flooding on the surface, or old adjacent mine workings); the
potential for roof collapse (due to the weight of the overlying strata); fire (the whole mine is
flammable - the walls, the floors and the roof); pressure outbursts (following strata collapse or
a release of pressure build-up in the coal); a build-up of toxic and explosive gasses (these result
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naturally in a coal mine due to the reaction between coal and oxygen and can accumulate as a
result of poor ventilation or can infiltrate the mine from inadequately sealed o↵ old sections of
the mine); and methane or coal dust explosions (due to ignition of the explosive gasses).
Explosions are generally perceived to be the biggest threat to underground coal mine workers
because of the potential for multiple fatalities to occur nearly instantly. The atmosphere in
an underground coal mine is inherently unstable in that the heat generated from the coal-
oxygen chemical reaction can be su cient on its own to ignite the mine atmosphere if the
mine is inadequately ventilated. Consequently the IMT must maintain awareness of the mine
ventilation during any incident to prevent a build-up of toxic and flammable gasses that can
lead to the incident escalating to an explosion.
Other contextual issues that can influence IMT decision making, some specific to under-
ground coal mines in general and some only specific to Australian mines, include:
• Physical communication with underground personnel is limited to short text messages to
key personnel and fixed line telephones installed at various locations in the mine.
• Following an explosion, the physical communication system and gas monitoring systems
will most likely be destroyed.
• An explosion can almost instantly kill many people at once, as the force and toxic atmo-
sphere propagates through the mine.
• Miners carry a self-rescuer breathing device that provides them with 40 minutes of res-
pirable air if they are able to put them on before being overcome by the toxic gas. Spare
rescuers, and sometimes more robust breathing units, are made available at change-over
stations located throughout the mine.
• Workers may be many kilometres from a mine entry/exit making rescue and escape times
lengthy.
• The layout of the mine continuously changes because more coal is extracted from new
areas of the mine and older areas are sealed o↵.
• Any item that may spark is prohibited from being taken underground. Only specialised
vehicles and equipment can be used underground.
• Daily operations are driven by production. Even short interruptions to production can
cost a coal mine millions of dollars.
• A control room o cer (CRO) is always on-site to oversee the electronic data monitoring
screens that track critical aspects of the mine such as the ventilation.
• Coal mines often operate 24/7 and on back shifts there may only be one or two persons
above ground whilst a full crew works underground.
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• The Incident Management Team (IMT) managing the emergency remains above ground
in mine administration buildings meaning that they are physically isolated from the un-
derground mine and workers during an incident. These buildings also generally house the
control room.
These factors impact emergency decision-making in a number of ways. For example, the
long distance between the miners and an exit and the limited communication system, means
that actioning a decision and getting feedback on its success or otherwise is time consuming.
The IMT being located above ground means that they cannot see what has happened and
must rely on information from others to determine the situation in the mine. The prohibition
of vehicles or equipment that can spark means that the emergency services are unable to use
the equipment and transportation they use routinely. The interconnectedness of the mine
means that one incident can impact many people in di↵erent locations. Further, there may be
a shortage of above-ground sta↵ on-shift to take roles in an IMT if an incident occurs on a
back-shift.
The last multiple fatality incident at an underground coal-mine in Queensland was an ex-
plosion which killed 11 men at Moura No 2 mine in 1994. This was the last in a series of
explosions at Moura that claimed a total of 36 lives between 1974 and 1994. The Warden’s
inquiry into the 1994 incident contributed to the development of new coal mining legislation
in Queensland and placed a requirement on Queensland’s underground coal mines to test their
emergency management procedures annually [144, 222]. As a result, four key strategies have
been implemented in Queensland to improve emergency management since this time: Changes
to the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act, the implementation of emergency exercises and the
development of the Mine Re-entry Assessment System and the Mining Emergency Management
System.
1.2 The Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999/Coal
Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001
Coal mines in Queensland have a legal responsibility under the Coal Mining Health and Safety
Act 1999 [40] to be prepared to respond to emergency situations. The Coal Mining Health and
Safety Regulation details procedures that mines must comply with in an e↵ort to prepare them
for an emergency [39]. These include the requirements that each mine must develop a safety
and health management system and a principal hazard management plan and must carry out
risk assessments and work within standard operating procedures.
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1.3 Level 1 Exercises
Since 1998, annual full-scale emergency exercises, referred to as Level 1 exercises, have been
conducted and assessed in accordance with a recognised standard [81]. The Level 1 exercise
is a realistic emergency simulation hosted at a nominated mine anytime within a disclosed
two-week timeframe. An independent management committee, generally comprising eight to
ten members, confidentially designs and plans the exercise over the course of several months.
Professor Cli↵, the primary supervisor of this research, has been a member of this committee
since 1998, and the researcher was a member for three years from 2011 to 2013.
On the day, the exercise involves the mine (surface and underground), external agencies (e.g.
the CFMEU), government agencies (e.g. the Mines Inspectorate), the Queensland Mines Res-
cue Service (QMRS), the emergency services (e.g. police, ambulance) and often neighbouring
coal mines. A team of approximately 25 assessors observe performance in all areas of the mine
impacted by the exercise. These include the control room, the room where the IMT meet,
the areas where the IMT functional groups work above ground, and the working areas a↵ected
underground. The multiple vantage points ensure the complete IMT decision-making process,
from gathering the data to actioning the decision, to be captured and evaluated by assessors.
Each year a report is published following the exercise 1 using the assessors’ comments, obser-
vations and recommendations; and each year these reports make recommendations in an e↵ort
to improve IMT performance and decision-making.
For example:
‘A mine must have an established, structured and comprehensive system for man-
aging an emergency with a trained, disciplined response team.’ (2004).
‘There is a further need to establish a clear organisational structure for the man-
agement of an emergency, including information gathering techniques, decision-
making processes and communication mechanisms. These are available within pro-
fessional emergency services organisations and should be reviewed and considered
for adaptation to the mining environment.’ (2003)
It is recommendations such as these that prompted the development of the Mines Re-entry
Assessment Schedule (MRAS) and the Mining Emergency Management System (MEMS).
1.4 The Mine Re-entry Assessment System (MRAS)
The MRAS is an information management tool. Its purpose is to help IMTs, with the assistance
of the QMRS, to decide if they should allow miners to: remain in the mine; to re-enter the mine
1The Level 1 emergency exercise reports are available from the Queensland Government website at
http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/safety-and-health/emergency-excercise-reports.htm. References to Level 1 re-
ports in this thesis will simply include the date of the exercise.
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following an evacuation; or to send rescue teams into the mine to rescue or recover missing,
injured or deceased miners. These decisions are communally termed the ‘re-entry decision’ as
they all require the same assurance of safety in the mine. The Moura inquiry specified that
‘Before re-entry is decided, the risks and benefits must be fully analysed.’ [222, p. 67] and also
that re-entry to recover bodies should not be considered an emergency. The re-entry decision is
conventionally a core mines rescue activity [144] because of the potential for would-be rescuers to
become victims. The QMRS’ philosophy is that the re-entry decision must be made analytically
using complete and accurate data to show, without a doubt, that the mine environment is safe.
‘The decision makers’ authorisation to re-enter the mine must be unmistakable, deliberate and
well informed.’ [145].
The MRAS facilitates the digital collection and collation of technical mine data, such as
historical gas readings, prior to an incident occurring. It has been identified that approximately
70% of the technical data required in an emergency exists before it occurs [143]. Therefore,
having this data readily accessible when an incident occurs should, in theory, enable decision-
makers to make a more rapid and informed re-entry decision. The MRAS was deliberately
designed to direct the decision-makers towards the relevant data but not to make the decision
for them, thus di↵erentiating between data gathering and decision-making [28]. The MRAS
was first used in a real situation at the Pike River Coal Mine in 2010 and supported the decision
not to deploy mines rescue [145]. This decision came only minutes before the mine exploded for
the second time and prevented the deaths of rescue workers who were keen to enter the mine
[161].
1.5 The Mining Emergency Management System (MEMS)
The MEMS is a management structure developed specifically for the management of a mining
incident. It is a command and control model that outlines the roles and responsibilities of the
people working within it. It is an adaptation of the Incident Control System (ICS) used by
the emergency services and government agencies during civil disasters in the U.S.A. The ICS
also forms the basis of the Australian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) and
the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS), used by the emergency
services of the respective countries. The purpose of these systems is to maintain control and
coordination of an emergency response when multiple agencies are required to work together,
such as the police, fire and ambulance services [65, 21]. However, during the rescue and recov-
ery stages at the Pike River Mine a mixture of ICS from the UK and NZ were applied by the
Police and this a↵ected the e ciency of the decision-making [161]. The Royal Commission rec-
ommended that ‘The implementation of the co-ordinated incident management system (CIMS)
in underground coal mine emergencies should be reviewed urgently’ [162, p. 355].
The MEMS training manual defines an incident as ‘an unplanned event that impacts upon the
safety and welfare of personnel, or the continuity of viable mining operations, which requires
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an e↵ective and timely response in order to contain or mitigate the situation’ [178, p. 6].
MEMS prescribes establishing an Incident Management Team (IMT) immediately following
the discovery of an incident. Mine employees on-site at the time are recruited to fill critical
roles in the IMT until they can be relieved by more suitable personnel. This includes the role
of Incident Controller (IC). This initial stage of an incident response is generally characterised
by a lack of information and ‘confusion and disorder’ [68, p. 106], especially when people are
unaccounted for.
Incident Controller 
Responsible for overall 
incident management 
Planning 
Collate information. 
Risk assessment. 
Predict 
development.
Operations  
Manage resources 
and activities
Logistics 
Procures facilities, 
services, materials 
and finance 
Figure 1.1: Mining Emergency Management System
The MEMS structure is shown in Figure 1.1. It includes three functional groups; operations,
planning and logistics. The leaders of these functional groups form the IMT, alongside the IC
and any other roles identified as necessary at the time, for example a mines rescue representative.
A key principle of MEMS is that the IC is ‘responsible for managing the entire response to the
incident’ [178, p. 7]. MEMS states that at a mine, the IC is either the mine-manager, the site
safety executive or the senior mine o cial. However, in Queensland the IC role has generally
been held by the mine-manager, due to his/her statutory responsibility for the mine and all who
enter it under the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act [40, 39]. The NSW mining industry have
recently adopted a command and control structure similar to MEMS providing some consistency
in coal-mining emergency management in Australia [169]. However, the NSW Mines Rescue
Incident Command and Control System (ICCS), acknowledges that the severity of an incident
may mean that the police will take control of the incident, a consideration not made within
MEMS.
IMT meetings are critical to the MEMS process because they are the primary source of
information for the IC and are where decisions are made. The functional group leaders share
information with each other and inform the IC of information and action status at these meet-
ings. The IC makes decisions by creating and approving action plans. Interestingly, the MEMS
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training guide does not specifically list decision-making as a role of the IC. During a coal min-
ing emergency in Queensland, mine workers from other mines, the emergency services (usually
police and ambulance), the mines inspectorate, other Government agencies and the QMRS will
attend the mine. Implementation of the MEMS should mean that in the event of an emergency,
all attending agencies will operate within a similar command structure, theoretically facilitating
e↵ective performance.
The Australian mining industry’s expectation that adhering to an incident control system
and its associated pre-prepared procedures and checklists, such as duty-cards and trigger action
response plans, will improve decision-making is based on the assumption that optimal decision-
making is solely reliant on complete technical data and adherence to a process. It assumes that
optimal decision-making is methodical and analytical and consequently that the implementation
of a logical and methodical decision-making processes will ensure an optimal outcome. This is
a reasonable assumption given that setting standards, defining objectives, achieving goals and
following standard operating procedures are the norm in the industry and have been e↵ective in
many cases, but the evidence from Level 1 exercises and Pike River suggests that the existence
of these predefined systems may be insu cient, on their own, to improve performance in the
emergency environment.
The application of work processes that are suited to daily operations, and embedding these
into a command and control structure that was developed for experienced emergency-services
response teams,who are familiar with the emergency environment and the command and control
structure, may not be ideal for mining IMTs who are novices in the emergency environment
and are unfamiliar with the ICS structure. The superimposition of such systems and processes
on a mining IMT overlooks the skills and abilities that the people implementing the systems
may need. People are expected to simply slot into the roles and complete the prescribed tasks
without consideration of their emergency decision-making experience or the level of training
they have received. Mining IMTs are expected to make decisions in a very di↵erent environment
to that of their daily production-oriented roles. The impact of people’s physiological, psycho-
logical or social reactions to the incident itself has generally been ignored except perhaps for
the proviso in MEMS that the IMT should isolate itself to minimise disturbances.
It is di cult to believe that people involved in a mining IMT would remain psychologically
and physiologically una↵ected at a time when colleagues, including best mates and potentially
close family members cannot be contacted in a mine that has just exploded and is potentially
on fire. This was exactly the scenario at Pike River. In the first hour alone it was evident
that behaviours were being influenced by individuals’ psychological response to the situation.
The summary at the beginning of this thesis shows the unwillingness of those on the surface to
interpret the available information as evidence of a serious incident.
The implementation of systems to control data (such as the MRAS), to structure team in-
teraction (MEMS) and to distribute roles and responsibilities (the duty card system) are an
attempt by the industry to mitigate the impact of stress and emotion on IMT performance
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and improve decision-making. However, there is no evidence that such systems can do this in a
mining emergency environment and only evidence to the contrary from mining emergency ex-
ercises: Despite implementation of these processes assessors still believe decision-making needs
improvement. This indicates that the implementation of such systems alone are insu cient
to noticeably improve decision-making, and suggests that other factors, which cannot be con-
trolled by these systems may be influencing IMT decision-making. Therefore, exploration of
the issues that mining IMT members encounter, with a view to determining if and how they
interact with decision-making, is worthwhile.
Issues relating to the unfamiliar emergency environment and IMT members’ reactions to this
are likely to be influencing decision-making. A critical di↵erence between the mining IMT and
IMTs in other industries is that the mining IC is a novice in emergency situations, whereas other
ICs are generally extensively trained or frequently make decisions in emergency situations, such
as fire commanders and other emergency services personnel. To these personnel the emergency
environment, and their reactions to it, are familiar.
Research conducted in other high reliability industries, defined as those that have a good
safety record but that are hazardous [59], such as nuclear control plants, the military, aviation
and surgery, has identified seven key social and cognitive skills that can improve performance
in daily operations and in emergencies [73]. These are decision-making, situation-awareness,
communication, leadership, teamwork, stress management and fatigue management. These are
called ‘non-technical skills’ to di↵erentiate them from the ‘technical-skills’ that these profes-
sionals need to perform their roles. At a superficial level these skills appear equally relevant to
the mining IMT, but they cannot be generalised across industries. Therefore, before identifying
potentially beneficial skills, the non-technical issues that impact mining IMT decision-making
must be identified [73]. Thus, this thesis aims to identify and describe the issues that impact
IMT decision-making at underground coal mines.
1.6 Research Question
What roles do non-technical issues play in incident management team decision-making during
emergencies at underground coal mines?
1.7 Aims and Objectives
The aim of this research is to explore and describe the non-technical issues that may impact
decision-making in a mining IMT. The objective is to develop a taxonomy that describes the
key non-technical issues that impact on decision-making in mining IMTs.
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1.8 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2 a description of the emergency environment at an underground coal mine is
provided to familiarise the reader with the unique context for this IMT research. This is
followed by a review of the decision-making literature, incident command system literature,
non-technical skills literature and literature pertaining to each of the non-technical issues that
a↵ect performance in other high-reliability industries. This chapter forms the basis for the next
three chapters that examine emergency exercise reports, direct observations of IMTs during
emergency exercises and interviews with experienced miners to understand the non-technical
issues that impact decision-making in the mining IMT.
In Chapter 3, Level 1 emergency exercise reports are examined for evidence that non-
technical issues may have contributed to the decision-making flaws noted in the reports. These
reports are written by experienced coal mining personnel and although an important source of
information, they do not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the non-technical issues. The
omission of details regarding non-technical issues cannot be considered a representation of their
unimportance; rather it reveals an opportunity for improvement as their omission is likely to be
because they are di cult to observe and articulate and potentially because of their perceived
lowly status in an otherwise tangible and technical working environment.
Chapter 4 outlines observations of IMTs conducted during mine emergency simulations and
reveals that non-technical issues can influence decision-making in emergency exercises. The
mechanisms by which they appear to have impacted decision-making are discussed. However,
several non-technical issues that would be expected in a multiple-fatality incident were not
observed highlighting potential di↵erences between the emergency environment created in an
exercise versus real-life.
Chapter 5 describes conversational interviews undertaken with 25 miners who have real-
life experience in emergency management. The non-technical issues that they believe have
impacted decision-making in previous real-life IMTs are identified and explored. The narratives
provide a rich understanding of the emergency environment of an underground coal-mine and
the resulting physiological, psychological and social issues that impact the decision-making
process. The findings of this research are summarised by the development of a decision-making
non-technical issues taxonomy.
Chapter 6 outlines the broad definition of decision-making as it applies to mining IMTs.
The major findings discussed include the importance of maintaining e↵ective communication
to obtain and maintain situation-awareness of the incident and the emergency management
e↵ort as a whole; the causes and debilitating e↵ects that interpersonal conflict can have on
critical interpersonal communication; the impact of one’s own and others emotion and stress
reactions; the role trust plays in data validation and the need to care and empathise with fellow
workers to maximise the performance of the IMT.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Decision-Making
This thesis is concerned with understanding emergency decision-making in mining IMTs. Ef-
ficient and e↵ective decision-making following a serious incident at an underground coal mine
is critical to sustain lives and prevent further injuries or fatalities. Emergency management
and emergency decision-making are synonymous because decision-making is the critical perfor-
mance measure of emergency management [36]. However, several contextual issues mean that
a mining IMT is not a typical emergency management team such as those comprised of emer-
gency services personnel. In particular, the mining IC and IMT are inexperienced in managing
emergencies and are not rigorously trained or selected for their emergency management skills.
Each one of us makes many decisions every day. ‘Decision-making’ is a familiar task and
is common terminology. Yet, understanding how the contextual issues surrounding the mining
IMT may impact IMT decision-making, what constitutes IMT decision-making, and where its
boundaries lie, is di cult to define due to the cognitive nature of decision-making.
Exploring decision-making as a research topic requires more than assessing the outcome
of a decision because the outcome does not necessarily reflect the quality of the decision-
making process [67], and hindsight bias can easily distort a post-hoc evaluation of it [51]. A
positive emergency management outcome could be the result of good fortune, rather than
a good decision-making process; just as a negative outcome may be the result of something
unforeseeable rather than a flawed decision-making process [148]. This distinction is often
obscured. Further, evaluating a decision outcome in terms of being good or bad is based on the
evaluators perspective [184]. For example, the police at Pike River deemed the decision-making
process to have went well because no further deaths occurred during the rescue and recovery
stage [203]. This is a common evaluation criteria in the emergency services [183] but is unlikely
to represent a good outcome from the viewpoint of the families whose loved ones remain in the
Pike River mine.
The multitude of issues that must be addressed to understand IMT decision-making mean
that several bodies of literature have guided this research. These include the mining literature,
psychological decision-making literature, naturalistic decision-making literature, incident com-
mand literature including the design and development of ICS systems, the non-technical skills
literature and situation awareness literature.
The majority of the mining literature examining human behaviour in emergencies has been
produced by scientists at NIOSH in the U.S.A. However, only in the last 25 years have be-
havioural aspects been considered [20]. There have been calls made for further behavioural
and psycho-social research on decision-making during emergency management [112, 111, 20].
Decision-making and leadership issues encountered by miners who are underground in the
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‘first-moments’ following the discovery of an incident, such as an underground fire have been
examined [113, 30, 205, 202, 212]. Decisions in this case are about reacting to physical danger,
such as escaping [205, 20] and are therefore contextually di↵erent to IMT decision-making which
is isolated from the scene and personal safety is rarely an issue. Communication issues between
miners who are underground and those in decision-making roles has also been investigated due
to the criticality of making sure the messages received are appropriate, accurate and complete
[126, 127, 128].
One NIOSH narrative study captured the real-life experiences of mine veterans who had
experience in emergency response. These mine veterans observed that some leaders had expert
technical knowledge, but were poor decision-makers, and that the opposite was true of others
[211]. The mine veterans interviewed placed importance on factors such as teamwork, trust
and practice [211]. Other mining research has raised questions regarding the e ciency of col-
laborative decision-making during an emergency [198] and several decision-making techniques
have been highlighted to assist mining IMTs avoid common psychological biases [111, 198].
However, decision-making in the mining IMT remains relatively unexplored.
Much of the psychological decision-making literature is framed around a cognitive information-
processing model where information is sought, options are methodically analysed and a deliber-
ative comparison of alternatives results in an optimal choice [90]. Expected utility and rational
choice decision-making methods are examples of such methods [179]. Figure 2.1 outlines the
key steps captured by these decision-making processes.
 
Figure 2.1: Information Processing Model of Decision-Making
This understanding of the decision-making process aligns with the rational and analytical
decision-making processes promoted by the Queensland mining industry’s Level 1 reports:
‘each decision needs to be driven to completion. Techniques to capture ideas, gen-
erate alternatives and evaluate di↵erent options to allow for systematic comparison’
(2002).
However, many factors have been shown experimentally to impair this analytical type of
decision-making. In particular, there are robust findings that conditions of extreme stress and
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emotion impair decision-making because it reduces cognitive functioning [55, 70, 90]. Given
that stress and emotion are expected in a mining IMT, the literature as a whole suggests that
this analytical and process driven decision-making process, assumed by the industry to be
appropriate, is particularly vulnerable to non-technical issues [155, 117, 158, 67].
Furthermore, the psychological research these conclusions are based on are generally context
free, laboratory based and single-variable experiments, a condition unlike the real world [67].
The benign and short-lived stressors that can be induced ethically in a laboratory are unlikely to
replicate the intensity of those potentially experienced in a real mining emergency thus reducing
its applicability to extreme situations such as military decision-making [55] and potentially the
mining IMT. Therefore, despite the perceived advantages of adopting an analytical, comparison
based, decision-making process it seems this may do little to counteract the impact of some
non-technical issues.
It is idealistic to expect that the rational-choice process would be employed in the real
world [207]. The manipulation employed in many of the psychological experiments, where the
analytical models of decision-making have been used, may have actually influenced the type of
decision-making process used by the participants. The way participants made decisions in these
experiments may not have been the way they would normally have made them meaning that it
may be more realistic to study decision-makers in their natural decision-making environment
[122, 106, 2, 228, 142, 206].
The concept of naturalistic decision-making developed from a realisation that in some high-
risk industries, such as fire-fighting and the military, people make quick, almost instantaneous
decisions [102, 106]. The complexity of the situations and the speed of their decision-making
made researchers doubt that decision-makers were working through an analysis, weighing up
alternatives and making an optimal choice, as previous research had assumed. Further, the
decision-makers stated that they only considered one option and flatly refuted suggestions that
they were considering several alternatives and making a choice [106]. This initiated a research
program into naturalistic decision-making (NDM) processes [102, 104, 132, 183, 228].
Naturalistic decision-making researchers focussed on understanding how people make deci-
sions in environments categorised by time-pressure, high-stakes, ill-defined goals, dynamism,
ambiguous information, high-risks, multiple-players and organisational constraints [67, 1, 150].
Many models have been developed [121]. One of these is the Recognition Primed Decision-
Making Model (RPDM) , which is said to be representative of the decision-making processes
used by pilots, intensive care nurses, firefighters, o↵shore installation managers, naval o cers
and soldiers [91, 73, 67, 29, 30, 102].
RPDM is sometimes described as intuitive decision-making because people may not realise
that they have made a decision as no conscious cognitive analysis is conducted [14]. RPDM
describes a process by which experts use available environmental cues to recognise a situation
using their previous experience, and once the situation is recognised, a course of action is chosen.
If there is time available, the decision-maker may mentally simulate the outcome of this action,
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and if it is not suitable, a more appropriate action may be sought and simulated [106]. A
critical pre-requisite for RPDM is relevant technical experience to enable recognition of the
situation and mental simulation of the proposed solution. Feature matching and story building
are the two key diagnostic strategies used to recognise the problem [228] and experts normally
develop a suitable solution on their first attempt [107]. Studies have revealed that experts
rarely improve upon their initial intuitive solution if they undertake a subsequent analytical
decision-making process [14].
Researchers have suggested that apparently very complex analysis can be conducted by
experts without great cognitive e↵ort because experts can access an abundance of salient in-
formation gathered from previous experience and the environment [14]. This is in contrast to
employing analytical processes which require a large amount of cognitive e↵ort and working
memory capacity. These capacities are especially vulnerable to impact by non-technical issues
such as stress [14]. Naturalistic decision-making highlight that ‘Intuition is not a shortcut to
deliberation, but something di↵erent’ [14, p. 286].
Both analytical and intuitive methods of decision-making are equally valid methods of
decision-making depending on the circumstances and the decisions that need to be made and
However, taken to extremes, both are impractical for the real-world. A fire-commander spend-
ing time undertaking an analytical decision-making process may lose control of the fire, and
from a pragmatic perspective, the mining industry would not be supportive of IMTs basing the
re-entry decision on intuition alone. What the NDM literature suggests is that senior mining
personnel may have a natural tendency towards using intuition because of the implicit knowl-
edge that they have. The fact that many experienced miners at Pike River concluded, much
earlier than the o cial IMT driven by the police, that the missing miners had not survived
(rightly or wrongly) is an example of this [161].
Over the course of an incident decision-makers have been shown to use both analytical and
intuitive strategies [42], with experts potentially using analytical and intuitive strategies simul-
taneously [14, 52, 70]. Indeed, neurological and psychological research indicates that emotion
is an inherent part of the decision-making process [13, 179, 166] indicating that considering
intuitive and analytical decision-making as distinct and opposing decision-making processes is
potentially flawed. Essentially it has been agreed, that experienced decision-makers use a two
stage model. They recognise a situation and they take action. For experts, recognising the
situation means knowing what to do [101, 228, 106, 149].
Given the large number of decisions that must be made in a mining IMT, including the re-
entry decision amongst many others, it seems likely a number of decision-making processes may
be used at di↵erent times and for di↵erent purposes throughout the emergency management
operation. E↵ective crews modify their decision-making process to the situation [68]. This
means that prescribing or legitimising the use of only one decision-making method is poten-
tially detrimental to an IMT’s performance. Factors that can determine which decision-making
process is optimum include who is making the decision, their expertise, how familiar the situ-
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ation is, the time available, the risk involved, the resources available and the rules that must
be applied [73]. Flin et al (2008), has outlined four types of decision-making processes used
in industry when an unexpected incident happens: recognition-primed, rule-based, choice and
creative decisions. These processes range from being intuitive to analytical and require varying
levels of cognitive e↵ort. Faster decisions result from intuition or rules (recognition-primed and
rule based methods) and analytical processes (choice and creative methods) are time intensive
because various options are evaluated. At a coal mine, as in many industrial settings, there are
operational guidelines and procedures that dictate some decisions, for example, the methane
level in the mine that triggers an evacuation. Analytical methods are generally used when the
problem is more complex, there is more time, or if the person making the decision is a novice
and the problem needs to be worked through from first principles [68, 78]. In some instances
doing nothing is a decision.
The decision-making literature discussed so far only addresses the cognitive component of
decision-making. It seems that this is where many researchers see the decision-making pro-
cess begin and end [67]. Further, in the emergency management literature, most research is
conducted on people who are experienced emergency decision-makers. Neither literature fully
captures the di culties that the mining IC and IMT may encounter when making emergency
decisions.
However, managers of o↵-shore oil and gas rigs, often located many hundreds of miles from
civilisation, are in a similar position to a mine-manager when disaster strikes. They are not
trained incident controllers, they are isolated from conventional emergency services, they work
within a highly structured and risk averse industry that is inherently hazardous, and they
become the incident controller in the event of an emergency [118]. Research with o↵shore
installation managers revealed that most decisions made during emergency simulations resulted
from the evaluation of one option or used standard operating procedures; decisions were not
made by comparing alternatives [186]. It was however observed that they had to address sub-
goals as part of the process towards reaching the main goal [186]. The researchers explained
that decision-making ‘refers to the complete set of activities required to select and execute
actions, from information gathering and interpretation, via goal specification, to selection and
execution of courses of actions’ [186, p. 134]. This highlights that decision-making process in
such an environment may be broader than what is conventionally covered by decision-making
literature.
Another consideration for the mining IMT is that the decision-making is not necessarily
an individual process. The IC is responsible for the decisions but the incident management
team’s role is to help him/her make decisions by gathering and processing information for
him/her [68]. E↵ective decision-making relies on the teams’ collective understanding of the
situation and is highly reliant on communication to integrate information and team members’
interpretation of the situation [73]. Group decision-making brings with it additional social
issues that are not present with individual decision-making such as communication, pressure to
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conform, individual motives, opinions, attitudes, agendas, and di↵ering perceptions that must
be addressed to reach a team decision [73]. An understanding of decision-making in a mining
IMT must include these social issues.
A critical component of decision-making, is situation-awareness. This is often described
as knowing what is going on around you and is required before any decisions can be made
relating to the situation. Situation-awareness has received a significant amount of attention
in high-reliability roles such fire-fighters, nuclear power-plant operators, pilots and surgeons
[73]. Researchers have analysed how such people scan data monitoring screens or use their
senses to ‘size-up’ what has happened [60], However, unlike these industries, MEMS deliber-
ately distances the IMT from the response itself meaning that the IC has no direct access to
the situation or raw data that could help form situation-awareness such as a fire-commander
observing a fire or a pilot monitoring cockpit displays. This means that although the IC is a
technical person, and the IMT is physically located at the mine-site, the processes used are
more akin to that of a remote command centre with senior o cials managing a large-scale
crisis. The IC cannot sense the situation or take action directly. The IC is dependent on the
IMT and others for information and to action his/her decisions. The IC’s situation-awareness
is wholly dependent on communication and others interpretations of the data. However, those
that supply the IC with information are just as unfamiliar with the emergency environment and
may also be psychologically and physiologically a↵ected by the incident. This has the potential
to influence their interpretation of the data and their communication skills.
The decision-making process in a mining IMT is much broader than previous decision-making
processes documented and is heavily dependent on the context [11]. The decision-making
process is more than the cognitive process alone. It is heavily reliant on communication and
consequently the decision-making process must include the social issues that are inherent in
the process of communicating, establishing collective situation-awareness and making team
decisions. This research considers the decision-making process to span from the time data is
initially gathered and communicated, through to the actioning of decisions, which incorporates
the demands and constraints placed on individuals from the emergency environment and the
inherent mining culture. The organisational, social and personal pressures [11] compound the
pressures of making a technical decision in an often technically ambiguous situation. Therefore,
the decision-making process in a mining IMT is a complex and highly coupled psycho-socio-
technical system.
The following sections discuss the issues believed to be critical within this process. This
includes a discussion of incident control systems and the relevant aspects of non-technical
issues that have been highlighted in previous non-technical skills research, namely: leadership,
teamwork, situation-awareness and communication. Given the focus on trust within previous
mining industry literature this is also included, as is emotion, following the police response-
coordinator’s assertion during the Pike River Royal Commission that ‘fatigue and emotion are
very di cult to manage’ [204, p. 1744].
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2.2 Using an incident control system in the mining IMT
Some researchers have suggested that a command and control structure is ine↵ective in emer-
gencies and that decision-making would be improved by implementing a flatter and more co-
operative structure [6, 210]. However, employing an incident control system to manage an
emergency is common amongst the emergency services and within Government agencies when
a complex or large incident needs to be managed. The incident control system (ICS) is es-
sentially ‘a bureaucratic system that requires certain conditions for it to work well” (emphasis
added) [21, p. 15]. The first incident control system was developed in the USA for use by wild-
fire fighters. These teams consisted of members who had worked up through the ranks together,
learnt from their superiors and formed strong interpersonal relationships by working together in
many emergency situations [103]. Therefore, the social and emotional skills developed through
this experience may be the certain conditions that are required for an ICS to work well.
It has been suggested that the ICS may not to generalise well to industries outside of that
for which it was designed [125] indicating that an ICS may not be particularly e↵ective for
mining incidents due to the vast di↵erence in emergency management experience between the
experienced emergency response teams the ICS was designed for and a mining IMT which has
little or no emergency response experience. For example the fire commander, for whom the
system was designed, has the following advantages over a mining IC: the fire-commander is an
expert in making decisions in emergency situations; he and his team are trained to deal with
emergency situations; he and his team have experience working together and making decisions
together in emergency environments; the emergency environment is familiar to him and his
team; the team know how they and their team-mates react in the emergency environment
and the ICS/AIIMS structure is used routinely. Aspects of these di↵erences may need to be
addressed before a mining IMT can benefit from the implementation of an ICS.
Interpersonal relationships between individuals and agencies involved in the response are
required for the successful implementation of an ICS [21, 184, 12]. In the emergency services
problems have been noted with collaboration and communication and with scaling the system
up to incorporate di↵erent agencies in large scale incidents when interpersonal knowledge or
training is absent [174, 21, 66, 154]. The incident control system was heavily criticised following
9/11 [48] , Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita [32, 125] where centralised decision-making
caused communication di culties and resulted in delays in providing assistance. This was
attributed to the command centre’s lack of situation awareness [215]. Indeed, if the system
can become ine↵ective within agencies where it is used frequently or practiced often it seems
inappropriate to believe the system alone, without the pre-requisite social skills and extensive
training, can solve the decision-making issues in mining IMTs.
The Pike River Royal Commission highlighted a number of issues that arose from the im-
plementation of ICS methods. The report claims the problems started when the police took
charge of the incident and filled all the IMT roles, including the IC, with police personnel [161].
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This led to critical decisions being made without the input of mining personnel. Sticking to the
hierarchy took precedence over e↵ective decision-making resulting in significant delays because
the approval of risk assessments was delegated to senior police personnel located o↵-site where
technical knowledge was generally unavailable until the police formed an independent technical
panel five days after the first explosion. A significant side-e↵ect of this process was the divide
it created between agencies which negatively impacted communication, trust, inter-agency and
interpersonal relationships.
In summary, the literature suggests that successful decision-making in a critical incident is
‘dependent not only on endogenous, situation-specific training of individuals, but also on the in-
terconnected exogenous factors associated with inter-team coordination and strategic response’
[1, p. 261] and that incident command systems are simply ‘an e↵ective set of principles for coor-
dinating the activities of well-trained and integrated communities’ [21, p. 14]. This means that
the implementing an ICS in a mining IMT, on its own, does not automatically generate better
performance. The incident control system is a structure alone, it does not decrease role con-
flict, work overload, role clarity, team task orientation, team coordination, team cohesion, team
pride or job satisfaction [125] and in some cases is believed to be detrimental to collaboration
[6], communication [215] and trust [82, 132] and lead to teams working towards their own goals
rather than the overall goal [132]. The incident management literature highlights skills such
as teamwork and communication as being critical for e↵ective emergency response within the
aviation, military, nuclear control, maritime, rail, health, fire services, and o↵shore oil and gas
industries [73]. Increasingly it is these social and cognitive skills, termed ‘non-technical skills’,
that are the focus of incident control training [45]. Given that critical decisions in a mining IMT
are made by people who are inexperienced at making decisions in an emergency environment,
and thus may be unfamiliar with how non-technical issues can impact their decision-making,
improving the industry’s understanding of non-technical issues may be the key to enhancing the
e↵ectiveness of MEMS and improving emergency management decision-making in the mining
industry.
2.3 Non-technical issues
In response to a number of aviation tragedies that were attributed to human error researchers
began exploring the non-technical issues that may be critical in a cockpit [220, 84]. The
philosophy was to make sure that the technical skills of the pilot and co-pilot were supported,
or even enhanced, by their psychological and social skills. A number of non-technical skills were
identified, and in the 1980s, cockpit resource management training was developed. Today, this is
called crew resource management and it is considered best practice for all pilots to receive such
training [8]. Following the success of crew resource management training in aviation, researchers
began identifying the non-technical skills considered important to improve work performance
in a number of other occupations with a low tolerance for error such as surgeons, anaesthetists,
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nuclear plant operators, and o↵shore installation managers responding to emergencies [46, 44,
71, 77, 147, 168, 180, 226].
From this body of research some key categories of non-technical skills have been found to be
relatively generic across these roles. These include decision-making, situation-awareness, com-
munications, teamwork, leadership and stress and fatigue management [73]. Other categories
of non-technical skills have been identified for other industries. For example assertiveness for
co-pilots in aviation, and understanding one’s own personal limitations in the case of o↵shore
installation managers [68]. Generalising across industries is inappropriate because of these dif-
ferences and because the categories are domain specific [186]. Consequently, the non-technical
issues specific to each workplace being must be identified and examined [45].
It has been recognised that, ‘The non-technical skills of an organisation’s emergency response
personnel are as important as their technical expertise and knowledge and application of emer-
gency operating procedures.’ [43, p. 255], and at a high level it can be appreciated that similar
skills may improve the performance of mining IMT. However, the categories outlined above are
broad and mean little without understanding what lies within them in the context of a mining
IMT. Given the assertion of the author that decision-making is highly dependent on issues that
arise in the psycho-socio-technical process of a mining IMT1, primarily situation-awareness,
which in turn relies on issues such as communication, teamwork, leadership and stress and
fatigue management, it is important to understand the details of each of these non-technical
issues.
In 2014 the NSW mine safety advisory board acknowledged the significance of non-technical
skills and rolled out an Action Learning Program addressing Associated Non-Technical Skills
(ANTS) [38] The program has adopted five of the generic non-technical skills identified by Flin
et al 2008: situation-awareness, decision-making, leadership, teamwork and communication,
with little tailoring to the mining context. The learning program is directed at normal opera-
tions but within the NSW mines rescue ICCS Guide it is acknowledged that non-technical skills
are required, in addition to technical skills, for the system to function [169]. Further, the QLD
mines rescue service have expressed an interest in adding non-technical skills training to their
existing MEMS programs. The current research, by identifying the details of the non-technical
issues relevant to IMT decision-making, will contribute to the development of such training.
2.3.1 Situation Awareness
Endsley defines situation-awareness as ‘the perception of the elements in the environment within
a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their
status in the near future’ [59, p. 792]. This definition incorporates three levels of situation-
awareness: Level 1 - perception, Level 2 - understanding and Level 3 - projection.
1The relationship between decision-making and the other psycho-social issues can be two-way, but when
decision-making is the outcome it is always dependent on having situational-awareness.
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Level 1 is essentially receipt of the data and is where most deficits are said to occur because
data were not available, data were di cult to detect/perceive, there was a failure to scan or
observe data or there was a misperception of data [60, 73]. Level 2 is where the observer makes
sense of the data using the interaction of existing schemata with knowledge and data [195, 194].
Level 3 is about predicting how the situation is likely to develop and requires higher levels of
cognitive processing than the preceding levels. It is also essential to stay ahead of the situation,
especially in environments such as coal mines, where implementing decisions can take a long
time [201].
Situation awareness is said to be the ‘cornerstone’ of decision-making [185, p. 3]. Essentially
there are two stages to making a decision: recognising the problem, and identifying a course
of action [152]. This implies that there are essentially two ways a decision can go wrong. The
interpretation of the situation can be inaccurate or the situation is understood correctly but
the wrong course of action is chosen [153]. However, in most cases a poor decision is the result
of inaccurate or incomplete situation awareness [152]. Optimal situation-awareness does not
guarantee good decisions or performance [6], but without situation-awareness the chances of
optimal decisions and performance are slim [61].
The ability to achieve and maintain accurate situation-awareness has been identified as a
critical non-technical skill in healthcare, aviation, the military, nuclear control plants, o↵shore
oil and gas [73], but the literature is divided regarding whether situation-awareness is a process
of becoming aware, or the end result i.e. the state of awareness of the situation [57]. This thesis
takes Endsley’s definition, where situation-awareness refers to the outcome [60]. Furthermore,
Endsley states that situation-awareness, although distinct from decision-making, is a key input
to the decision-making process [60]. Therefore, understanding how the mining IMT and IC
form situation-awareness is essential if IMT decision-making is to be improved. If situation-
awareness is accurate and can be acquired quickly, there is the potential for decision-making to
be improved [228].
The process of acquiring situation-awareness, is generally perceived as a cognitive process
requiring perception, senses, attention, comprehension, information integration and working
memory capacity to detect and process the cues from the environment to form an understand-
ing of the situation [61, p. 325] [151]. Situation-awareness is said to be a↵ected by attentional
issues, working memory capacity, long term memory, work-load and stress and that perception,
spacial ability and analytical skills are key to the acquisition of situation-awareness [60, 73].
Therefore, the problems generally associated with poor situation-awareness are those that limit
an individual’s cognitive capacity such as being tired or stressed [191]. Situation-awareness has
primarily been assumed to exist solely in the head of the observer [190] without acknowledge-
ment of the observer-world interaction that is prescribed by systems engineering theorists [194,
195].
The key reasons why much of the situation-awareness research carried out in other industries
cannot be directly applied to the mining IMT include that, firstly, most of the situation-
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awareness research has been carried out on professions, like pilots or surgeons, who can directly
perceive the data by scanning digital displays or by watching for a physical response. This is
not the case for the mining IC who is solely reliant on information communicated to him/her by
others. Secondly, the limitations identified by Endsley that impact the acquisition of situation-
awareness are generally only cognitive and include the interactions between working, short-
term and long-term memory and their experience. Thirdly, there is little account of the role
of communication in the acquisition of situation-awareness, or, fourthly, how communication
and situation-awareness may be a↵ected by social processes that may arise from the emergency
environment or the command and control structure.
To facilitate discussion of this topic, the roles of the IMTmust be clarified within the industry.
Despite the implementation of MEMS, this remains unclear. A variety of statements relating to
the IC being wholly responsible, the ideal decision-making process being collaborative, and the
need to stick to one’s own roles in the Level 1 reports and MEMS training creates a confusing
message. The Level 1 reports and MEMS training do not prescribe what takes precedence in
an IMT meeting: hierarchy, collaboration or distributed responsibility i.e. the IMT members
are responsible their own functional area but are aligned towards the same overall goal [18].
This is important in theory and practice because di↵erent methods of sensemaking are used in
hierarchical and collective data gathering processes [105].
The IC is at the apex of the hierarchy, according to MEMS, and is solely personally respon-
sible for the decisions made. Consequently, one would assume that he/she needs a complete
understanding of the situation. Conventional situation-awareness processes would dictate that
this means the IC should receive su cient data to enable him/her to achieve personal situation-
awareness to inform his/her decisions. However, in MEMS, the IC is provided with a group, the
IMT, to work with collaboratively to assist the IC make or approve decisions. The idea behind
this is to help the IC make optimal decisions by benefiting from the information, skills and
experiences the IMT members have. The team-members analyse the raw data outside of the
IMT providing the IC with richer information and lessening the likelihood of the IC becoming
overloaded [132]. However, their involvement suggests the decision-making is a team e↵ort, and
if it is collaborative, some level of shared situation-awareness is necessary if they are to assist
the IC make critical decisions.
This is in contrast to simply furnishing the IC with su cient data to make decisions or
simply chipping in on decisions relating to their functional area. A collaboration where the IC
is solely responsible seems inconsistent. It means the team’s involvement may not automatically
augment the ICs abilities because their role is unclear. Are they a collaborative team with the
equality that assumes? Do their responsibilities only extend as far as the boundaries of their
functional area? Or, are they working in a hierarchy and doing what they are told? These
situations are very di↵erent and elicit di↵erent social interactions. For example, it is well
recognised that those who are more junior or who have less status may be reluctant to speaking
up in a team [58], and if a team member feels he/she is accountable for his/her functional area
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alone, he/she will be less inclined to exert e↵ort understanding information to assist the IC if
the overall emergency management is the IC’s sole responsibility [182].
Unlike the non-technical skills literature, where the focus has been individual processes only
[73], it seems important to understand the processes an individual and a team use to acquire
situation-awareness because both may coexist in a mining IMT. The following paragraphs will
describe the individual cognitive processes involved in acquiring situation-awareness and then
the social and cognitive processes involved in forming team situation-awareness.
Individual Situation Awareness
Endsley’s work remains relevant to the mining IMT, because each IMT member, including the
IC, will form some understanding of the situation by cognitively processing existing schemata
from their long-term-memory alongside the information they acquire during the incident to
develop a mental-model of the situation. This internally focussed cognitive process is only one
small part of a broader process. Endsley would not define the broader process as situation-
awareness, but it is essential to the development of a mining IC’s and IMT’s situation-awareness
in real-life. The individual cognitive processes of acquiring situation-awareness (Level 1 through
to 3) will occur, but the data sources will be di↵erent from those assumed in the majority of
the literature, and they will be di↵erent for each IMT member and the IC. The IMT members
may have closer access to raw data (such as gas monitoring data) meaning that they must
gather data in what could be termed a hybrid-environment [138] where they must recognise
the situation from a mixture of communication and technology. However, the IC only has the
information that is communicated to him and this occurs in the IMT meeting itself. In this
environment the information will be a rich mixture of the facts, experiences, understanding and
interpretations each team member has made regarding some or all facets of the incident being
addressed. The information will not be isolated from the social interaction that occurs in that
meeting and the pressures the emergency environment places on this interaction. Therefore,
the data source for an IC, and for IMT members trying to augment their mental-models with
information from their team-mates, is a rich but interdependent and complex amalgamation of
facts and feelings shared by communication.
The acquisition of situation-awareness has often been defined in linear and deterministic
terms [195]. However, as with the problems that arose with assuming decision-making was
a methodical and analytical process, researchers struggled to explain how people could make
rapid predictions [195, 194]. An example of this is a fire fighter who knows he needs to get
out of a room and escapes just in time before it collapses, yet he cannot articulate why he
knew he must get out. Such examples indicate the potential subconscious nature of experts
situation-awareness.
The construction of situation awareness as potentially sub-conscious is at odds with an
engineering definition of situation awareness that ‘good situation awareness implies a high cor-
relation between actual and judged system states’ [100, p. 463]. The engineering approach
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views situation-awareness as the observer’s knowledge of an amalgamation of facts about some-
thing external to the observer; that is, situation awareness is something factual and driven by
the world and the things in it [196]. This understanding assumes there is an objective truth
independent of the observer.
This construction seems superficially logical because some data are factual (such as methane
levels) and it may appear that these facts alone can provide all the information needed to deter-
mine the appropriate actions to take without requiring any subjective interpretation. However,
this is too simplistic in the majority of cases because data is frequently missing or can be inter-
preted in a number of ways. Situation awareness therefore requires interpretation of data, and
is the outcome of an interaction between conscious and sub-conscious cognition and the data
obtained from the environment [190].
Situation awareness is not simply about the acquisition of all relevant and objective facts. As
with all knowledge, it is constructed by people. No two individuals will construct exactly the
same understanding of a given situation because of their di↵erent experience [190]. Situational
assessment is neither passive observation [190] nor simply the acquisition of the data. It is the
individual’s perception of the meaning of the data and what the individual predicts it means
for future events.
This interaction between the individual and the environment is understood to be dependent
on the use of schematas that experienced individuals have stored in their long-term memory
from previous real-life or simulated experience [60]. The mental-models they use are proto-
types rather than a representation of an exact and detailed situation and can therefore be
applied to di↵erent situations with similar attributes [60]. The cognitive processes involved in
using mental-models to achieve fast and accurate situation-awareness include pattern matching,
where an experienced individual recognises the situation by using stored memories of a similar
situation [228, 199], and, assimilation and accommodation, to integrate new information into
what is known [24]. Therefore, it is vital that the observer can adapt and update his/her
mental-model [208].
These mental-models facilitate the acquisition of situation-awareness by guiding the data
search (Level 1 situation-awareness), understanding the information that is returned (Level
2), and using this understanding to predict what might happen next (Level 3). This makes
sense theoretically, but in the real world, the process of acquiring and understanding the data,
on which the situation-awareness will be based, is not going to be as linear as the three level
approach suggests. The individual is likely to receive data that cannot be understood in terms
of mental-models, some data may not be available at the time it is required, other data will
be inaccurate or incomplete [101]. The IC must instruct others to look for more information
if it is needed, meaning that su cient data to form enough of a whole picture (mental-model)
is required to enable the determination of what information might be missing. Experienced
incident controllers in other industries are said to be able to determine if they are losing the big-
picture suggesting that ‘Situation awareness not only supports the construction of ‘the picture’
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but also assesses its integrity’ [190, p. 64] highlighting that situation-awareness is more than
the linear and deterministic cognitive process often described. Situation-awareness is actually
a cyclical and iterative process of taking action to look for information which instigates further
action to acquire more knowledge [195].
However, there is a fine line between conducting a guided information search, which is
said to be essential to acquire situation-awareness e ciently, and potentially biasing situation-
awareness by not considering all the relevant data or misinterpreting it. Problems can occur
if the observer has no mental-model, their memory fails them, they are over-reliant on their
mental-model and fail to look for data that may prove their mental-model incorrect, or if
they select an irrelevant mental-model and only seek data that fits this model resulting in
confirmation bias [60, 195].
In summary, when an individual receives data, it will be processed cognitively in an e↵ort
to understand the situation. In the situation-awareness literature, this data is expected to
be directly perceived by the observer i.e. he or she ‘sees/hears/feels/smells/tastes the whole
experience in terms of its meaning’ [194]. However, the mining IC’s raw data is communication
from others. IMT members will obtain data from communication with their own functional
teams and possibly some raw data, but they are reliant on their incident management team-
mates and each of their mental-models, skills and experience to achieve situation-awareness of
the incident as a whole if they are to collaborate with the IC and assist him/her with decision-
making. Therefore, a large proportion of acquiring situation-awareness requires a sharing of
some, or all, of the situation-awareness between the IMT members and between the IMT
members and the IC.
Team Situation Awareness
Team situation-awareness is more than simply the cumulative situation-awareness of each
team-member [157], but there are three di↵erent philosophies regarding what team situation-
awareness actually is, and how much is optimal. The first philosophy considers that the ideal
team shares situation-awareness, meaning that they all have similar situation-awareness around
certain aspects [60], the second considers that having shared situation-awareness is impossible
given the reliance on an individual’s knowledge and experience to develop their situation-
awareness. This means that situation-awareness is ‘distributed’ and team members only know
what they need to know about their own areas, and as long as it is compatible with the others’
this is adequate [195, 99]. Most recently however, it has been considered that a combination of
these two philosophies is most likely to be beneficial [25].
In any case, some shared, or at least compatible, situation-awareness within the group is
desired and this involves a process of sense-making. In a team, this involves synthesising
one’s own mental-model with respect to others’ [105]. This process is wholly dependent on
communication in the IMT. To share mental-models team members must share a broad mixture
of fact, interpretation, feelings, and evaluations based on the information available and their own
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experiences. The transference of such rich data is far more complex than the simple transmission
of data from one person to another and is part of the process of achieving su ciently compatible
mental-models on which to progress the development of the team’s situation-awareness and
the IC’s situation-awareness [99]. Consequently, the environmental and team factors that can
impact communication become an inherent part of the process of developing situation awareness
and making decisions, yet this has received little recognition in the situation-awareness literature
[17].
For the IC to benefit from the team’s technical skills, and their interpretation of the situation,
the IC must understand the rich information they can provide, not only gather facts. The
IC would become overloaded if he/she were to receive all the technical raw data to process,
therefore the IC must rely on the team-members to process the data and present an informed
interpretation. This means the IC must develop a mental-model that is aligned su ciently with
the information provided to fully comprehend the message.
Shared mental-models are needed to maintain tactical understanding of the operation and
the functions of the team-members [62]. However, in command and control, the overall hier-
archy places the IC in charge of the whole event, meaning that the IC needs an understand-
ing of the people involved, the broader teams and the responding-agencies which means that
he/she must maintain a more overarching situation-awareness than the team-members to co-
ordinate the teams and predict others’ needs [6, 155]. Essentially the IC is trying to maintain
situation-awareness over a number of environments [219] and maintaining this additional level
of awareness means additional demands on his/her cognitive resources [6]. It is recognised in
other industries that it is unrealistic to assume one individual is capable of managing a large
incident [6].
2.3.2 Communication
Communication is an integral part of forming mental-models that are compatible with team-
mates [157]. Therefore, communication is critical to developing team situation-awareness and
thus the decision-making process. In previous non-technical skills literature communication has
been recognised as an element of all other non-technical skills rather than being a skill in its
own right. Communication has been viewed as a transaction between a sender and receiver
[126]. Meaning that a message is encoded, transmitted and then decoded by the receiver to
access the meaning [73]. Thus tactics to improve communication have been based on making
sure the message is correctly transmitted and received. For example, the implementation of
two-way communication where the receiver recodes the meaning taken from the transmission,
and transmits it back to the original sender to check the meaning.
This aligns with the strategies previously adopted in mining. Mining researchers have devel-
oped the ‘emergency communication triangle’, which identifies three primary categories essential
for the communication of an incident: who, where and what [127]. And if circumstances allow,
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the secondary categories of miners, event and response should be transmitted [126]. However,
the message itself is only one aspect of getting communication ‘right’ during an emergency:
‘the right information needs to get to the right person at the right time’ [157, p. 478]. Four
common communication failure mechanisms have been identified; the information comes too
late, the content is incomplete or inaccurate, the information does not reach the key individuals
or issues are ignored until they become urgent [157].
Notwithstanding this, defining the ‘right’ information is essential. The information must
be accurate because a wrong decision based on faulty information may be irreversible [113].
The transmission of numeric facts or data may be adequate in some cases but frequently
more is required of communication than the receipt of data or facts if it is to support team-
cognition and create team knowledge [99]. The role of communication in the IMT is to
achieve shared meaning to ensure that the other person can understand the meaning in the
words/data/information/instructions [32]. Thus, communication is a critical component of
building team situation-awareness [157].
However, the communication process may be more complex in a mining IMT than has
been identified in other industries. Mining research has highlighted that during an emergency
response, miners use ‘who’ the information has come from as a determinant of its accuracy
[126]. The information giver’s experience, whether or not they are trusted and credible dictate
how ‘right’ the information is perceived to be [113]. This indicates that the message the receiver
takes from information transmission is more than the facts alone. These miners are using the
context surrounding the message, specifically in this example, who delivered it, as a component
of the message they receive.
The IC’s and IMT’s mental-models will be negotiated, explicitly and implicitly in the IMT.
Discussions will create meaning around the data and this meaning will guide the development
of situation-awareness [25]. How the information is presented during these discussions will
influence how the team-members assimilate and accommodate the information into their own
mental-models [6]. What a team-member says in the IMT is shaped by the individual’s mental-
model. In turn, what is said, is used by others to shape their mental-models and then what they
say will be based on their mental-model. This iterative process occurs until all team-members
mental-models become similar [98], or at least compatible enough to move forward [99].
Accordingly, in addition to factual transmission, what team-members say is critical to the
development of situation-awareness [228, 206, 157]. Information that is known by multiple
team-members will automatically be discussed more in the IMT than information that only
known by one team-member [9]. This means that how the individual imparts this information
is important. For example, using the same words as others in the group can support the
development of a shared situation-awareness [195]. In addition, social aspects such as trust,
honesty, self-respect and the norms of respectful interaction are also said to make groups better
at the sensemaking process [218] because when people become agitated they concentrate on this
rather than the task [217]. Additionally, team-members can adopt the mental-models of others
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without synthesising them with their own skills and this, along with some people’s tendency
to go with the majority [9, 205], can result in the teams’ situation-awareness becoming aligned
without much analysis resulting in team-biases such as groupthink [25]. Deviance tactics, such
as the implementation of a Devil’s advocate, can be e↵ective in alleviating this [170] but can
also lead to conflict issues [198].
Hierarchical structures such as MEMS assume that defining information flow helps decision-
making and in some cases this can be true [6]. However, problems occur when communication
up and down is inadequate and what is communicated is based on what people think those on
other levels of the hierarchy need, rather than what they actually need to know [141]. Team
members may filter out too much data making it di cult for the IC and other IMT members to
pattern match, detect inconsistencies and know what data is missing. Alternatively, they may
fail to pass on information because they believe it is inconsistent or irrelevant, yet it may be
a vital clue. Good communication outside of the IMT is also essential because any omissions,
miscommunications, ambiguity or errors can infiltrate the IMT via its members.
Flin et al (2008) proposed four generic aspects of good team communication; being explicit
to avoid any ambiguity; timing the communication appropriately; being assertive; and under-
taking active listening. Ambiguous information is problematic because it can lead to multiple
interpretations. If ambiguity is not recognised there is a risk that the receiver could falsely
assume that their interpretation of the information is the only correct interpretation [153] or
feed biases [228]. Ambiguity may also contribute to plan continuation errors because without
concrete evidence to support why something doesn’t feel right, or doesn’t match one’s own
mental-model, there may be a reluctance to speak-up [153].
Not speaking-up was an issue identified by the non-technical skills literature. On the flight
deck it is the leader’s responsibility to ‘establish the social climate in which crewmembers are
encouraged and expected to provide and receive information’ [92, p. 125]. The communication
climate in an aircraft is developed by the pilot briefing [153], and in swift starting teams, the
tone of the first few moments establishes this [227]. Behaviours that can reduce the likelihood
of people contributing include being treated in a rude manner [209] or being challenged too
directly [153]. ICs who interacted more with their teams than others were found to perform
better, indicating that the environment the IC creates is a key factor in determining the quality
of communication in an IMT [6].
Other reasons for communication failing in an emergency environment, include information
overload [73]. This means messages may not be heard due to the overload or the accompanying
stress, as people focus on their tasks rather than listening [172, 69]. Communication and
trust are reciprocal and are both required for good team communication [172, 82]. Emotion,
stress and mood can impact communication [160] with stress and emotion often leading to
data filtering either unintentionally but also intentionally. Team members may be reluctant to
pass on unfavourable data and emphasise good news, or they may alter information to make
themselves look better or filter the data more as time pressure increases [136]. This filtering of
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the data means that decision-makers are potentially accessing inaccurate or incomplete data.
2.3.3 Leadership
The activation of MEMS in the event of an emergency clearly places the IC at the top of the
command and control hierarchy. MEMS states the IC takes sole responsibility for the ‘entire
response’ [178, p. 7]. It is perceived by the Queensland mining industry, and was restated
by the Pike River Royal Commission, that the mine-manager will assume the role of IC in
Queensland, and according to the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act the mine-manager has
the statutory responsibility for the mine and all who enter it [40]. Therefore, it is clear that in
the event of an emergency, the mine-manager is a critical actor.
Incident control systems are usually implemented in industries where the IC is an experienced
emergency decision maker such as the military or the emergency services, where skills in making
decisions in dynamic, time-pressured and high-risk situations are developed through extensive
training and practice in real-life or in realistic simulations. However, mine-managers only have
limited relevant training and experience: they must only satisfy one relevant unit of competency
within their training; the MEMS course is not mandatory and is a one-o↵; multiple fatality
incidents are rare; Level 1 exercises are annual and only occur at one mine per year; and the
mandatory annual simulations at mines are less rigorous than the Level 1 exercises.
Mine-manager training does not extend beyond the physical preparation and organisation of
a documented system; ‘Establish and maintain underground coal mining emergency prepared-
ness and response systems’ [37]. The three critical elements of incident control, identified by
Flin from extensive studies in incident command, are not addressed. These are the social skills
to manage a team under emergency conditions, the individual’s ability to cope with stress and
the skills to make decisions under these conditions [68]. The only non-technical skill included
in the mine-manager qualification is the requirement to have knowledge of decision-making
processes. However, this requirement is very di↵erent to assessing the candidate’s personal
capacity for decision-making under conditions of extreme stress, whilst managing the teams,
the assistance agencies, mines rescue, assistance from other mines, the media, the families, the
police, the mines inspectorate, the government, politicians, and head o ce i.e. the reality of
being an IC during a serious mining incident.
The philosophy of using the most senior person on-site as an incident controller is not
unique to mining. In other high-hazard industries this is necessary because the emergency
services cannot be relied upon in their usual capacity due to the remoteness of the site, as is
the case for o↵shore oil and gas rigs, or due to the complexity of the industry, as is the case
at nuclear power plants. In this respect, the role of mine-manager is very similar to that of an
o↵shore installation manager. They are production oriented on a daily basis and become the IC
should an incident occur [45, 74], yet ‘cannot be said to be expert emergency managers’ [186,
p. 145]. In both cases, those who become ICs are there because of their rank in the company,
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not because of their emergency management skills [68].
The devastating consequences of assuming o↵shore installation managers had the inherent
characteristics to become a competent IC became apparent on July 6 1988, when the Piper
Alpha North sea oil rig exploded killing 167 people. The Lord Cullen report, an investigation
into the tragedy, highlighted the potential deficiency of having an IC that was not selected,
trained or necessarily made of the ‘right-stu↵’ to be an IC (Lord Cullen’s report 1990, as cited
in [76]). This report instigated an intensive research program to identify the skills and traits
required of o↵shore installation managers as ICs and how to improve their selection and training
accordingly [75]. The search for the ‘right stu↵’ precipitated research looking at the ideal
personality traits for an e↵ective IC. Better performance was moderately correlated to liking to
take charge, being sociable, tending towards making fast decisions, preferring abstract thinking,
and liking to analyse the behaviour of others [189, 187]. They also found that communication
and decision-making factors accounted for 70% of the variance in performance [74]. However,
overall the personality indicators were not significantly correlated with performance [76, 68].
Ultimately, the focus on personality could, at best, help the industry to ‘select-out’ those
mine-managers that are less likely to perform well as an IC, as is the case in aviation and
military, but the focus on personality does little to improve the skills of personnel. Therefore,
the focus on personality has generally been superseded by research addressing required skills,
because these are more accessible by training [59].
Since Piper Alpha, the selection criteria for o↵shore installation managers has been reviewed
[188] and competencies have been developed for assessing emergency management ability [186,
68]. At least one employer has developed training and selection criteria to identify o↵shore
installation managers that are ‘competent’ or ‘not yet competent’ in emergency command
(p67, D113). Table 2.1 lists the competencies identified. The determination of competency is
based on extensive training involving a week long emergency command skills training course,
several on-shore table-top training exercises, a major o↵shore incident simulation, and finally
an assessment based on another major o↵shore exercise. Throughout the process the o↵shore
installation managers are required to address the extensive feedback provided by a selection of
Royal Navy personnel and experienced ex-o↵shore installation managers who have also received
training (a summary of this process is provided in [68].
Leadership ability is a key component of an IC’s necessary skill set [75]. Yet the term
‘leadership’ is generally broad and unhelpful. In the words of Pondy, ‘Have we been misled by
the existence of a single term in our language to think that it reflects some uniform reality?’
[163, p. 224]. ‘Leadership’ means di↵erent things to di↵erent people and at best captures a wide
range of loosely related features. Statements such as the following, which is included in AIIMS:
‘the need to be capable of using sound leadership and managerial practices to implement their
strategies in the safest and most e cient manner’, explain nothing [65, p. 36]. CIIMS is slightly
more detailed it states ‘an e↵ective Incident Controller must be assertive, decisive, objective,
calm, and be a quick thinker ’ and ‘also needs to be flexible and realistic about his or her
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Table 2.1: Performance criteria for o↵shore installation managers
Ref. Criteriona
1 Maintain a state of readiness
2 Assess situation and take e↵ective action
3 Maintain communications
4 Delegate authority to act
5 Manage individual and team performance
6 Deal with stress in self and others
a The six performance criteria for OIMS, as cited in [186, p. 127]
limitations’ [26, p. 15]. However, there is little supporting research for statements such as
these.
Incident command researchers state that a leader in daily operations needs di↵erent skills
to that of an IC, and that traditional management techniques are irrelevant and potentially
detrimental to an emergency response ([115] as cited in [73]). Evidence suggests that leaders’
behaviours change as a situation becomes an emergency including communication patterns
[192] and decision-making processes [156]. Leaders in daily operations generally make objective
and consultative decisions whereas, during an incident, an IC tends to make subjective and
directive decisions ([115] as cited in [73]). This is in line with experts using intuitive methods
to make decisions quickly enough to be useful. The study of o↵shore installation managers
revealed that they were no exception to this and ultimately did not use the processes taught
and promoted by their industry [186].
It has been recognised that an IC’s interpersonal skills determines their e↵ectiveness [52].
Such skills are said to include ‘communication, flexibility, team-working, high-level decision-
making under pressure, and stress management’ [68, p. 46]. Managing one’s own and others’
stress and understanding how it impacts decision-making appears critical. Stress and emotion
are discussed in a later section of this report, but it is essential to highlight the specific stressors
the mine-manager in the role of IC is exposed to, as an individual, within the current Queensland
emergency management system.
Unlike ICs in most other industries the mining IC is unlikely to have experience in anything
similar since there has been no multiple-fatality incident in Queensland for twenty years. There-
fore, a mining IC is bound to feel more stress than experienced emergency commanders simply
because he/she will have had little exposure to the emergency environment [68]. Further, unlike
the emergency services the mine-manager has no alternate to take-over at the end of a shift. A
mine-manager in the role of IC is solely legally responsible for all decisions made during a mine
emergency due to his/her statutory responsibility in section 150 of the Coal Mining Safety and
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Health Regulation [39]. The IC is therefore personally culpable for any poor decisions whilst
retaining control of the mine, whether or not he/she is physically present or not. From a legal
perspective it is understandable why the industry seeks this unified command approach, but
it may be detrimental to IMT performance [119]. The accountability placed on the IC will
undoubtedly contribute to the IC’s stress levels [90, 89] because the IC will have to deal with
the legally assumed guilt and potentially fear the personal repercussions including individual
prosecution and the cost to career and personal reputation.
The hierarchy prescribed by MEMS may provide some sort of comfort to others, the ‘security
promised by a commanding leader” [215, p. 138], but this is misguided because the IC is most
likely to be inexperienced at managing an emergency. Furthermore, the hierarchy may result
in team-members shedding their responsibilities onto the IC, because the IC is of higher status
[36]. Task shedding is a common tactic used to cope with stress and is likely to occur because
team-members may also feel under pressure [108, 90]. The relationship between the IC and
the IMT is critical to successful leadership. Without followership, leadership is ine↵ective [87].
Therefore, factors that determine the relationship between the IC and IMT members are critical
to the success of the response.
2.3.4 Trust
Trust is an issue that has rarely been raised in non-technical skills research, but when it has, it
has been included as an aspect of teamwork. However, trust has received significant attention
in mining literature [113, 111, 82] and therefore seems worthy of separate consideration for the
mining IMT. Trust issues were identified by the NSW mining industry safety review as a critical
factor in determining health and safety outcomes [223]. However, worryingly ”debilitating
mistrust” [82, p. 19] was identified as one of the ”industry systemic issues” [223]. A subsequent
report commissioned by the Australian Coal Association Research Program noted ‘mistrust is
deep-seated at a number of mines’ [82, p. p4].
The 2008 report noted that a lack of trust has seriously impaired the ability of mine man-
agement and mine workers to work together, ‘the industry has a history of antipathy and
antagonism between workers and management (an us and them attitude prevails)’ [82, p. 19].
Reciprocal mistrust was noted between mine management and mine workers; mining companies
and the NSW mines inspectorate; trade unions and mines; mine-sites and their corporate man-
agement; contractors versus sta↵ employees; and long-term workers versus short-term workers.
These divisions and cliques were described as a ‘prominent feature’ of the NSW mining culture
at the time of this report [82, p. 47]. The tendency not to report issues to mine management,
deliberate non-communication between groups and widespread suspicion outline in the 2008
report could seriously impair IMT performance.
Trust has been highlighted by miners with experience in emergency conditions as necessary
to get people to accept instructions and information [211]. Miners have stated that the IC must
42
be trusted by both escaping miners and the incident command team, especially in the early
stages of a response [113], and mining emergency decision-makers have indicated that they rely
on trusting those who provide them with the information they base decisions their on [113].
The identification of such inherent mistrust in the industry, combined with statements re-
garding its necessity in emergency situations, is concerning because trust issues could potentially
worsen in an emergency. Mine workers trust in mine management decreases the more manage-
ment isolate themselves from the workers and also when workers feel that they are not being
heard [82]. The workers may perceive the formation of an IMT as doing just this. Secondly, the
deep-seated mistrust of the mines inspectorate has developed from the expectation of routine
prosecution for those who are in charge if a fatal incident occurs leading to the perception that
accident investigations are actually ‘de facto prosecution investigations’[82, p. 5]. During an
incident, such concerns are bound to increase, especially for the mine-manager.
Two types of mistrust were identified in Australian coal mines; motivational mistrust and a
mistrust of capabilities. Motivational mistrust refers to the belief that another person is acting
in a self-serving manner to the detriment of the team and is believed to be the most disruptive
because it leads to the breakdown of relationships. A mistrust of capabilities was defined as the
belief that the other person or team may not have the capabilities to perform what is expected
of him/them, but this is easier to resolve because it is related to capabilities rather than motives
[82].
There is no universally accepted definition of trust and it is a ”nebulous concept” [193,
p. 1] but often involves a notion of vulnerability [36, 194] i.e. the truster adopts a position
of vulnerability or risk with the understanding that the trustee will act in the truster’s best
interests. In a mining IMT the IC cannot do everything alone so must trust the team to act in
his or her best interests because it is the IC who is personally vulnerable if things go wrong. In
other words, the IC must accept the personal risk of delegating his/her fate to the team; this
is trust [134]. The more the IC trusts, the more he/she can benefit from the group’s collective
skills [41].
Trust can directly influence the amount of information shared because, in the worst case,
individuals or cliques at mines that do not trust each other can refuse to speak to each [82].
Further, a lack of trust in the mines inspectorate has meant information sharing by the mine
has been hampered by a fear of self-incrimination [82]. Therefore, with more trust, more
information is shared [88]. Interestingly, the reciprocal is also true; sharing more information
builds trust [134, 88].
Studies on trust in emergency response are ‘scant’ [88], however trust is imperative to good
teamwork [227, 153, 213, 68], performance [172], and enhanced group decision-making processes
[53]. Without trust, collaboration becomes di cult; work is unnecessarily rechecked, people
work independently and fail to delegate [53]. Often team-members become distracted by trust
issues, such as evaluating others’ behaviour, limiting the cognitive capacity available to focus
on the team goals [33, 134]. Mistrust can cause the collapse of sense-making [88, 25] and mutual
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trust and respect are believed essential to the success of an IMT [69].
Where there is mistrust collaboration can fail because people behave in a manner that is
not conducive to teamwork. Having trust can protect against collaboration failing because if
someone behaves in an unexpected manner due to an emotional reaction to the emergency
environment, and they are trusted, their behaviour is less likely to be deemed o↵ensive or
suspicious [41]. Pre-existing trust is not influenced by new emotions [56]. When trust has been
established prior to team formation, it is retained during an emergency. However, this can be
detrimental if the trust is misplaced, especially in a technical environment because it can lead
to assumptions being made that certain technical processes or tasks have been actioned when
they may not have [205].
However, if the IMT is formed quickly, and some individuals are unknown, they have to
presuppose trust because they do not have time to earn it. It is proposed that this is more of a
‘role’ trust than a ‘person’ trust [134]. Over time, trust can be established but a person’s mood
can a↵ect how much they trust someone [193] and when they are emotional, their evaluation
of who to trust or how much to trust can be a↵ected [56]. Angry people tend to trust less
than sad people [56], highlighting the potential vulnerability sad people may expose themselves
to in a serious incident or alternatively how angry interactions may escalate in a low trust
environment.
2.3.5 Teamwork
The typical definition of a team used in non-technical skills research is ‘a distinguishable set
of two or more people who interact, dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward
a common and valued goal/objective/mission, who have each been assigned specific roles or
functions to perform, and who have a limited life-span of membership’ [173, p. 4]. However,
the mining IMT is quite di↵erent to this team. Firstly, the IMT is structured hierarchically
and team-members are working in pre-defined roles and responsibilities, but these are not the
same as their daily role. Secondly, those in the team may know the other team members but
be unfamiliar working with each other in these roles. Thirdly, the seriousness of the incident
may mean other agencies become involved, and lastly, the team is working within an emergency
environment which is unfamiliar to them. The IMT therefore involves aspects of many di↵erent
teamwork research fields and also branches into the emergency management domain. In terms
of teamwork, the mining IMT could be described as a swiftly formed and ad hoc emergency
response team within a ‘team of teams’ [227, 174] where information is shared ‘within and
between teams, up and down a chain-of-command’ [12].
The most illustrative way to describe team-working in the IMT is possibly to explain what it
is not. It is not the MEMS system and it is not the task-work. Task-working relates to doing the
tasks without consideration of the team [23, 174, 172]. Teamwork refers to the social processes
that are needed to make a group of people come together as a team, or even a team of teams
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and includes the many social and cognitive issues that can impact team-members interaction.
Salas et al describe teamwork as ‘a set of interrelated thoughts, actions, and feelings of each
team member’ [172, p. 562] and includes aspects such as making people feel valued to encourage
their contribution [172], it is reliant on trust [172, 227], it is about how people feel about each
other and the task [73], yet the goal of ‘teamwork’ is not increasing the harmony in the team
it is about how to make better decisions [27]. Teamwork supports decision-making by taking
advantage of combined skills and knowledge, as described in the situation-awareness section,
and provides a mechanism to catch errors and provide back-up strategies such as monitoring
team-members for the e↵ects of fatigue or stress that could impair their performance [153].
Coordination is one of the critical social processes required for teamwork [174], and requires
an understanding of others’ roles and responsibilities [7]. This, when it becomes implicit rather
than explicit, can speed up performance as team members can anticipate others’ needs and
react earlier [7, 27]. Implicit coordination and the ability to read others relies on shared
mental-models about the team and the roles (in contrast to that of the incident) [27] and may
be reliant on the team forming an identity [73]. The most e↵ective teams are those that can
alter their behaviours, workload, processing and communication to suit the situation [152].
Collaboration is also required and relies on cooperation [172] but this can be hampered by
individual’s seeking to satisfy personal tasks rather than group goals [4], a tendency which is
more likely in inexperienced teams [73]. Collaboration and cooperation are necessary to dis-
tribute workload fairly [216], yet pure collaboration is rarely achieved, even in the emergency
services [4]. It seems especially unlikely within the mining environment characterised by ‘an-
tipathy and antagonism’ [82, p. 19] or within the constraints of an ICS, ”Greater capacity for
command and control is not synonymous with greater capacity for collaboration” [215, p. 137].
The cliques that are a ”prominent feature” of low trust mines, and the ‘us-and-them attitude’
between workers and management leading to groups not speaking to one another [82, p. 19]
have the potential to undermine the e↵ectiveness of a mining IMT because the IMT is reliant
on communication from mine-workers for information to derive their situation-awareness. Ad-
ditionally, conflict in the form of rude behaviour has been shown to reduce helpfulness, disrupt
cognitive processes and impact task performance of the recipient and the team [164].
Ultimately the mining IMT, needs to be e↵ective immediately, even if there is no social
sca↵olding to work with. Swift starting teams are said to be more task-focussed and the social
needs of the team members are of lower priority [227], and it would be fair to assume that this
would be the case in a mining IMT for pragmatic reasons. It is also what the duty card system
and MEMS promotes by the pre-definition of roles and responsibilities.
The component elements of teamwork are less obvious, and as recently as 2005 most re-
searchers were left wondering, ‘what is teamwork?’ [172, p. 558]. The response was the
development of the ‘Big Five’, the core components of teamwork; team leadership, mutual
performance modeling, backup behaviour, adaptability, and team orientation [172]. These re-
quire mental-models, mutual trust and closed loop communications as coordinating mechanisms
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[172]. Teams are more likely to be e↵ective if they have a shared situation-awareness of the
task, the task environment and the roles and skills that other team-members bring to the team,
thus highlighting the integrated and reciprocal relationship between the non-technical issues
discussed in this research.
2.3.6 Emotion and Stress
In response to questioning by the Pike River Commission, the police resource-coordinator indi-
cated a belief that emotion impairs decision-making, and implicitly, that ”objectivity” is both
possible and desirable in such situations:
‘you can’t a↵ord to have that sort of variable [emotion and fatigue] impacting
upon your decision-making, so you lift it up to have a degree of objectivity to ensure
the best available information is providing and contributing to the decision.’ [204,
p. 1727].
One of the major criticisms surrounding the rescue and recovery at the Pike River mine was
that the decision-making approval process was taken from the mine-site and delegated to police
o cers in the town of Greymouth and at police headquarters in Wellington, NZ [203]. The
police justified this strategy by claiming the need to distance decision-making from the emotion
and fatigue inevitable at the mine-site.
‘So as the response co-ordinator, fundamentally I set the strategic framework
and that’s been documented and is available to the Royal Commission. I set it
out determining the decision-making process and invest the decision-making with a
degree of physical and emotional separation.’ [203, p. 1638].
‘This was always going to be a challenge in this type of operation when people
were involved in the rescue of those whom they worked with and knew. Fatigue was
always going to be an issue, to be able to sustain the operation over a long period
of time. So when you put emotion and fatigue into one context you’ve got a real
cocktail of challenges. So you try and manage that by either sound structure or
process, a combination of both actually.’ [203, p. 1639]
The consequence was that decision-making was removed from the mining company sta↵
and other mining experts who had gathered at the mine and who were the most technically
competent to contribute to the decisions. In any mining incident, those who work at the mine
will be best placed to inform decisions from a technical perspective. They will also potentially
be those most emotionally a↵ected by it. However, the situation at Pike River highlights the
short-sightedness of eliminating highly skilled personnel from making decisions simply because
they may have emotions that could a↵ect their decisions.
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It is clear in the decision-making literature that emotion is an integral part of decision-
making, whether we are conscious of it or not [137, 114, 13, 124]. However, the belief that
emotion cannot be anything other than debilitating to e↵ective decision-making is common
in many industries [114, 197] and is highly prevalent in mining. The frustration and delays
experienced at Pike River suggest that it is not possible to eliminate emotion from decision-
making, even if it were considered to be desirable. This raises a few questions. What actually
is emotion? Where does stress fit in? How can emotion influence decisions? And, most
importantly, is it even possible (or desirable) to cut emotion out of IMT decision-making?
What is emotion?
‘Emotions are not appraisals, but a complex organised system consisting of thoughts,
beliefs, motives, meanings, subjective bodily experiences, and psychological states, all
of which arise from our struggles to survive and flourish by understanding the world
in which we live.’ [118, p. 100]
Emotion is a personal evaluation of one’s involvement in the person-environment interaction.
The environment includes the social world and the people in it. Emotion is not a fact, it is
not defined by what went wrong or the stressor itself, it is the person’s own evaluation of
their situation that results in an emotion. Therefore individual di↵erences are expected and
personality can impact the emotion felt [118]. Making an evaluation of the emotion someone
‘should’ feel, and the resulting cognitive ability they ‘should’ have is simplistic, and could
ultimately be to the detriment of IMT decision-making if individuals who can cope and are
removed, or who cannot cope are retained.
Lazarus’ list of fifteen emotions includes anger, envy, jealousy, anxiety, fright, guilt, shame,
relief, guilt, hope, sadness, happiness, pride, love, gratitude [118]. Mining IMTs are not immune
to emotion [110], and scenarios that could instigate all of these emotions could occur during a
mining emergency management operation.
Where does stress fit in?
The existing mining literature has acknowledged that stress is a critical factor in mining emer-
gencies [110, 111], yet also notes it has mostly been overlooked in training [109]. Lazarus
proposed that emotion is the super-ordinate term that includes stress and coping and that
emotion, stress, and coping are a conceptual unit [118, p. 37]. The coping process regulates the
emotions that are felt and motivation and appraisal mediate them by influencing the evaluation
of the person-environment relationship [118].
The definition that stress results from an evaluation of resources versus demands is well
established [177], and because stress is an emotion, it is the individual’s perception of this
evaluation, rather than any objective measure, that determines their stress level. Therefore,
stress is not necessarily directly proportional to the stressor, and the stress not the stressor
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guides actions [109]. A moderate amount of stress is beneficial as this can activate a state
of vigilance [90], yet too much stress can impair cognitive functioning [165, 116] or otherwise
impact upon decision-making processes [171]. However, even the act of making a non-routine
decision can induce stress [63].
The incident command literature outlines some of the stressors that ICs generally face during
emergencies that can impact their decision-making. These include: inaccurate data, incomplete
data, changing data, comprehending the information, di↵erentiating fact from rumour, infor-
mation overload, making and adapting plans, uncertainty regarding the severity of situation
and the length of e↵ort required, the media, the type of decision-making strategy being used,
company procedures, level of authority, bureaucracy, time pressure, seeing the injured, multi-
agency or inter-agency conflict and the consequences of error [45, 155, 158].
What could cause emotion in mining IMT?
A fatal incident is highly likely to trigger emotional responses. Initially, it is quite natural
for people to deny there is an issue, feel numb and struggle to function cognitively [118]. An
attempt to normalise the situation often occurs [131] and hope may be employed as a coping
mechanism which may have been the case at Pike River where many perceived the hope was
actually ‘false hope’ [161]. At Pike River, this hope quickly changed to sadness at the moment
of the 2nd explosion. Sadness is di↵erent to other emotions because coping by re-evaluating the
situation cannot work because sadness is a reaction to an irrevocable loss [118]. Compassion,
described as being in-line with another’s su↵ering and wanting to help can, ‘paradoxically, can
impair our ability to help.’ [118, p. 246]. Uncontrollable events where people are at risk have
generated the strongest stress reactions among rescue operation commanders [183], a situation
that is unfortunately representative of a serious mining incident. The impact of traumatic
stress has been acknowledged in the mining literature with a call to consider this in preparing
for mining emergencies [111]. However, there are potentially many other emotions at play in
a mining IMT that may be more subtle and less expected than those triggered by the horrific
consequences to others.
The increasing criminalisation of human error can cause stress because personal goals such
as not wanting to incriminate oneself may not align with the team’s goals [50, 49]. This is
particularly relevant to the mining industry where a fear of negative consequences is particularly
strong [82]. Accountability can be serious stressor as can fear, anxiety, conflict and rivalry [90,
205].
Emotion results from the evaluation of the person-environment relationship. The environ-
ment guides what the person deems as acceptable and places demands upon the way people
feel they should behave. Constraints include what is deemed punishable, time-pressure and
culture [118, 205]. In many industries there is a culture to suppress stress [160] meaning social,
cultural and organisational factors can contribute to stress [148]. The salience of the mascu-
line and tough norms of the mining industry will also possibly contribute to IMT members’
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evaluation of their own goals, beliefs and resources [118]. They may feel pressured to act in a
particular way. For example pilots can engage in risky behaviours because they feel the social
pressure to act as if they are knowledgeable even when they are unsure [153]. It seems highly
likely that the masculine culture of mining, could impact how IMT members choose to deal
with their emotion. For example, anger may be perceived as more acceptable than weeping
but anger is even more disruptive because it increases the propensity to blame others and can
cause conflict [56].
Anger results from the belief one has been unfairly slighted and it comes with social rules.
In some cases anger is seen as OK or even warranted, but not in other cases [118]. Where
anger has resulted from a ‘demeaning o↵ense against me or mine’ [118, p. 217] saving ego can
become the goal and result in relationship failure if the anger is not resolved [118]. Behaviours
associated with anger, such as rudeness, can result in others becoming emotional if the target
of the anger takes the behaviour personally. This may result in retaliation and further upset
[198]; they may choose to end their social interaction with the person [164]; or they may waste
valuable cognitive resources ruminating about the other person’s behaviour [33, 53, 134]. There
has been little research conducted on emotion in team performance [160].
How could emotion a↵ect the decision-making in the IMT?
Emotion can directly impact the cognitive process of making a decision. Emotion that is related
to the decision or its outcome, and emotion that the decision-maker brings with them to the
decision-making process, that may be unrelated to the decision, can both impact the decision
made [140, 133].
Emotion may be used as an input variable for the decision-making process, and this may
actually be rational, albeit not in line with the goals of the IMT. The rationality may be in its
alignment with the personal goals of the decision-maker. If there is personal fear related to a
particular outcome, this may guide the decision towards avoiding this particular outcome even
if it is not in the best interests of others [140, 139]. Decisions may also be made in a manner
that minimises expected regret [35] which implies a personal anticipation element and an aspect
of fear leading to self-protection [133, 176, 167]. It is also possible that emotion associated with
the decision can result in avoidance of making the decision altogether [3]. This is deemed to
be more of an issue when the decision-maker is aware he will be held accountable [182] and in
a mining emergency environment, with the ‘political pressure for mine-managers to be hung’
[82, p. 24] the drive to do nothing may be extremely powerful.
Decision conflict arises when the decision maker needs to balance losses with their own
self-esteem and reputation [89]. Their personal goals may not align with the team’s. Guilt
is a particularly influential emotion in decision-making because of the concern over one’s own
responsibilities [5]. Janis and Mann claim that when a dilemma involves serious losses and a
decision is required in a short time period this is the scenario where ‘thinking is the lowest of
all’ [90, p. 42]. This unfortunately describes the situation a mine-manager will find himself in
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if an incident occurs at his/her mine.
The e↵ects of stress on decision-making are well researched. Flin et al (2008) summarises
much of the literature on the cognitive e↵ects of stress by stating, ‘the negative e↵ects of
acute stress on cognitive processes can be: over-selective attention (tunnel vision), loss of
working memory capacity, restrictions in retrieval from long-term memory, with simple retreival
strategies being favoured over more complex ones.’ [73, p. 57]. Other issues include, reduced
working memory capacity [108], a lack of concentration, over-reliance on rules, susceptibility
to biases, flitting from one problem to another, an inability to prioritise, think ahead or work
on multiple issues simultaneously [68], the tendency to provide an answer before weighing up
all the alternatives, non-systematic scanning of information, temporal narrowing [96, 95] and
getting side-tracked more easily [97]. When individuals are stressed, it is associated with a
feeling of having lost control and it is common to try and redress this by finding an explanation
for the situation to regain a perception of control [79].
In addition to interfering with the processing, emotion may also influence the types of
decision-making process employed. For example a fearful and anxious individual may be drawn
towards more systematic and comprehensive decision-making strategies [140] which are more
impacted by a↵ect [55]. When stressed or fearful there may be an under-reliance on intuition
or when people are in a positive mood they may choose less e↵ortful cognitive strategies [136].
Generally, when people are stressed they will stick with using more basic processes [227] and
systems familiar to them [123, 85].
Emotion can also impact decision-making by a↵ecting an individual’s situation awareness.
Emotion may impact the information collected by limiting and biasing the information search,
or alter the interpretation of the facts because of a tendency to interpret information in a manner
that makes it consistent with the observers mood [140]. Similarly, the observer’s perception of
the situation is dependent on an evaluation of the expected success of the operation [183]. This
is significant because when leaders of real-life major emergency incidents viewed conditions as
favourable a positive outcome was more likely [184].
Further, given that the acquisition of team situation-awareness is dependent on communi-
cation and team interaction, emotion that increases the likelihood of team disruption can neg-
atively impact situation-awareness and decision-making. Emotional reactions can potentially
cause behaviour that increases conflict which can, in turn, instigate emotion in others. Overt
behaviours associated with emotion, and more particularly stress, that have the potential to
cause emotive reactions in others, include aggression, hyperactivity, anger, argumentativeness,
irritability, jumpiness, swearing, shouting and emotional outbursts [68]. Emotional reactions
that reduce communication can directly impact upon team situation-awareness. These include
freezing, withdrawing or becoming detached, apathetic, disengaged or focussing on retaliatory
thoughts [68] and often result from personality clashes [205].
This means that the way in which individuals cope with their emotion can impact situation-
awareness and decision-making. Although coping long-term following a mining incident is a
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relevant and worthy topic of research it is not the focus of this thesis. Coping in this case
means how people cope or deal with how they are feeling during the incident to enable them
to continue contributing to the emergency management operation. Their coping mechanisms
can in-turn influence the decisions that they make, and as explained above possibly influence
others. Janis and Mann identified five coping mechanisms; vigilance, un-conflicted inertia,
un-conflicted change, defensive-avoidance and hyper-vigilance [90]. The most e cient form
of coping in terms of decision-making is vigilance. Extreme hyper-vigilance is often termed
panic and does not normally lead to optimum decision-making in an emergency because of
the associated constriction of cognitive capacity, perseverance and errors of judgement [90].
However, previous mining literature states panic is rare [129]. Also of interest is that hope is
said to be required to maintain a state of vigilance [89].
Behaviours associated with defensive-avoidance coping include passing the buck to others
either up or down the hierarchy of a command and control system or ignoring the unfavourable
conditions of a decision they have made by bolstering the good points and ignoring the bad
[90]. This behaviour is particularly dangerous because the person or team who has made the
decision only focuses on the advantages of the decision made and dismisses any disadvantages
meaning that they are unlikely to undertake decision monitoring or a realistic post-hoc analysis
[3] and can fail to develop contingency plans [136].
One of the key issues the mining industry is likely to encounter, an issue identified in pilots,
is a failure to accept that stress impairs their performance [76]. Previous mining literature
has highlighted the benefits of individuals knowing their own stress reaction to enable them to
continue to make decisions [113].
In summary, emotion (including stress) is the result of an individual’s complex evaluation
of their place in a complex social environment and therefore emotions are a product of reason.
Emotions are based on personal reasoning at that time, and the situation can be re-appraised
to modify emotions. The strong perception that to be emotional means to be irrational, ‘a
lack of regard for other goals is what highlights the idea that emotions are irrational’ [118,
p. 220], is untrue. The mine-manager’s primary goal may be to avoid prosecution and therefore
may act in ways to minimise this risk. This is not irrational, but others may see it as such
because they do not share the mine-manager’s personal goal. Furthermore, emotions are not
unpredictable or necessarily guaranteed to negatively impact upon decision-making. Therefore,
an honest appraisal of one’s own, or others’ self-interests, goals, morals and personal strengths
and weaknesses may be more helpful than simply labelling all behaviours or decisions that do
not align with the team goal as emotional and irrational. It must also be recognised that stress,
in particular, can impact cognitive processing abilities and the way people behave, which may
impact decision-making directly or by disrupting communication and team-processes vital for
the acquisition of situation-awareness. An acceptance that it is impossible, and in many cases
unwise, to eliminate emotion or intuition from decision making may be a more e↵ective starting
point from which to explore mining IMT decision-making.
3 Level 1 Exercise Reports
3.1 Introduction
Level 1 emergency exercises have been conducted annually in Queensland since 1998. Following
each exercise a report has been published outlining the details of the exercise and providing
recommendations for improvement. These reports have consistently called for improvements to
decision-making in the IMT and most recommendations have outlined systems or procedural
based solutions. However, the recurrence of IMT decision-making recommendations, even fol-
lowing the implementation of systems (including MEMS and MRAS), suggests that the issues
that are detrimental to decision-making are not satisfactorily addressed by the current systems.
An examination of the Level 1 reports has indicated that the generic non-technical issues
identified in previous non-technical skills literature may be impacting IMT decision-making.
Table 3.1 below lists some comments made by Level 1 assessors that are indicative that non-
technical issues may be equally relevant to the mining emergency response context. This chapter
expands on this by examining the Level 1 reports in detail to understand the decision-making
problems that have been identified and to assess the role non-technical issues may have played
in them.
As a precursor to understanding the Level 1 reports, two issues that directly influence the
content of the reports must be highlighted. Firstly, the Level 1 reports are generally written by
assessors who are coal-mining personnel and are therefore not trained human-factors observers,
or experts in the field of decision-making. Many non-technical issues, which cannot easily be
observed, such as situation awareness, are naturally less likely to be included. Further, assessors
generally only see what they are looking for. If the assessor focusses on procedural issues, as is
likely given the nature of the industry, he/she may only recognise and make recommendations
regarding issues that are believed to be amenable to procedural solutions. Further, even if
the non-technical issues were recognised, the assessors may not appreciate the complexity and
interaction of them, they may find them too di cult to articulate or they may simply disregard
them as irrelevant and subjective.
Secondly, the Level 1 reports are written within the contextual constraints of the mining
industry in Queensland. The host mines sacrifice significant sums of money, in some cases this
has been millions of dollars, by halting production for a day to participate in these exercises.
This monetary loss may drive the reluctance to be critical in Level 1 reports to ensure continued
support from the industry for future Level 1 exercises. Since 2003 Level 1 reports have become
much shorter than those published previously due to increased pressure to publish the reports
soon after the exercises. As a result of these pressures, and the need to produce a document
relevant to the industry not only the host mine, the critical evaluation of performance at the
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Table 3.1: References to generic non-technical skills in Level 1 reports
Non-technical skill Relevant quotes from Level 1 exercise assessors
Decision-making Decisions not being recorded (1998, 1999).
Not having a clearly defined decision-making process (1998, 1999,
2002, 2003, 2005).
Groupthink evident (1999, 2002).
Best with only core IMT members (2003).
Situation-awareness Taking the initial decision/scenario or response as the only one and
not considering all alternatives (1999, 2001, 2003).
Failure to consider all the options available to them (2003).
Being reluctant or cognitively unable to redefine the scenario to the
correct one following an initial misinterpretation of the situation
(2003).
Communication Poor communications (1998, 1999, 2000, 2006).
Better communications between CRO and IMT required (2001,
2002, 2008).
Some communications not recorded (2002).
Vital information for decision-making not getting to IMT (2005).
Electronic communication went well (2007).
IMT not challenging IC, more input from IMT required (1999,
2001).
Informed the wrong family their next of kin was dead (1999).
Information to IMT was slow and not of high quality (2000).
Information flow needs to be improved (2005).
IMT in the dark (2008).
Teamwork Confusion regarding roles and responsibilities within the MEMS
(2006).
Rescue team not included in decision-making (2000).
Leadership Goals not clear (1998, 2002, 2001).
IC trying to set own goals (2003).
Better objectives need to be set (2007).
IMT needs to take control of all activities on site once formed
(2010).
Stress management Decisions are not driven to completion (2001, 2003).
Fatigue management Fatigue a↵ecting decision-making (2000, 2001, 2002, 2007).
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mine has decreased significantly. The focus on providing industry wide recommendations means
that authors avoid specifically commenting on poor performance. The recommendations are
context-free and are a generic industry-wide recommendation based on the assessor’s under-
standing of the problem and the strategy he/she feels could resolve the problem. However, given
the assessors’ inexperience with non-technical issues, the proposed solutions are not generally
based on academic theory.
For example:
‘Review training of statutory o cials (and other personnel who may be required
to lead in an emergency e.g. rescue personnel, leading hands) to include decision-
making, leadership, communication and accounting for personnel.’ (2008)
This recommendation looks relevant to this research but actually explains nothing of the
problem that prompted it. Its inclusion simply implies that inadequate performance was
observed in decision-making, leadership, communication and accounting for personnel. The
recommendation fails to recognise the complexity of the non-technical issues mentioned, and
assumes that a revision of training can fix the undefined issues.
3.2 Method
Thirteen Level 1 reports were examined, those from 1998 to 2010. The three reports from 2010
to 2013 have not been included in this review because the researcher directly observed the IMTs
in these Level 1 exercises. The reports each include an overview of the scenario, a timeline of
the exercise and recommendations for industry. The average length of the reports is 84 pages.
3.2.1 Design
Hundreds of recommendations have been made since 1998, including over 150 solely directed
at IMT processes. The recommendations are indicative of the methods the industry has im-
plemented and believe should be implemented to address the decision-making problems. The
recommendations were of limited value in detecting the role of non-technical issues because
they did not describe the issue that instigated the development of the recommendation. As a
result, the text and observations, rather than the report recommendations per se, were more
illustrative of the non-technical issues that may have influenced behaviour.
3.2.2 Procedure
The Level 1 documents were input into NVivo and a thematic analysis was conducted to
understand how non-technical issues may have impacted IMT decision-making. The coding
themes were the non-technical issues identified in the literature review namely: decision-making,
situation-awareness, leadership, communication, fatigue, teamwork, stress and emotion and
54
trust. Additional categories of assertiveness and personal limitations were added during the
analysis to reflect the content of the reports.
3.3 Results
A perceived lack of decision-making process is a recurring theme throughout the thirteen Level 1
reports. However, the reports do not explicitly identify that non-technical issues could influence
the decision-making process and only rarely imply their existence.
The coordinators of two Level 1 exercises, who edit the reports, added the folowing comments
acknowledging that non-technical issues can impact IMT performance (2002, 2005). However,
unfortunately the events that instigated these comments were not discussed.
‘There appears to be an assumption (perhaps industry wide), that because a per-
son holds a senior management position within an organisation, they must have the
skills necessary to act in emergency incident management. This is not necessarily
the case - and a number of the key skills were not always in evidence during the
exercise.’ (2002)
‘The discipline of emergency incident management is far more rigorous and
requires more structure and discipline than normal management. The application
is outside the normal routines and decision-making of managers. The technical
skills required become all the more important when applied during an emergency -
where time is always critical and stress, fatigue and personal responsibilities take
their heavy toll. Such circumstances are clearly outside the day-to-day managerial
environment in which people routinely operate. Their capacity to function may
therefore be hampered and the expectations of their position within the organisation
structure adds further pressure.’ (2002)
‘From an industry perspective, there continues to be a slow response to gathering
information that is available from the mandatory monitoring systems and eye wit-
nesses. This may well be due to what is being understood as the debilitating e↵ect
of stress on a person in such cases. This needs to be addressed as a matter of im-
portance in the same way as a structured approach is now being embraced. If people
are not able to adequately manage the psychological impacts of such an incident, no
amount of structure will succeed.’ (2005)
The information extracted from the Level reports that helps identify the role non-technical
issues may play in the mining IMT decision-making process is discussed in the following sections.
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3.3.1 Decision-making
Generally the recommendations propose structural and procedural improvements to the decision-
making processes; following a process or procedure; applying a decision-making system; having
a clear definition of ‘how decisions will be made’; following disciplined systems; clarifying the
decision-making processes; sticking to documented and formal processes; clarifying roles in
decision-making; applying discipline; and improving the structure and focus on the decision-
making processes. However, the decision-making process itself, despite being referred to fre-
quently, is never clearly defined.
For example:
‘Decision-making did not follow any formal process.’ (2003)
‘Decision-making process needs to be streamlined.’ (2002)
‘He informally attempted to follow proper decision-making process.’ (2006)
‘There was no formal decision-making process evident within the planning group
and the IMT.’ (2006)
‘Improve the structure of the decision-making processes without unnecessary for-
mality. Ensure that all personnel are aware of the ground rules for e↵ective IMT
operation prior to an incident being initiated.’ (2003)
‘There must be established a central, clearly identifiable, decision-making process,
based on risk assessment principles.’ (2008)
‘There needs to be a clearly defined decision-making and validation process in
place for all decisions, particularly those of the IMT.’ (2008)
The cognitive decision-making processes that are discussed in the decision-making literature,
are not addressed in the Level 1 reports. This may be because they are invisible to observers
or were not considered important. However, there is also a clear assumption that the ideal
decision-making process is an analytical comparison-of-alternatives model such as the rational
choice method.
For example:
‘Each decision needs to be driven to completion. Techniques to capture ideas,
generate alternatives and evaluate di↵erent options to allow for systematic compar-
ison (2001).
The decision-making process needs more focus and each option needs to be driven
to completion before allowing digression.’ (2001)
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‘There must be established a central, clearly identifiable, decision-making process,
based on risk assessment principles.’ (2006)
These comments reflect an underlying industry assumption that the only good decision-
making process is one that is objective and procedural, and that systematic analysis of multiple
options will enable the decision-maker to identify the optimum solution. Equally it is assumed
that poor decision-making is the result of not following through with such a logical and rational
process.
Recommendations made to improve the decision-making process included the implementa-
tion of a management structure. However, since the implementation of MEMS, decision-making
issues continue to be raised in the Level 1 reports. The recommendations now call for more
rigour in adhering to the MEMS process including an additional role within the MEMS system;
a process checker, indicating that the system is still seen as the solution:
‘The QMRS should investigate whether or not MEMS should be modified to in-
clude a formal role for a process checker and also the streamlining of the forms
used.’ (2007)
These post-MEMS recommendations are an extension of the previous assumption; that pro-
cess and structure are the key to good decision-making and that if only the MEMS system
could be followed more rigorously, decision-making would automatically improve. The recom-
mendations do not challenge the system, only the miners’ inability to stick to it.
The calls for observable decision-making processes are likely to be based on an understanding
that good decision-making should be process driven. However, it could also be the case that
the assessors’ desire for decision-making to follow an observable, pre-prescribed and well doc-
umented processes may be driven by the di culty of observing and assessing decision-making
when these systems are not in place. It is possible that when observers can’t determine what
the participants are thinking, from their behaviours alone, they are likely to recommend imple-
mentation of a process as evidence a process is occurring and ultimately, so they have something
concrete to observe.
However, just because the decision-making process cannot be seen does not mean it is absent
or that it is inherently less e↵ective or valid than an observable method. It is also possible
that this drive for observability stems from the understanding that if a fatality occurs, clear
accountability will be required for both an incident inquiry, and any criminal investigation [82,
49, 50], rather than a belief that increasing documentation of decisions actually improves them.
For example:
‘The lack of a formal recording system would be seen as a major discrepancy
in a Warden’s Inquiry in the process of determining true nature and cause as vital
information can be lost.’ (2006)
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The following quotes highlight the extent to which the documentation of decision-making is
promoted.
‘Far too much informal planning occurred with little or no documentation.’
(2006)
‘There must be e↵ective recording procedures, especially by the Incident Control
Team of any actions taken, decisions made or reasons/evidence supporting these
decisions’ (2006)
‘Verification of decisions, who made them, where they came from, and who should
receive them may be improved.’ (2008)
‘Ensure all instructions and decisions are formalised and recorded.’ (2008)
‘the decision-making process was not recorded’ (2006)
It is therefore possible that because pre-defined processes and verbal discussions about de-
cisions make them easy for assessors to observe, this has the potential to be equated to ‘good’
decision-making. The following evaluation of ‘good’ decision-making actually says nothing
about the quality of the decision-making.
‘It was good to see that, on several occasions, members of the IMT, other than
the IC, forced the decision-making process to be rigorous and not take short cuts.
On several occasions a course of action was decided upon, only to be overturned by a
late question, which then caused a shift in focus and initiation of a risk management
on a di↵erent scenario.’ (2001)
In the 2003 report the exercise coordinator made the following comment:
‘decision-making in emergency situations is markedly di↵erent to normal decision-
making processes. There is generally no time for proposing and assessing options
and so on. There is a greater requirement for clear information, accurate appraisal
of the situation, clear and positive actions based on a combination of facts and expe-
rience and all lead by the Incident Commander. This is not the time for courteous
committee interaction and management protocols.’
and he concluded the report by stating:
‘Decision-making protocols were of a traditional nature and not appropriate for
emergency situations. Naturalistic or Dynamic Decision-Making, as practiced by
professional emergency organisations, o↵shore oil rigs management and defence
forces should be utilised for mine emergencies’ (2003).
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This indicates an understanding that emergency decision-making is di↵erent to conventional
decision-making and that perhaps other methods would be beneficial. However, it seems that
the concept of naturalistic and dynamic decision-making were not fully understood. The asser-
tion contradicts what the IMT assessors actually observed in this exercise, because what they
stated indicates that the IMT were actually using a naturalistic decision-making process:
‘Typically an idea was proposed and agreement was sought. Generally this was
not a documented process. The lack of documentation reduced the ability to objec-
tively identify the issues and evaluate options.’
In addition, the assessors continued to say that the decision-making process did not follow
any formal processes, that it lacked integrity, that the informality of process contributed to
decision-making delays and that the decision-making process was very brief and not exhaus-
tive. In e↵ect the assessors observed a decision-making process that was more akin to the
naturalistic decision-making processes yet were calling for the typical structural, procedural
and documented decision-making process. The misunderstanding is evident because of this
contradiction within the Level 1 report but also because NDM and dynamic decision-making
are not processes that can be taught, as is implied in the concluding comment. Both these
methods are a description of what has been observed in previous research. It is possible that
this confusion was a result of the coordinator attempting to find a better overall solution but
not fully understanding the theoretical basis of NDM. Around the same time period, the fo-
cus of the recommendations was on replicating the emergency services processes, hence the
development of MEMS.
‘There is a further need to establish a clear organisational structure for the man-
agement of an emergency, including information gathering techniques, decision-
making processes and communication mechanisms. These are available within pro-
fessional emergency services organisations and should be reviewed and considered
for adaptation to the mining environment.’ (2003)
In no other years, did the Level 1 report highlight that there is any other valid way of making
decisions other than the rational choice method.
3.3.2 Situation Awareness
The reports described several instances where the IMT’s situation awareness was incomplete or
erroneous. Examples include: not determining the source of a fire; working on false information
regarding the location of a body; not recognising that there were ignition sources at a particular
location underground; and an IC being unaware that help had arrived from other mines and
the emergency services.
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Most of the comments coded to situation awareness were related to communication and were
coded to a sub-theme of ‘data gathering’. Data gathering is the lowest level of situation aware-
ness as defined by Endsley (1988) and the frequency with which related comments appeared in
the Level 1 reports suggests that this is either the most troublesome stage of situation-awareness
to acquire or potentially that it is the easiest to observe.
For example:
‘Greater emphasis and diligence must be placed on gathering information and
understanding, as far as possible, of what is actually happening, who is a↵ected
and what equipment is required. This will come from witnesses, rescue teams, gas
monitoring and other mine monitoring. This will then flow onto the quality of
decisions made and actions taken.’ (2003)
‘The break down in accurate communications resulted in decisions that may have
had catastrophic consequences e.g. the tube bundle monitoring system was always
operative and was providing vital data that was not utilised for over three hours.
A vehicle was dispatched underground on the belief that there was only 50ppm CO
present. This was simply the o↵-scale reporting figure of the sensor software. There
was in fact over 6% CH4 and 600ppm CO in the 703 TG when that vehicle went
underground. Interpretive analysis of the available data would have provided the
Incident Control Team with early warning of the development of a major fire, its
rapid propagation AND if left untended, there was a real probability of a second
explosion’. (1998)
Given that verbal communication is the primary source of information for the IMT, and that
it is this information that the IC and IMT will use to build their situation-awareness, it is dif-
ficult to arbitrarily create a distinction between recommendations and text targeting situation
awareness and those targeting improvements in communication or information management.
The term situation-awareness was used infrequently, but this absence is not indicative that
situation-awareness is not problematic, it is more likely because the distinction between gath-
ering information and situation-awareness is unlikely to be made by Level 1 assessors. It is im-
plicit in the reports that if the correct data reaches the right people then situation-awareness is
achieved. This is not necessarily true given the complex nature of deriving situation-awareness.
The recommendations made have consequently focussed on the improvement of, or imple-
mentation of, more processes to ensure data is not lost. Acquiring situation awareness, has
been portrayed in the Level 1 reports as a factual and objective process of gathering data that
is vulnerable to procedural failure, incorrect technical data or the unreliability of having human
beings conveying the messages. The recommendations related to improving the amount of in-
formation getting to the IMT, have generally involved computerising information management
systems.
For example:
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‘The communications interaction between the various operation areas needs to
be systematically organised such that all operational areas are provided with the
necessary information and updated regularly. Consideration should be given to un-
dertaking this electronically to minimise the disruption of phone calls.’ (2002)
‘Consideration should be given to the processing of incident information and
decision-making online so that all parties, including SSE and QMRS have all infor-
mation readily available.’ (2006)
‘Develop improved incident management aids for the Incident Management Team
to assist the application of a disciplined system for information management, record-
ing and decision- making.’ (2006)
The recurring proposal to use electronic data to minimise communication errors highlights
a disregard for any advantages the people within the systems could bring to the process of
acquiring situation-awareness such as sensing when information is being withheld, reading body
language, or simply obtaining more information through conversation and discussion.
The focus of these recommendations is on making sure every piece of information is available
and documented for view by anyone who could want it. This is essential to the extent that
technical data is used as the basis of technical decisions, therefore the data needs to be accu-
rate and complete. However, these systems only address part of the problem. Sometimes the
technical data alone, or that which is available, cannot reveal the situation by technical inter-
rogation alone. Data is often incomplete, ambiguous or potentially erroneous in the emergency
environment, and in many cases waiting until the data is complete would render any decision
useless.
The Level 1 recommendations do not address the social or the cognitive aspects that can
impact the formation of situation awareness when the data is not ideal. Further, technical or
electronic systems do not eliminate the cognitive issues that can impact situation-awareness.
For example jumping to the conclusion that the phones were o↵-line simply because they were
not answered (2002). Groupthink is an example of a social issue that was observed in 1999.
Issues such as these are not the result of missing or falsely conveyed information and are just
as likely to occur whether or not there is a system in place.
In addition to maintaining situation-awareness of the incident the IC must maintain aware-
ness of the emergency management operation itself. It is recognised in the reports that, in this
case, interpersonal communication is valuable:
Incident controller did not move between teams, this resulted in information
being lost and IMT making decisions on limited information. Suggest that between
formal IMT meetings the Incident Controller moves between teams both to gather
information and keep the teams abreast of the current details he has to hand. This
would also be an ideal opportunity to boost morale and keep spirits up that can flag
over long periods.(2008)
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The Incident Management Team must not become isolated from events. There
must be an area of refuge for decision-making and discussion, but the IMT itself
must circulate in order to gather information and assess how events and actions are
progressing.(2003)
Debriefing
A data source that has been consistently under-utilised in Level 1 exercises is collecting infor-
mation from the crew members who exit the mine immediately before or after an incident. The
purpose of this debriefing process is to gather first-hand data from those who may have seen,
smelt or heard something underground that could assist the IMT to understand the situation
underground.
For example:
‘Information from debriefing sessions to be incorporated into the decision-making
process. For example, the operator of the vehicle may have provided useful informa-
tion to assist that decision-making process (eg., the fire was relatively small, the fire
was actually 20m inbye 9 cut-through). Critical witnesses should be identified and
also de-briefed by IMT so that they can get a better understanding of underground
conditions.’ (2002)
The debriefing problems identified in the Level 1 reports include: people being debriefed as
a group; those who conducted the debrief asking poor questions; the information obtained from
the debrief not reaching the IMT; or simply that debriefing was not conducted. Recommenda-
tions arising from these observations include:
‘A protocol for this type of communication should be developed with sample ques-
tions. All questions asked should be read from a written copy so that the answer
options can be reviewed against the exact question.’ (2006)
‘Review the process for the debrief of mineworkers to ensure that relevant infor-
mation reaches IMT ie the ERZ controller from the longwall was debriefed several
times and the key information about a broken down vehicle in the maingate was not
identified’ (2007)
‘Dedicated personnel need to be assigned to the debriefing of underground eye-
witnesses and collation and communication of this information to the IMT.’ (2004)
These recommendations are clearly advocating more process and structure as the solution to
the debriefing issues. Yet improvements have not yet been observed. Debriefing failures have
been observed as recently as 2012.
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Validation
Accurate data is pre-requisite for accurate situation-awareness. Validating data has often been
overlooked in Level 1 exercises and as a result the following procedural recommendations have
been made:
‘ensure that we are dealing with accurate information and that all groups are
dealing with the latest and validated information.’ (2006)
‘There needs to be a clearly defined decision-making and validation process in
place for all decisions - particularly those of the Incident Management Team.’ (1999)
3.3.3 Leadership
Two leadership issues discussed in the Level 1 exercises include having a ‘dominant IC’ steer-
ing the IMT towards making the decisions that he wanted (1999), and an IC’s reluctance
to ask for assistance or advice from others (2002, 2006). Both behaviours have led to poor
decision-making, either directly or by impacting the information flow and the IMT’s subse-
quent situation-awareness.
The IC’s reluctance to ask for assistance or advice from others
The Level 1 reports highlighted that the IC is often reluctant to request help. Since 1998, the
reports have frequently recommended that IMTs engage experts such as the QMRS, the police,
skilled personnel from neighbouring mines and recognised gas experts. In one case the mine’s
own ventilation o cer’s expertise failed to be fully utilised.
‘The SSE was reluctant to involve the police at the start of the exercise and
request them to come to site. He maintains that police are only required for fatalities.
District Inspector insisted that police be called to site at 1.03pm’.(2006)
‘The application of the Ventilation O cers expertise into the decision process was
not utilised. The failure to recognise this vital aspect did not allow full exploration
of a range of possible mitigating options.’ (2002)
The dominant IC
Assessors noted that an Incident Controller in the 1999 exercise was not collaborating with the
IMT and essentially making the decisions himself:
‘The Incident Controller was dominant in the IMT. Team member opinions were
listened to by the Incident Controller but not always considered in any subsequent
decision.’ (1999)
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‘The Incident Controller led the decision-making process and only appeared to
use the IMT as a form of validation of his decisions.’ (1999)
There were also occasions when the IC’s behaviour was believed to have negatively impacted
the IMT’s situation-awareness:
‘Little evidence was observed to suggest that any other scenarios were considered
outside the Incident Controller’s original scenario’ (1999)
‘The Incident Controller had already developed a scenario that identified the ex-
istence of a fire prior to the formation of the IMT. The IMT subsequently confirmed
the Incident Controller’s hypothesis. Only limited validation techniques were used
by the IMT’ (1999)
‘The prioritising of information type and flow was almost solely determined by
the requirements of the Incident Controller. This resulted in the Incident Manage-
ment Team maintaining a somewhat narrow focus’ (1999)
It is unlikely that this was the only year such circumstances arose, especially as similar
observations were made by the author in a recent Level 1 exercise. It seems likely the limited
number of examples of leadership issues in the Level 1 reports is a consequence of moving away
from actively critiquing performance, especially as the identity of the IC would be apparent to
those in the industry.
3.3.4 Assertiveness
Assessors noted that the problem of a dominant IC was exacerbated by members of the IMT,
not challenging the IC. Why they didn’t challenge is speculation, but could be indicative of a
lack of assertiveness from team members. Equally, it could be because the IC did not maintain
an environment conducive to open communication, because the IMT members lacked technical
knowledge or any number of reasons driving the IMT to simply go along with the leader’s
beliefs.
‘Incident Management Team was disinclined to challenge assertions and strate-
gies adopted by the Incident Controller.’ (1999)
‘Incident Management Team members remained totally supportive of the Inci-
dent Controller throughout the entire conduct of the exercise. This may have resulted
in some opportunities being missed to explore alternative strategies.’ (1999)
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3.3.5 Communication
The IC almost solely relies on communication from IMT members to derive his/her situation-
awareness. The criticality of good communications has been recognised in the Level 1 reports:
‘Accurate information flows must be established to minimise decisions that may
result in catastrophic consequences.’ (2009)
Communication recommendations have generally emphasised physical solutions. When com-
munications were deemed to fail due to human error, implementing further systems was rec-
ommended. For example:
‘Electronic white boards (for recording), accurate mine plans, desktop space, com-
munication facilities-preferably with automatic call-forwarding of all incoming UN-
DERGROUND phone calls, video/audio recorders, secretarial /shorthand support
and security against intrusion are not just desirable - they are absolutely vital.’
(1998)
‘A systematic regime should be established for reporting and displaying moni-
toring information. Without systematic recording of information it is impossible to
e↵ectively brief external bodies or undertake changeover of key personnel.’ (2006)
‘Communications between the Incident Management Team and ‘eye witness’ per-
sonnel from underground needs to be accurate. Consideration should be given to
defining the communication flow in an emergency to prevent the ‘informal’ chan-
nels developing during an incident.’ (2003)
‘All instructions from the Incident Management Team should be in a written
format - verbal instructions are often misinterpreted.’ (2003)
3.3.6 Fatigue
The Level 1 reports indicate that fatigue can negatively impact decision-making by slowing
cognitive processes. However, this is an assumption based solely on observation. Slowed pro-
cesses could have resulted from other non-observable non-technical issues such as frustration,
hunger or stress. For example:
‘As the exercise proceeded through the night, the onset of team fatigue became
apparent.’ (2000)
‘The fatigue of the IMT became evident in the early hours of the morning and the
ability to make decisions and carry out analysis was demonstrably slowed.’ (2001)
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Fatigue issues receive a lot of attention in the mining industry, therefore it is possibly the
most commonly accepted non-technical issue. However, even so, it seems that a stigma remains
attached to fatigue. The statement below is almost apologetic for highlighting fatigue as a
potential issue:
‘Ensure the number and balance of the IMT is correct. This is by no means a criticism
of the Newlands team who performed admirably. It is more a question of fatigue
and how long a team should remain constituted until relieved.’ (2000) (Emphasis
added)
The solution proposed for fatigue was a systems approach:
‘A systematic process for evaluating fatigue should be implemented rather than
rely on the individuals to notify the Incident Controller of their status.’ (2006)
The means by which this could be operationalised was not detailed but designing a process
to evaluate fatigue in other people, outside of a laboratory context, to a reasonable degree of
accuracy is complex and unrealistic.
A standard (one-size-fits-all) fatigue management plan that sends people home after a certain
number of hours may not be ideal. The following statement acknowledges this but does not
consider that social and emotional factors would make it impossible to persuade half the workers
to go home if an incident involving people had occured:
‘It is di cult to make prescriptive rules for fatigue management that apply
equally to any emergency. However, the e↵ects of fatigue on the quality of decision-
making cannot be ignored. Fatigue management for an ICT should include:
• arranging for half of the ICT to go home to bed as soon as it is known that the
problem will take longer than a full shift to solve
• identifying a back-up person for each key person on the ICT
• members of the ICT admitting that they are tired and arranging a replacement.’
(2010)
3.3.7 Teamwork
Teamwork has broken down during Level 1 exercises both within and between the functional
teams, and at shift changeover. There are also several examples of confusion occurring between
the roles and responsibilities of the operations, planning and logistics teams. For example:
‘From the concentration of functions in Operations it would appear that in many
ways they were a de facto IMT.’ (2008)
‘Operations personnel carrying out what would normally be classified as logistics
functions.’ (2008).
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‘The new IMT personnel need not only to gain the information from the previous
team, they also need to maintain the momentum of the IMT and the group dynamic.
This is often best achieved through a staggered change-over. This staggered change-
over can commence as early as the 5 hour mark with the IC usually the last to change
out. The IC cross over may take up to 2 hours as the IC is often very di cult to
move on.’ (2001)
‘Three senior people made a number of decisions in isolation from the rest of
IMT.’ (2000)
‘Underground Mine Manager started to define his own goals.’ (2003)
Recommendations regarding better understanding of roles and responsibilities have generally
been proposed as the solution to teamwork issues, as has training on the use of the MEMS
incident control system.
‘ICS - The personnel need to be trained in the functions required for the ICS
system to work. This training relates not only to the functions of an individual
but also recognition of the roles and responsibilities of others and the appropriate
interaction mechanisms.’ (2006)
‘The role of the QMRS within the IMT should be clearly defined e.g. formally
recognised as part of the decision-making team and/or advisory and/or implemen-
tation.’ (2006)
Interestingly, the favoured decision-making process appears to be reliant on collaboration
with the team, yet it has been stated that it is most e↵ective when only the core IMT members
participate (2003).
‘All IMT members need to be encouraged to actively participate in the decision-
making process.’ (2006)
‘It appeared that decision-making was most e↵ective when the IMT consisted of
only the core members.’ (2003)
The implementation of clear goals is another strategy employed to facilitate teamwork:
‘Additionally, the exercise highlighted the critical need for Incident Management
Teams, Duty Systems and aided rescue agencies such as the Mines Rescue Services
to set clear, complementary and unambiguous goals and objectives, establish pri-
orities and tracking mechanisms for attaining such goals and to maintain a strict
discipline of process management throughout.’ (2002)
67
3.3.8 Stress
In terms of psychological stress within the IMT, no recommendations were made and there
were only a few references to stress within the reports. In one report stress was mentioned
as the possible cause of slow data gathering, and in another stress was reportedly caused by
miscommunication.
A number of possible conclusions could be drawn from the limited acknowledgement of stress:
• The level 1 exercises themselves were not stressful to the IMT members.
• The reports did not mention stress out of concern it would be taken as a criticism.
• The e↵ects of stress may not have been recognised by the assessors.
3.3.9 Emotion
There were very few references to emotional issues in the Level 1 reports. One of the few
acknowledgements that emotion directly impacted the IMT’s decision-making performance was:
‘Once the report was received that the fire was out the sense of achievement was
extremely evident and a detailed focus on the rescue of the missing contractors began
immediately. This relief and sense of purpose quickly dissipated on the receipt of
the report that the fire had re-ignited.’ ’From this point energy levels, focus and
the rationale behind the decision process faltered to a degree and at times erroneous
information communicated to the IMT with respect to the coordination of the rescue
teams did little to assist.’ (2000)
It is possible that because participants know that the exercise is not real, it is not conducive
to creating an emotional response. Evidence of this includes several comments such as:
‘The whole situation in the incident management room was surreal. There were
people in danger below ground and there was no sense of urgency and no firm and
hard decisions being made.’ (1999)
‘There needs to be more urgency in decision-making when retrieving persons un-
derground who are injured or have limited life support equipment available.’ (2006).
However, emotion is a broad category that includes many feelings. Frustration was mentioned
in the first Level 1 report: an assessor commented on the fact that communication with the
mines rescue service should be both forthcoming and sought from the IMT and that the lack of
‘information can, and did, lead to increased tensions and frustration and should be corrected’
(1998).
Level 1 exercises have not embraced the opportunity to have the IMT engage with people
who are undergoing emotional trauma. The IMTs have never been put under stress from
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those who have withdrawn from the mine and who have potentially seen mates injured or
killed and then undertaken a long, hot, arduous walk out of the pit. Only in the 2003 report
an assessor acknowledged the complexities of considering the emotional state of others whilst
working through the decision-making process and at the 2011 exercise, the exercise immediately
following the Pike River disaster, an actor, playing the mother of a miner who was unaccounted
for, arrived at the mine site. However, the only reference to this in the report was:
‘... the person fulfilling the role of surface security, for example, should be trained
to deal appropriately with a distressed family member, or be supervised in doing so’
(2011).
3.3.10 Trust
Trust was only identified in one Level 1 report:
‘Trust needs to be developed and accepted in certain areas, i.e.:
• QMRS to trust the mine personnel in their solving of mining issues.
• Mining personnel to allow QMRS to develop intervention plans.
• Mines rescue brigadesmen to trust the validity of direction from QMRS sta↵.’
(2007)
3.4 Discussion
The Level 1 reports have provided the industry with many recommendations over the years
with the intention of improving emergency management performance. Decision-making recom-
mendations are clearly motivated by the view that optimal decision-making is the result of an
analytical process whereby information is sought, options are systematically compared and an
optimum decision is made. It is assumed that an optimal decision will result from sticking to
a process. The recommendations have called for mines to pre-define a clear emergency man-
agement decision-making process detailing how decisions will be made, and then adherence to
these formal processes by applying discipline and maintaining the formality in the systems.
The recommendations indicate the industry is supportive of a collaborative decision-making
process by the calls to include all IMT members in the decision-making process. This is reliant
on many non-technical issues including the team’s communication skills and their willingness to
challenge the incident controller. However, the MEMS focus is solely on tasks; know your own
role, know your colleague’s role and stick to them. This is task-work, not team-work, where
people work collaboratively together [172]. Indeed, the prevailing attitude seems to be that the
human beings in the process can only harm it and their inherent non-technical skills are not
valued.
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The reports raise a concern that perhaps those being assessed in the Level 1 exercises may
be acting in a way that they believe will earn them ‘Favourable judgement of performance by
peers.’ One assessor commented that there appeared to be a ‘competition mentality’ in the
exercise which may impact on the behaviours observed, and in 2007 the report stated ‘In some
cases the Level 1 Mine Emergency Exercise is being regarded as a pass or fail test by mines
whereas, in fact, it is a test of the statewide response with an opportunity for an individual mine
to test, trial and learn about its own emergency response plan.’ (p5, 2007). It seems that over
the years, the true purpose of the Level 1 exercises, one of the legacies of the Moura disaster,
may be becoming forgotten.
The desire not to be overly critical in the Level 1 reports has driven assessors to list issues
with a positive bias. Many statements indicate that non-technical issues may have arisen,
but no detail is provided that could help others to learn. For example, in a section titled
”Positive points noted by assessors” the following statement is included: ”The absence of
friction between IMT members” (2001). Does this indicate that this normally occurs in this
assessor’s own experience? Similarly, in 2003 ”First signs of relaxation, maybe because of steady
state situation and first time that most information has arrived” (2003). Does this mean they
were stressed beforehand and it was a problem? And also in 2003, ‘There was never overt
conflict within the IMT, however, divided views did emerge that could have been reconciled’
(2003). Again, what happened and could the industry have learned from it?
The early Level 1 reports, from 1998 to 2003, included names of miners and the names of
the assessors, there was text about what assessors believed or felt, behaviours were critiqued,
subjective statements were made and overall the reports were more informative. These early
reports seem to be more in-line with the spirit of the Moura recommendations as they promoted
learning by discussing the issues that had gone wrong in context. Whereas, the recent Level 1
reports are sanitised and essentially only make generic recommendations. These recommenda-
tions only address the need for improvement but do not add anything to the readers’ learning
about what could go wrong and the specifics of preventing it.
Further evidence of a shift in priorities for the Level 1 reports is contained within the following
debriefing recommendation with a direct reference to incident investigations:
‘Develop improved debriefing techniques. This has application in incident in-
vestigations as well operational activities.’ (2012)
As a side issue, this confuses the purpose of the debrief and is only likely to make it a less
useful tool for gathering open and honest information during an incident if the association with
investigations is maintained leading to connotations of potentially incriminating oneself .
Further, from the researcher’s own experience within three recent Level 1 organising com-
mittees, non-technical issues have been deliberately omitted, or significantly sanitised before
inclusion in the Level 1 reports. Behaviours observed such as becoming stressed or emotional
have been omitted from the reports potentially to avoid insulting or embarrassing the individ-
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ual or showing-up the mine itself. This seems driven by an attitude that if anyone behaves in
anything other than a rational manner, it would be o↵ensive to point it out. For example, as
stated earlier, one IC was seriously blinded by confirmation bias. The reference in the Level 1
report was as follows:
‘At times the ICT appeared to be looking for information to confirm a view that
they already held, rather than objectively analysing the data’.
This statement does nothing to promote understanding or learning about decision biases such
as the fact that confirmation bias is extremely common, and does not only happen to ‘other’
people. Prior to the exercise this IC was highly aware of the psychological and social issues
that can influence decision-making, yet when immersed in the situation he did not realise he
was being controlled by a bias (personal communication). We all succumb to biases. To judge
is simply arrogance, and to omit details because of perceived judgement is to deny the industry
of good learning situations.
The absence of non-technical issues in the Level 1 reports reveals an under appreciation of
these issues by the industry, either deliberately or unintentionally. Thus, this opens up the
possibility that decision-making could be improved by addressing them. In the next chapter,
direct observations of the IMTs in the past three the Level 1s are discussed alongside observa-
tions of emergency simulations staged at MEMS training courses. This first-hand observation
is intended to improve understanding of how non-technical issues can impact IMT decision-
making.
4 Mining Emergency Management
Simulations
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to explore the role of non-technical issues in IMT decision-making at
underground coal mines. A review of the literature in Chapter 2 described the non-technical
issues that have been identified as critical to optimal performance in other industries along-
side others that may be relevant to mining. These include decision-making, communications,
situation awareness, teamwork, leadership, emotion and trust. In Chapter 3, an analysis of
Level 1 emergency exercise reports revealed that these non-technical issues may also influence
a mining IMT’s decision-making during these exercises. However, due to under-reporting of
non-technical issues in the Level 1 reports the impact on decision-making remains unclear and
under-acknowledged. Building on this, the current chapter discusses direct observations of
IMTs participating in emergency exercises to further explore the role of non-technical issues
play in IMT decision-making.
Pilot observations conducted for this research revealed the di culty of making meaningful
observations of non-technical issues. Decision-making and situation-awareness, due to their
cognitive nature, were particularly di cult to observe. Consequently, a mining specific ob-
servation template, a measure of situation-awareness, and a post-simulation semi-structured
interview script were developed to assist with, and augment, the data collection.
The observation template helped structure the observations collected. Using a template can
be a limitation because of the tendency for an observer to only report issues that fit within
the template [73]. However, the four categories in the template were broad and the researcher
was aware of this tendency and actively sought to identify all non-technical issues, not only
those included in the template. Using a template is an accepted observation method within
non-technical skills research [73].
The situation awareness measure was loosely based on the Situation Awareness Global As-
sessment Technique (SAGAT) method [59]. This technique was developed to assess pilots’ sit-
uation awareness during electronic flight simulations and involves the simulation being frozen
in time to allow a researcher to verbally probe the participant about their situation awareness
[61]. Generally, three probe questions are used that correspond with the three levels of situation
awareness defined by Endsley: perception, comprehension and projection [59]. The questions
are normally developed following intensive research of the task to ensure they are appropriate
for the di↵erent stages of the simulation [61, 146]. Due to the exploratory nature of the current
research, and that the observations were to be conducted during a real-life training exercise, a
highly simplified paper and pen method was used to probe the IMT members at various times
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during the mine-emergency exercise.
When possible, semi-structured interviews were conducted with IMT members after the
exercises to explore the role the participants believed non-technical issues played in the team’s
performance. The interviews also provided an opportunity to clarify the thinking behind some
of the behaviours observed.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
The participants were employees of the Queensland mining industry and were either attendees
of two MEMS training courses run by the Queensland Mines Rescue Service, or were employees
of the mines hosting the last three Level 1 exercises. All participants were typical of those who
may be required to take IMT roles in a real event. However, collectively, the groups attending
the MEMS training did not necessarily have all of the technical skills that would be available
at a mine-site because people from di↵erent mines attended the same course. For example, in
both MEMS simulations, the IC was not played by a current mine-manager or SSE because
there was no mine-manager attending these particular MEMS courses. In all five simulations,
all IMT members were male except for the scribes.
The study procedures were approved by the Human Ethics Committee at The University
of Queensland. Fully informed, written consent was obtained from all MEMS participants
but no consent was sought from those observed at the Level 1 exercises because observational
assessment forms part of the mandatory process.
4.2.2 Materials
The materials developed to facilitate the simulation observations are described below.
Mining specific observation template
Anaesthetist, surgeon and pilot behavioural marking scales formed the basis of the mining
specific observation template. These existing scales were designed, and have been validated, to
enable observers to rate non-technical skills in these professions [180, 224, 225].
These behavioural rating scales use a three level framework where the non-technical skill
categories are subdivided into elements and then into relevant behaviours. At the highest
order level (the categories), these high-reliability industries have common core non-technical
categories including teamwork, leadership, decision-making and situation-awareness [73]. These
categories are divided into three to five elements which are more industry specific than the
categories. At the lowest level of the scale examples of good and bad behaviours help raters
evaluate performance within a particular element.
73
The mining specific observation template adopted the common categories identified above:
teamwork, leadership, decision-making and situation-awareness. Lower order elements from the
existing templates were adopted if they appeared relevant to the mining IMT or were easily
adaptable [66, 72, 83]. However, at the behavioural level, most examples from the existing
scales were irrelevant due to their industry specificity. The full behavioural mining specific
observation template is included below in Table 4.1.
Situation awareness measure
The following three questions were designed to assess the participants’ three levels of situation-
awareness at particular times during the simulations:
• What are the key facts?
• Describe the current situation.
• What do you think could happen next?
Post-simulation semi-structured interviews
Two sets of questions were developed, one for the IC and one for the remaining IMT members.
Interview questions for IC:
1. What do you think you did well in terms of people and leadership skills?
2. If you did this scenario again what would you do di↵erently?
3. What people/social/psychological skills in IMT members would have made your job eas-
ier?
4. If you were in a similar scenario again what would you hope others would do di↵erently?
5. In general, what people skills do you think are important in situations such as this?
Interview questions for other IMT members:
1. What do you think the IC did well in terms of non-technical skills?
2. If you did this scenario again what should the IC do di↵erently?
3. What people skills in IMT members would have made your job easier?
4. What people skills do you have that you think helped you the most?
5. If you did this scenario again what would you do di↵erently?
6. If you were in a similar scenario again what would you hope others would do di↵erently?
7. In general, what non-technical skills do you think are important in situations such as
this?
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Table 4.1: Mining specific observations template
Category Element
Teamwork Team coordination (including team building and conflict solving)
Considers roles and responsibilities, requirements of teams, estab-
lishes open communication, gets feedback, allocates tasks and deals
with conflict.
Sharing information
Provides updates, clear documentation, communicates plans, lis-
tens to concerns, encourages input and ensures shared understand-
ing.
Collaboration (considering and supporting others)
Considers the condition of other team members, asks for assistance,
monitors others, acknowledges concerns of others and anticipates
the needs of others.
Leadership Authority and assertiveness.
Makes requirements known, leads, provides clear orders, motivates
team and speaks up when necessary.
Setting and maintaining standards
Leads by example.
Coping with pressure
Remains calm under pressure, takes responsibility, doesn’t freeze,
takes responsibility and does not attribute blame.
Prioritising, planning and preparation - workload management.
Discusses priority issues, orders tasks and distributes tasks accord-
ingly.
Decision Making Problem definition
Gathers su cient data to identify problem and discusses with rel-
evant people
Identifying and considering options
Considers options
Selecting options and communicating them
Considers risks of options, reaches decision and clearly communi-
cates it, makes plan ‘B’.
Implementing and reviewing decisions
Re-assesses situation and changes to plan ‘B’ if necessary.
Situation Awareness Gathering information
Recognising and understanding information
Projecting and anticipating future states
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4.2.3 Procedure
Familiarisation
Pilot observations were conducted to familiarise the researcher with MEMS and the mining
industry in the first year of this thesis. The researcher attended three MEMS training courses;
once as a participant and twice as an observer, and attended two emergency simulations staged
at mines. The researcher also physically went underground at two mines.
MEMS Observations
The MEMS course is held at a conference venue and is a five-day residential course. On
the penultimate day of training a day-long simulated emergency is staged that involves the
formation of an IMT and the functional groups that support it. In an attempt to replicate
reality a gas-monitoring simulation for the fictional mine must be interpreted by the team as
one aspect of maintaining situation-awareness of the conditions in the underground mine. The
IMT and the group members must communicate via telephone with actors who take on the
roles of underground workers, suppliers, company head o ce, concerned wives, neighbouring
mines, and the media. Further details of the scenario are confidential. The researcher attended
the three days of training prior to each simulation to minimise experimenter bias.
During the MEMS observations, the observation template, the situation awareness measure
and the semi-structured interviews were used. Prior to the simulations, the researcher set up
a desk where the IMT meetings could be heard and observed without being disturbed. During
each IMT meeting the researcher completed an observation template and upon completion
of the simulation, combined the key points into a single template. The course coordinator
completed a template at the end of each simulation to verify the researcher had not missed a
critical decision-point.
The situation awareness measure was provided to all IMT members at the same time. The
purpose was to determine if the IMT members all had similar circumstantial situation-awareness
at the same time. Further, a comparison of the IMT members’ situation-awareness with the
real situation could be made because the person operating the gas simulation informed the
researcher if significant changes to the gas simulation were made.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted immediately following the simulations with the all
five members of each IMT (the incident controller; the scribe; and the leaders of the operations,
planning and logistics groups). The interviews were conducted where the interviewees could
not be heard by the other participants.
Level 1 Observations
Permission was granted by the Level 1 organising committees for the researcher to attend three
Level 1 exercises as both a researcher and as an assessor. The researcher took comprehensive
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chronological notes to assist with the development of the Level 1 reports. Consequently, the
observation template was completed between IMT meetings and finalised post-event using the
comprehensive notes. Video and audio recordings were referenced if required for clarification.
The observations template was only completed at the most recent two Level 1 exercises. Cir-
cumstances allowed one structured interview, and one informal interview to be conducted with
the ICs following two of the Level 1 exercises.
4.2.4 Analysis
The completed observation templates and the transcribed interview scripts were input into
NVivo and a thematic analysis was conducted. The coding themes were the non-technical
issues identified in the literature review namely: decision-making, situation-awareness, leader-
ship, communication, fatigue, teamwork, stress and emotion and trust. Additional categories
of caring for others and personal strengths and limitations were added during the analysis.
The completed situation awareness questionnaires were examined for consistency between IMT
members and with the actual situation.
4.3 Results
The MEMS and Level 1 observations, the situation-awareness measures and the post-simulation
interviews are considered together in the following results sections. Each section relates to a
non-technical issue that emerged from the analysis.
4.3.1 Decision-making
As can be seen in Table 4.1, the decision-making category in the observation template comprises
of three elements taken from existing behavioural marker systems that indicate a three stage
analytical decision-making process may be observed. They include identifying options, selecting
an option, and reviewing outcomes. However, the observations revealed that this was the
dominant decision-making process because options were rarely considered.
With hindsight, to help identify decision-making processes, the researcher was initially look-
ing for overt discussion surrounding decisions and significant decision-points such as those that
would impact upon the safety of the miners underground or potential rescuers. However,
this pre-conception of what an emergency-management decision might look like also proved un-
founded. Most of the IMT’s time was spent trying to achieve and maintain situation-awareness.
However, the process of acquiring situation-awareness actually involved many sub-decisions
such as who should collect data, what type of data should be collected, and how this would
help identify the problem. These types of decisions rarely fitted the description of the ratio-
nal choice decision-making process prescribed and assumed by the industry and conventional
decision-making literature.
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Several decision-making processes were observed. The use of procedures was one. Examples
included the determination that evacuating the mine was not yet necessary because the gas
level trigger point had not been reached, and another was that regulations precipitated an ICs
decision to call the mines rescue service upon the discovery of people unaccounted for after an
incident. In all but one of the five exercises, the ICs adhered to their duty-cards or other pre-
prepared role checklists which gave them tasks to do. This checklist type strategy is employed
in many industries to guide the decision-making but these can introduce other issues. For
example, one IC completed his tasks in the order they appeared on the duty card, rather than
prioritising the tasks in order of importance. It was observed that the IC organised the next
shift to take over the response in nine hours’ time (part of the fatigue management plan) before
establishing the extent of the situation. Not having a strategy in place to deal with fatigue
issues has been heavily criticised in Level 1 reports, therefore it seems likely that this may have
driven the priority status of this task on the pre-prepared duty-cards.
Creative thinking was precipitated by the receipt of new information that there was an
individual missing in the underground mine. The situation was that there was a smouldering
mine vehicle (it had been on fire) in the main access route into the mine and it was maintaining
a condition of irrespirable air in the mine meaning that industry protocols dictate the mines
rescue service is required to conduct the search and rescue. However, the fresh air side of the
vehicle (between it and the mine exit) was safe and the IC was unhappy with the time it would
take to deploy mines rescue teams to look for the missing miner, so he decided to have the
smouldering vehicle pulled out of the mine to allow the mine-ventilation to clear the air in the
mine naturally enabling non-rescue personnel, who would be quicker to deploy, to undertake
the search. Some IMT members were initially opposed to the idea as they had been told by the
police-o cer that the vehicle should not be moved to preserve evidence for their investigation (a
man had died in the vehicle). The IC discussed his idea with the IMT coordinator, mentioned
it to others and at the next IMT assertively presented his solution to the IMT and the police-
o cer. The police-o cer agreed that improving the air quality in the mine, to potentially
sustain life, took priority over preserving evidence.
Due to the overt nature of this decision it was one of the easiest to observe. The IC received
information (that someone was missing underground), he considered his options - this was
done in series not parallel (i.e. the delay was unacceptable so he looked for a new option rather
than weighing-up both options simultaneously), he made the decision, he discussed it with
others but did not concur with their concerns about evidence tampering so he presented it to
the IMT and the police-o cer for approval. This one decision involves many of the decision-
making strategies outlined in the literature. It is one of the most analytical decisions observed,
yet was still more representative of naturalistic decision-making processes, where the situation
awareness is obtained and a suitable action identified. Several options were not compared and
contrasted in pursuit of an optimal choice.
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4.3.2 Communication
A mining IMT is reliant on good verbal communication to derive their situation-awareness and
discuss decisions. Verbal communications skills are vital for IMT members and those delivering
information to them. However, verbal communication was seen to fail on many occasions
resulting in reduced e ciency of the IMT and the emergency management operation as a
whole. Communication broke-down for a number of reasons including that people deliberately
chose not to speak; through errors in the transmission and receipt of information, including
information not being heard or processed properly; and communication being misinterpreted
or misunderstood.
Deliberately choosing not to speak
Of the ways communications failed, people choosing not to speak was most frequently observed,
and was the most disruptive to the IMT’s performance. It meant that some information was not
shared, concerns were not raised if there was disagreement and clarification was not sought if a
task was not understood. Examples of observations where people withdrew from communication
include:
• A team member’s body language made it obvious that he disagreed with the team leader
but he did not communicate this and only the leader’s point of view was considered in the
discussion. When interviewed afterwards he said he saw no point in speaking up because
of the personality of the team leader.
• A team-member in one of the IMTs stopped contributing to the IMT meetings. In
the post-simulation interview he did not state explicitly why he stopped speaking but
commented on the IC’s abruptness and how the IC didn’t pick up when team members
did not understand what was happening. Another IMT member believed that almost all
the IMT members deliberately stopped speaking-up in the meetings and only responded
to direct questions from the IC because they disliked his demeanour.
• There was a seven minute delay between the IC asking a team member to ask the mock
‘control room o cer’ (the person operating the gas simulation) for clarification of the
scale on a graph and him doing it. The team-member did not do anything else in the
seven minute delay and when he eventually asked for clarification it was prefaced with a
summary of his experience to explain why he did not understand the scale. He seemed
extremely reluctant ask for help and delayed the process.
• It was apparent that a team-member had information he wanted to tell the IC on a number
of occasions, yet he didn’t verbalise this. Instead his behaviour became belligerent over
time and he displayed a lack of interest in what the IC was trying to explain to him by
fidgeting and looking away from what the IC was pointing to.
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From the five simulations observed, the quality of the IMT communication seemed highly
dependent on the IMT environment the IC created, and how the team members reacted to it.
In two out of the five simulations the IC behaved in an arrogant and hostile manner and this
directly impacted the amount of information the team was willing or able to share with him. In
the three other exercises, the ICs were open to collaboration and these ICs were generally kept
better informed by their teams. However, one of these ICs was reliant on the team for technical
expertise meaning that perhaps his collaborative techniques were borne out of necessity rather
than preferred style.
Some examples of the behaviours observed that appeared to contribute to developing an
IMT environment conducive to e↵ective and e cient communication include:
• Establishing early that asking for clarification or for significant information to be repeated
is acceptable. In the initial IMT meeting the site senior executive asked the mine-manager,
who was the IC, to repeat details. The exchange was amicable and seemed to set the
precedent for future meetings.
• The IC used team-members’ names to ensure that the person, who the information was
relevant to, was actively listening.
• Visually focussing on a mine plan, rather than the other person, aided discussion and also
seemed to di↵use building conflict on several occasions.
• When IMT meetings followed the same process throughout the simulation, whereby each
IMT member was given an opportunity to speak, the IMT members did not interrupt
others which encouraged listening.
• The IC asked each team member, by name, at the end of the meeting if they had anything
else to share. However, even with this strategy some team-members did not share their
knowledge.
• At the end of each meeting the IC summarised the tasks each IMT member was expected
to complete before the next IMT meeting. He used the team members’ names to check
they all knew who was responsible for each action and waited on their recognition before
moving on.
• The IC encouraged input from the IMT throughout the meeting discussions, ‘can anyone
else see anything?’, ‘anything else we need to do?’
Some behaviour observed that hindered e↵ective and e cient communication in the IMT
include:
• Mobile phones being answered in the IMT. In one case the constant ringing of phones in
the IMT caused an IC to lose his temper and he requested no more incoming phone-calls
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from the control room. This contributed to the IMT’s poor situation-awareness for the
remainder of the exercise.
• The IC was unwilling to brief the QMRS upon their arrival at site building hostility
between the QMRS and the IC.
• Speaking too quickly and not allowing time for the data to be understood or recorded by
team-members, the scribe or the person marking up the white-board.
• Poor whiteboard management including the use of shorthand (confusion over the term
‘SS’), errors, poor layout, and forgetting to update it. In one IMT whiteboards were not
used at all.
The behaviours observed that appeared to impact the IMT environment reducing the team-
members likelihood of speaking up in the IMT:
• The IC attributed blame to a team-member when an action was not completed. ‘Why’s
that? Just piss poor planning on your part?’
• The IC called the IMT teams ‘malingering employees’ and shouted at the underground
team when data didn’t come through as fast as he would have liked.
• The IC prefaced the request for a risk assessment to be completed with ‘Make sure the
risk assessment doesn’t become a jolly’ indicating a lack of trust in their integrity.
• The IC raised his voice over others who were speaking about issues that he deemed
unimportant.
• The IC ignored ideas from team-members.
• The IC shouted ‘[NAME], put the fucking phone down!’ at a team-member who took a
phone-call in the IMT meeting. The team-member shouted back in retaliation.
• The IC openly and abruptly reprimanded team-members and criticised their performance:
– ‘You need to be clearer!’
– ‘OC wants spoonfed’
– ‘If you don’t catch it, write it down, don’t just sit there looking dumb.’
– ‘You should know this type of crap.’
Participants of the post-simulation interviews generally did not criticise or discuss the be-
haviours listed above. Only one participant stated that the IC shouting was ‘not ok’. This
possibly reflects an underlying belief that to talk about such issues would be petty and invalid.
When asked, the participants of the post-simulation interviewees described behaviours they
have used, or would suggest others use to maintain open communication in the IMT:
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• Be able to appease people to maintain communications when people are ‘cranky and
upset’
• Tone of voice is important - remaining calm
• Never put someone down, could have said ‘piss o↵ you idiot!’
• Be careful with words, use ‘we’ rather than ‘you should have’
• Speak to people in their own language
• Talk to some people di↵erently to others
• The way you communicate helps reflect whether you respect the person or not
• Don’t attack
One IMT member explained that team members should not ‘get carried away in the emotion
and drama’ and need to focus on what they are told to do rather than be ‘drawn into the way
[someone] said it’. He also explained that people should not become agitated with statements
sounding curt or people who are rude, abrupt or pissed-o↵.
All of the comments above, about maintaining cooperative and respectful communications,
came from members of a collaborative IMT. All spoke positively about the IC’s interaction with
the team; calmness, inclusiveness, thoroughness, his listening skills, his pleasant demeanour,
the value he placed on team members’ opinions, and the fact that he did some work himself. It
is interesting that despite seeing no poor behaviour they described it, yet all but one of those
who experienced hostile behaviour from the IC did not discuss it.
Another aspect of communication raised in the post-simulation interviews was, ‘what kind of
message you are sending when you don’t send a message?’ This statement was directed at an
IC’s reluctance to tell the underground workers who remained in the mine, why all non-essential
workers had been evacuated. Those left in the mine were obviously concerned and confused
but the IC refused to brief them increasing their frustration. Another participant criticised
an IC for not briefing all the members of the planning, operations and logistics groups. The
interviewee believed that if the IC had conducted such a briefing the teams would have had
more confidence in him.
During the simulation when IMT members stopped contributing to the IMT meeting, more
than communication was a↵ected. The IMT members appeared more focussed on the conflict
than the task. For example, swift glances were shared between IMT members each time one of
them was reprimanded by the IC and one team-member was observed making a fist behind the
IC when the IC was verbally attacking another team-member. In the post simulation interviews
one IMT member stated feeling disempowered in the IMT, and that if anyone was in doubt they
certainly ‘wouldn’t be game to say it’. However the team-member qualified this by saying that
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IMT members ‘should question the leader, even if they are having a rough day’. This indicates
that despite not speaking-up, rationally he knows that they should.
The discovery that this interviewee felt disempowered, and the observation that many of the
team-members’ focus was on the conflict, indicates that hostile behaviour from the IC may not
only stifle open communication but a↵ect the way people feel, think and perform. However,
from these observations alone, this hostility and its e↵ect on speaking up and conflict cannot
be generalised to a real scenario because people may act di↵erently when the risks to others
are greater and the benefits of speaking-up and contributing to the process are clearer.
Errors of transmission and receipt of data
Other communication failure mechanisms were more anticipated and included errors in the
transmission and receipt of verbal information such as not listening or misinterpreting or mis-
understanding data. Not listening included information not being heard and information that
was heard but not processed appropriately.
Communication failed because people spoke to people when their backs were turned, when
the other person was walking away, or when the other people were clearly deep in thought. For
example:
• The ventilation o cer discussed readings of 900ppm of carbon-monoxide with the op-
erations and planning coordinators. Following a visit to the control room he corrected
himself a few minutes later by shouting across the room that it was actually 600ppm. This
was altered on the planning whiteboard but not the operations whiteboard. Operations
continued to base their decisions on 900ppm for a significant time after this.
At other times information was misinterpreted, for example:
• An IMT member asked the storeman (an actor) if there was any silent sealer in the stores.
The response was, ‘perhaps you should check’. This was interpreted as an a rmative;
that there was some in the stores. This assumption spread to all functional groups when
in fact there was none in the stores and they needed to order some.
Sometimes the information transmitted did not have su cient context, the ‘why’ was missing
and this resulted in unnecessary work on the following two occasions:
• A decision was made by the operations team to clear out the chemical store for use
as a temporary mortuary. However, logistics had already ordered cold storage for this
purpose. Nobody outside of the operations team department knew why the chemical store
was being cleared out, and nobody outside of logistics knew that a cold-storage unit was
already ordered.
• The logistics coordinator was not told that the equipment and operators he was ordering
were to be used in a hazardous area, meaning that he actually needed to organise specialist
operators as well as the equipment.
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A general tendency not to communicate clearly often caused confusion, delays and frustra-
tion. This included issues such as mumbling, strong accents and whispering:
• Confusion arose over colloquial terms because the IMT consisted of people from di↵erent
mines. Two IMT members were talking at cross purposes about ‘product’ because they
each had a di↵erent interpretation about what ‘product’ was.
• The IC says to a team-member: ‘so you would keep in contact with crews regarding gas
levels’. The team-member did not do this. It is suspected that he did not recognise this
statement as an instruction.
• Upon the discovery of an incident, when the IC and others were deciding if they should call
all, or only some, of the mine employees to the mine (to leave provision for a subsequent
shift as per fatigue management strategies) the conversation was as follows: The IC asked
a team-member to call them all in. The team-member said ‘really?’. Some moments
passed. The team-member then said to the IC ‘so, are we getting them in?’, then after
another period of silence ‘so will we?’. The IC replied ‘so will we?’ and the team-member
then said ‘you’re the boss’. The IC then calls in all of the mine employees, without any
further discussion, despite the original team-member, and others, seemingly disagreeing
with him, but not managing to articulate it.
• A team-member came into the IMT room looking for a document that the IC happened
to be reading at the time. The team-member indirectly asked if he should look at the
document. The IC remained silent for a while, and then said ‘was that a question?’ After
a moment, the team-member asked again. The IC did not respond. The team-member
walked away obviously extremely agitated and without the information he required.
• The IMT was told that a fire was ‘under control’ however, this statement could be inter-
preted as the fire was out or that it was still burning but was contained. Similarly the
IMT were told that a body had been ‘recovered to the surface’, but this did not help the
IMT who needed to know where the body was. On both occasions the opportunity to
discuss these issues at the appropriate IMT meeting was lost. Time was wasted while the
facts were determined.
The observations above highlight the integral and reciprocal nature of communication with
teamwork, leadership, situation-awareness and stress. However, the observations also high-
lighted the vulnerability of verbal communication to both social and cognitive processes. The
communications issues discussed, despite perhaps sounding trivial, are extremely important
because verbal communication is essentially what links the functional groups together in the
MEMS and provides the IC with situation-awareness. If communication breaks down there is
no knowledge transfer, potentially leading to inaccurate or incomplete situation-awareness and
impaired decision-making.
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4.3.3 Situation Awareness
The observations are discussed below in sections relating to the level of situation-awareness,
that they best align with. However, it was found that these levels of situation-awareness are
not necessarily discrete. Most observations related to the first Level: gathering data, because
this took the most time and was a continuous activity to maintain situation-awareness of the
situation. An additional topic of being aware of the incident management team has been
included following comments received on the situation-awareness measure.
Gathering data
The acquisition of as much reliable information as possible, in as short a period of time as
possible, is crucial to the decision-making e ciency of the IMT. The fundamental knowledge
required in a mining incident is to determine if there are people involved, and if so, who they
are, where they are and how they are. Yet, in all three Level 1 exercises it took an excessively
long time to determine these facts. The minimum was three hours.
Given the isolation of the IMT from the incident site, often the best source of data is from
those who have exited the mine shortly before or after an incident has occurred. Yet, in all
three Level 1 exercises observed the debriefing process failed; the debriefing was conducted in
groups; forgotten about until a few hours into the response; and completed on paper but not
delivered to the IMT.
In one IMT situation-awareness was seriously impacted by the IC placing restrictions on
incoming calls from the control room. The IC said that he would initiate any requests for
information and as a result the IMT had very poor situation-awareness throughout the exercise.
Post simulation, this IC confirmed that he didn’t know what was going on outside of the IMT
room.
In another exercise the IC believed the incident to be something completely di↵erent to
the actual scenario. The IC had a preconceived idea and this guided his information search
and influenced how he interpreted the information the IMT was given. Three hours after the
incident started, as the search neared the site where he assumed the problem was, he stated ‘we
just need to check...’ , indicating that at this point he was still seeking validation of his theory,
rather than considering other options. The IC sub-consciously failed to recognise that the data
provided to the IMT did not validate his assumption. This was confirmed in a post-simulation
interview. This bias was exacerbated because no-one challenged the IC’s directives despite
the collaborative environment in the IMT. It was only when the suspected problem area was
physically reached by rescue-crews, and concrete evidence to support the assumption was not
found, did the IC and IMT realised their mistake. The IMT worked with the wrong scenario
for almost four hours. Within this time the potential for fatalities was not mentioned in the
IMT despite evidence that a serious incident had occurred being presented in the second IMT
meeting.
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During the post-simulation interview, the IC explained his perspective;
‘what you do is you’re looking, and your trying, it’s like trying to put a jigsaw
puzzle together and some are key pieces and some aren’t, and the key pieces are
the ones that were like shrouded and I was looking at some of these smaller pieces
that I was making them big pieces, but it’s very di cult because you get this much
information, and you’re trying to make sense of what you’ve got, and like I say, as
the events unfolded and some bits drifted away then the root to the cause becomes
clearer.’
This example highlights the interaction of biases that can drive ‘where’, ‘when’ and even ‘if’
data is sought, and then ‘how’ it is interpreted. Filtering of the data was a relatively common
bias observed, for example an assumption was made that an increase in carbon-monoxide
readings was from vehicles running close to the gas monitoring point, normalising what could
have been indicative of a developing issue. In another case, the IC’s previous experience, rather
than interpretation of the available facts guided his management of the emergency and this
delayed detection of an impending incident.
However, to complicate matters, a mining IMT can receive a lot of unsolicited information
so they must undertake some filtering to help them identify the current situation. In one post-
simulation interview an IC said that this was about ‘establishing the facts’ and ‘weeding out’
the issues and that this is a skill needed by an IC. The IC said that the amount of incoming
data was too much for him alone to recall and that he relied heavily on the scribe. In another
exercise the IC did not maintain a log and relied on his memory alone but as the incident
progressed he was unable to recall the detail he required.
Situation awareness was also impacted by tasks to collect data not being actioned by the
functional groups despite this having been being delegated. In one case, the IMT were making
decisions using the wrong data because no-one was assigned to monitor the gasses.
Understanding the data
Gathering the data is the first step in the decision-making process. The data, once gathered,
must be interpreted because without context and interpretation it is often meaningless.
For example, one IMT was told that all the gas monitors were reading the same high level
over quite a large area. The IC’s interpretation of this information lead him to instruct the
team to check if the readings observed were the maximum read-out value for the equipment. It
has been the case in other incidents that monitors have read the maximum read-out value when
a serious incident has occurred; the gas levels are either too high for the equipment to read,
or the equipment may have been damaged. Both could indicate an explosion has occurred.
On another occasion an IC requested historical gas data so that this could be compared with
sample results post-incident providing a normative level for comparison. This added meaning
to the otherwise context-free data.
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Another example of making meaning out of facts was when an IC instructed teams to back
calculate, from the data available, the possible area within which a missing miner could feasibly
be. In one case he suggested determining an envelope around where the man was last known to
be, to determine a search area. Later, a beep on the communications system from underground
was detected and it needed to be determined if this was a system anomaly or potentially the
missing man i.e. could he physically have reached the location where the beep came from.
Projecting the data
The projection component of situation-awareness was often biased because it was a simulation.
In all but one exercise, participants in the MEMS and Level 1 exercises assumed the scenarios
would quickly develop into a crisis prior to any evidence suggesting this. One IC confirmed
this, ‘because it was an exercise we were anticipating that we would see it get worse and worse.’
Only in one simulation did the IC behave how he believed he would react in reality. He
was focused solely on the resumption of coal-production and unlike others, was reluctant to
evacuate the mine or inform those underground that an issue may be developing. Observation
alone was insu cient to determine whether or not the IC had foreseen how the incident may
develop, but the situation-awareness measure revealed that the IC had predicted what may be
developing but chose not to share this with the IMT.
The situation-awareness questionnaires revealed that, in general, all members of the IMTs
in the MEMS courses had the same understanding of the current facts and what they meant.
However, there were minor di↵erences in when and how people predicted the situation would
develop. A comparison of participants’ situation-awareness with concurrent gas-monitoring
data showed that both MEMS IMTs were slow to notice changes and interpret them.
Situation-awareness of the incident management team
Leading an IMT involves leading the decision-making process and leading the people managing
the incident. This involves maintaining two types of situation-awareness; that of the incident
and that of those managing it. The situation-awareness measure highlighted this distinction.
One of the ICs used the situation-awareness measure to comment upon the IMT members in
addition to the technical issues. Comments included: ‘sta↵ will come together’, ‘team feels some
pressure’. ‘[team members] not always with the plan’. This indicated that the IC was aware of
his dual role of managing the team and the incident. Once he perceived that everything began
running smoothly, he wrote ‘team is on task’ and no further comments were made.
4.3.4 Leadership
The environment the IC creates in the IMT seemed to determine the level of support the IMT
o↵ered the IC. In both cases where the IC’s behaviour was hostile the IMT were unsupportive
and in one case rallied together in defiance against him. However, it cannot be claimed that
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one leadership style is necessarily better than another because there were also issues with
collaborative IMTs’ decision-making processes. These included team-members not speaking up
despite being encouraged to do so, discussions rarely being concluded and few decisions being
made and implemented.
Further, the utility of a certain leadership style seems dependent on the IMT members’
reaction to it. For example, when an IC swore at a team-member and the team-member shouted
back, both parties and the IMT resumed normal interaction immediately afterwards. However,
when another team-member was treated similarly by the IC he withdrew and failed to actively
contribute to the IMT from that point forward. The ICs behaviour was consistent, it was how
the team-members reacted to it that determined the success or otherwise of the team. Indeed,
the IC of the IMT that withdrew complained that his team were too compliant and needed to be
more confident. Therefore, evaluation of good leadership is subjective and successful leadership
is dependent on the team’s reaction to the IC’s behaviour and their resulting followership.
4.3.5 Teamwork
Following the incident where the IMT members seemed to rally in defiance against the IC, one
team member explained that he believed the IC’s behaviour led to stronger teamwork between
the functional teams. A similar ‘us and them’ situation was observed in a familiarisation MEMS
observation where two of the functional groups became competitive and started openly blaming
each other for the deficiencies in the overall performance. This indicates that intergroup conflict,
as well as interpersonal conflict may impact IMT performance.
‘Conflict solving’, an element of teamwork in the aviation behavioural marking system,
and adopted in the mining specific observation template, seems particularly applicable to the
mining IMT. The aviation taxonomy cites: keeping calm, suggesting conflict solutions, and
concentrating on what is wrong rather than who is wrong as behaviours that minimise conflict.
In contrast: shouting, withdrawal of cooperation and a strong blame culture was evident in
several of the mine emergency simulations.
The hierarchical nature of MEMS was observed to be potentially detrimental to teamwork.
Team-members were heard to say ‘you’re the boss’ on two occasions. In one scenario the team-
member seemed to want to o✏oad his responsibility and in the other scenario, it was possibly
to minimise conflict with the IC. This indicates that they were using the hierarchical nature
of the command and control structure to shed responsibility and avoid open discussion about
conflicting opinions minimising collaboration and many of the benefits of teamwork.
During MEMS simulations there was often confusion regarding the di↵erentiation between
the roles of the planning group and the operations group which was corrected by the MEMS
coordinator. This indicates that training is required if MEMS is to be implemented as it is
intended.
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4.3.6 Assertiveness
Due to the mining IMTs reliance on verbal communication, assertiveness issues are potentially
important. The observations of team-members not speaking up when they disagreed with the
IC or didn’t understand the tasks they were given indicates that assertiveness may be an issue.
However, it seems more likely that multiple issues drove the desire to stay quiet, including
the hostile IMT environment, fear of being humiliated, being overloaded, being observed by
assessors and interpersonal conflict.
4.3.7 Stress and Fatigue Management
Stress was observed as a result of: work overload; due to the constant ringing of phones in the
IMT; when delays meant that the response was not progressing; when people felt they were not
being listened to; and when they were spoken to in a manner that they felt was inappropriate.
An observation that may have indicated stress in the functional groups included a number of
team members gathered around a whiteboard discussing a pipework connection. The solutions
being discussed were not particularly technical and their behaviour was casual, ‘it’s so easy,
just go to Bunnings and get silicone sealer’. They all appeared to enjoy this discussion and all
jostled to contribute. They spent time working through di↵erent strategies and there was not
the usual break o↵ from the group observed in previous discussions. Their relaxed demeanour
and their reluctance to move on and deal with more pressing issues, may have been indicative
of them temporarily relieving their stress at this time. However, this could also have been the
result of fatigue, boredom or frustration. There was no other evidence of fatigue observed in
the simulations.
4.3.8 Emotion
Emotion resulting from poor social-interaction was the only emotion observed in the Level 1
and MEMS simulations. The petulant and uncommunicative behaviour of one IMT member
may have been an emotional reaction to the shouting, blaming and belittling tactics used by an
IC, or alternatively an emotional reaction to not having the required technical skills. Similar
behaviour was observed in team-members who were overloaded or who were not being listened
to.
Perhaps of more concern was the lack of emotion and urgency observed in any of the three
Level 1 exercises when there were miners unaccounted for underground, possibly injured or
dead. In one Level 1 exercise it was temporarily believed that one miner had been exposed to a
potentially fatal concentration of CO yet no urgency or emotion was apparent. In another IMT,
the fact that three miners may be dead or dying underground, was not mentioned in the IMT
at all. It is unlikely this would be the case in a real scenario, as one Level 1 post-simulation
interviewee explained, ‘we would all have been having chest pains. I mean it would have been
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absolutely catastrophic even the fact they were missing. And clearly we didn’t respond like that.’
4.3.9 Trust
Two statements made by an IC; ‘Make sure the risk assessment doesn’t become a jolly’ and
calling those working for the IMT ‘malingering employees’ possibly contributed to the IMT’s
negative reaction towards him. These statements possibly reveal more about the IC’s personal-
ity rather than actual levels of trust. However, it seems likely that these statements were found
particularly o↵ensive because they implied a lack of trust in the workers integrity.
4.3.10 Personal Strengths and Limitations
In the mining context, personal limitations must include a lack of technical skills and this is
an issue not addressed in previous non-technical skills literature because the decision-makers
have been assumed to be technical experts. However, mine-managers may not have the specific
technical skills required to make technical decisions in a particular incident and may be reliant
on their teams’ or external experts’ knowledge. The observations clearly revealed the inter-
relatedness of technical and non-technical skills and associated behaviours. For instance, a less
experienced IC had to be collaborative because he didn’t have the technical skills required and
wanted the security of his team standing by him should things go wrong. In the post-simulation
interview this IC stated that at one point he ‘probably panicked a little bit’ when he hastily made
a decision, and he acknowledged that ‘it was a big help having them [the IMT] contribute their
thoughts, and all of them challenging why this and why that’. He stated that this collaboration
helped him revise his inappropriate and hastily made decision. A team-member in this IMT
stated that in a real scenario this IC would need to be more direct and set clearer expectations
and another stated that if the IC had more technical skills he would have been more confident
in the decision-making.
A key personal strength or limitation appears to be self-confidence. This is likely to be at
least partially dependent on real and perceived technical skills. There is obviously the potential
to over and under-estimate one’s own skills but even for the most technically competent, the
combination of stress; fatigue; overload; an unfamiliar, rapidly changing and emotive environ-
ment; and the pressure of making life and death decisions, could seriously undermine their
ability, or their confidence in their ability, to apply their technical skills.
Confidence or over-confidence may have driven the behaviour of the two ICs who were
dismissive and disrespectful to their teams because they possibly believed they had the skills,
and were therefore confident that they could handle the incident on their own.
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4.4 Discussion
The observations revealed the over-simplification of considering situation-awareness and decision-
making as discrete categories, with a linear, one-way and dependent relationship between
situational-awareness to decision-making. Acquiring situation-awareness involved many sub-
decisions to direct data-gathering, to validate data, to understand data and to decide what
information was relevant. This is in line with Brehmer’s description of dynamic decision-
making where many decisions are made to maintain control, rather than to achieve goals, in
real-life situations [18]. Much time was spent in IMTs determining what data was required,
organising the physical collection of the data, understanding the data, monitoring changes to
the data, re-evaluating the meaning of the data and providing instruction to the team. As the
scenarios progressed, the IMTs often seemed to simply be trying to catch up with what was
happening in the mine.
If a linear process is assumed, from situation-awareness to decision-making, it would mean
that situation-awareness must be achieved prior to decision-making occurring. This then leads
to the question, ‘what is situation-awareness in a mine?’ If it is assumed that situation awareness
means working out what has happened in the mine, i.e. the details of the incident, in many
cases this would severely restrict decision-making. It could be said that no-one at Pike River
had situation-awareness during the rescue and recovery stage because it took two years to
determine what most likely caused the blast. This definition is therefore idealistic, and a more
useful definition, that would enable IMTs to make progress, is having an understanding of the
most likely current and future state of the situation underground with the recognition that it
is a dynamic state and interrelated with the sub-decisions made within the process of acquiring
situation-awareness.
Situation awareness is not binary, it is not a matter of having it or not, there will always be
some situation-awareness, and some decisions will need to be made before complete situation-
awareness is achieved. Decisions with high impact consequences, such as the re-entry decision,
require more certainty surrounding the situation-awareness than decisions of less consequence,
say those regarding potential contingency plans for a future time. For example, it is clear
that the re-entry decision is one where any uncertainty regarding the safety of the mine is
deemed unacceptable. Therefore, the acceptability of the level of uncertainty surrounding the
situation-awareness is a decision in itself and is determined by the severity of the consequences
of any decisions to be based on it. If no decisions could be made without complete and accurate
situation-awareness during a mine emergency response then few, if any, decisions could be made.
This may be an issue the root of the problem of delayed decision making. However, it must be
acknowledged that without adequate situation awareness there is only a slim chance the correct
decision and accurate, and conversely, complete situation-awareness does not guarantee a good
decision.
The observations exposed an assumption that the researcher had made previously from
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reading the mining literature, that there are only one or two ‘big’ decisions IMTs need to
make. Prior to the observations, this assumption overshadowed the recognition that lots of
‘smaller’ decisions must be made throughout the emergency-management, for example how to
achieve situation-awareness, and that therefore the relationship between situation-awareness
and decision-making is reciprocal. This means that the decision-making process in the min-
ing IMT, is not a singular and isolated activity within the IMT. It is much larger and less
constrained than was assumed because it is an evolving and social process that is reliant on
the technical, social and cognitive skills of the people within the IMT, and outside of it, who
contribute knowledge to the IMT.
The decision-making process was observed to be heavily dependent on communication, lead-
ership and teamwork to provide the IMT with su cient information to develop situation aware-
ness. The observations highlighted that communication is essential to the IMT process yet that
it was also the weakest link due to the prevalence of interpersonal and intergroup conflict issues.
Communication failure was commonly observed and this impacted IMT performance generally
by causing delays because information was either not exchanged or people did not challenge
the assumptions of others at the appropriate time. Not speaking-up resulted in confirmation
bias going unchecked for several hours. As a result, the issues of interpersonal and intergroup
conflict seem to require more attention than the previous literature would suggest because its
impact on communication can mean that data gets lost or delayed, biases can thrive and tasks
can remain undone.
Di↵erent decision-making techniques were observed including: following heuristic rules; fol-
lowing checklists and guidelines; and developing creative solutions. Detecting intuitive decision-
making from observation alone was di cult meaning that the lack of examples may be a function
of its invisibility, rather than being indicative that it does not occur.
A significant observation was the impact the IC has on the functioning of the IMT. When
ICs were cool and calm, so was the team and communication was more open. When ICs
were arrogant, and sometimes o↵ensive, the IMT generally failed to communicate and act in a
helpful manner. This supports previous research that rudeness can a↵ect helpfulness, cognitive
functioning and creativity [164], with the proviso that performance is dependent on the team-
members’ reactions to the IC’s behaviour [64]. However, a cool and calm IMT was not su cient,
on its own, to ensure an open and collaborative decision-making process because people still
did not necessarily speak-up. Similarly, an autocratic IC does not automatically lead to poor
performance as long as the team can resist the tendency to take the IC’s behaviour personally
and get on with the job.
Participants of the Level 1 exercises seemed to understand the purpose of exercise as a test of
the mine’s emergency response plan, and their own individual ability to stick to and complete
the tasks prescribed by it. At one Level 1 exercise, prior to the start of an incident, the
researcher observed one man ‘swatting-up’ on procedures. In all cases fresh mine plans were on
the IMT tables and the policies and procedures had been recently revised. The behaviour of the
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participants was characteristic of people showing that they were following due process and that
their documentation was su cient, rather than being representative of what would actually
happen if colleagues were missing. A similar issue was identified in the training of o↵shore
installation managers, they were assumed to be competent following experience in simulations,
yet the simulations only encompassed the use of company emergency management procedures
where ‘Time pressure, incomplete information, or life and death issues are not present’ ([186,
p. 130]).
Due to the fact that the observations were of simulations only, it is likely that some of the
behaviours observed were not representative of those that may occur in a real life IMT. For
example, in all but one case, the ICs and IMTs were trying to predict what tricks and twists
the scenario might entail rather than only using the available facts. In addition, no stress or
emotion was evident in the exercises as a result of the life and death nature of the incidents.
Therefore, it is clear that the Level 1 exercises did not have su cient psychological fidelity to
initiate all of the issues that may impact decision-making in a real IMT, evidenced by the lack
of urgency when people were missing and more than likely dying. This means that reliance on
the Level 1 exercises alone to determine the issues that may impact IMT decision-making is
insu cient. Thus the next phase of this research involved finding and interviewing the small
number of mining personnel who have had real-life experience in mining IMTs to provide insight
into the issues that they have seen a↵ect decision-making in real mining emergency situations.
5 Interviews: Real Mining IMT
Experiences
5.1 Introduction
The primary goal of this research is to determine the role non-technical issues play in decision-
making during the management of an emergency at an underground coal mine. Chapter two
examined related academic and mining literature; chapter three explored Level 1 mine emer-
gency exercise reports and determined the role that some non-technical issues may have on
mining IMT decision-making; and chapter four built on this by discussing the non-technical
issues that were observed by the researcher during emergency exercises. This chapter examines
data captured via interviews with individuals who have experienced decision-making during
real-life coal mining emergencies.
Twenty five men who have been involved in mining emergency IMTs were interviewed using a
semi-structured and conversational style interview technique to obtain a detailed understanding
of their experiences with non-technical issues during these events. A taxonomy of non-technical
issues is presented to summarise the findings and provide the basis for recommendations and
future research.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Recruitment of interviewees
Purposeful sampling [159] was undertaken to recruit individuals who had experience in a serious
real-life IMT as a mine employee/contractor, a mines rescue member or a Government repre-
sentative. Potential interviewees were identified at MEMS courses and during the 2012 Level 1
planning trips. Snowballing sampling [15] was used throughout, whereby the interviewees were
asked if they could suggest others that had relevant experience.
5.2.2 Participants
Twenty-five participants with real-life IMT experience were interviewed. Fifteen had been
involved in incidents involving one or more fatalities. Ten of those people had involvement in
the IMT at the Pike River Mine, and seven of these ten had experience with fatalities prior to
the Pike River incident. All participants were employed in mining related roles in Australia or
New Zealand at the time of the interview. All were male, and had between 10 and 55 years
of experience in the mining industry. The participants’ average number of years in the mining
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industry was 33 years. Table 5.1 shows a breakdown of years’ experience by employment status.
Table 5.1: Coal mining experience by employment status
Number of % of Average experience
Participants Participants (years)
Employee of mining com-
pany/contracting company
12 46 36
Employee of a mines rescue
service (NSW,Qld or NZ)
9 36 29
Government representative 4 18 33
Total 25 100 33
Only four participants had less than 25 years mining experience and each of these were
involved in the Pike River IMT. The age of participants ranged from mid-40s to mid-70s. The
incidents discussed spanned the years 1972 to 2011 and occurred in four countries; Australia,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Africa.
5.2.3 Interview overview
A semi-structured conversational interview style was adopted for the interviews in which ‘re-
searcher and participants are viewed as partners, collaborators, or co-constructors’ [22, p. 64].
This method of interview has been used in previous mining studies to obtain more candid and
insightful responses than those achieved by structured interviews [82].
Although the details of decision-making at particular incidents may have been obscured
by the fog of time, these men’s recollection and interpretation of their experiences and the
emotional and physical environment of a coal mining emergency is a real, rich and valid data
source for understanding the non-technical issues that may impede decision-making in a mining
IMT.
In some cases the interviewees had not thought in detail, or ever spoken about these is-
sues, before the interview. However, the opposite was also true. Some participants who were
involved in the Pike River commission were very well practiced at providing factual and objec-
tive accounts of their involvement there. Both sets of interviewees struggled to articulate what
seemed, to them, to be subjective and nebulous concepts. The meaning of the behaviours the
participants had observed and the decisions they had made, or had seen made by others, were
discussed and negotiated to provide a rich understanding of the non-technical issues. By nego-
tiating the meaning within the interviews and then discussing and negotiating these meanings
with others in subsequent interviews a more thorough and complete picture was obtained [34].
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5.2.4 Procedure
Employees of the Queensland and NSW mines rescue services, and those who worked at under-
ground coal mines in the Bowen Basin, were generally interviewed at their workplace. Three
trips were made to the Bowen Basin between September and October 2012. The participants
working at the mines held senior management roles and their availability was limited and un-
predictable. Interviews were consequently conducted whenever and wherever possible as long
as the location enabled privacy and was quiet enough to ensure a clear audio recording. Lo-
cations included corporate o ces, hotel rooms, homes and quiet restaurants. Interviews were
conducted in Newcastle, Brisbane, Emerald, Mackay, Dysart, Blackwater, Middlemount and
the Bowen Basin coal mines between 25 September 2012 and 26 March 2013.
Conducting interviews
Participants were thanked for their time and provided informed consent. The interview was
then conducted in two parts: Part 1: This involved the participant talking through a di cult,
or otherwise memorable, decision that they had participated in making in an IMT. During this
period the interviewee was not interrupted and the researcher formulated questions relating to
non-technical issues that were implied in their narrative. These questions were asked at the
end of the interviewee’s narrative. Probes from the interview template were also used to access
relevant non-technical issues. The probes included hypothetical questions and those directed
at specific non-technical issues e.g. ‘How do you think someone with less experience might have
handled that situation’ and ‘What was your understanding of the situation based on?’.
Allowing the participants an uninterrupted opportunity to speak freely allowed them to
present their ‘press release’ early on [221].This is a term used to describe what the participant
wants to say, based on what they believe is the truth and how they want to be perceived. This
‘truth’ however is driven by the socio-cultural context of the industry and the interview itself.
The initial narrative allowed the researcher to gauge the participants’ overall and unprompted
attitudes towards the issue.
The initial questioning based on their narratives helped the interviewees to understand the
focus of the research and enabled them to keep on track as the term ‘non-technical’ can be,
and was, interpreted in many ways. It was also useful in establishing trust and rapport.
During this initial component of the interview, where there was uncertainty from both parties
about the utility of the impending interview, the power was negotiated. Power issues are integral
to the interviewing process [120]. The researcher was often tested by the interviewees in terms
of technical knowledge, or general worthiness of the interviewee’s time. During Part 1, the
researcher could indicate her understanding through nods and acknowledgement throughout
the participant’s own story. The men being interviewed were generally senior in age and in
their status within their company, holding significant responsibility for production and safety
at their mine. The researcher had much less status than the interviewees being younger, female
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and a student.
Immersion in the industry for the previous 18 months of the research, and in particular
learning the extensive and unique mining terminology, proved vital to the success of the in-
terviews. However, in some cases the researcher deliberately disclosed the fact the she was a
Chartered Professional Engineer to help re-balance the power and move the interview towards a
more useful and egalitarian conversation. Self-disclosure for the purpose of establishing rapport
and trust with the participants is as an integral part of accessing good quality qualitative data
using interviews [129]. This was evident by participants revealing more personal accounts of
their experiences later in the interviews once trust and rapport had been established. In one
case, a participant admitted that he had deliberately withheld a pertinent detail earlier. For
those interviewees who had recently assisted in the rescue and recovery stage at Pike River,
the details of the decision-making could be discussed in more detail due to the recency of the
event.
Part 2: Participants were asked specifically whether they could recall an incident when a
particular non-technical issue, such as fatigue or emotion had impacted on the IMT’s decision-
making. The non-technical issues addressed in turn were leadership, teamwork, stress, fatigue,
emotion, trust, personal limitations, assertiveness, communication and emotion. ‘Caring’ and
‘respect’ were included after the third interview because all three participants had raised these
issues independently.
However, Part 1 generally resulted in a deep discussion covering all of the non-technical issues
from the participant’s own experience meaning that Part 2 was not employed in full. Part 2
was mostly used to confirm the researcher’s understanding of the participant’s understanding
of the role of each non-technical issue.
On completion of the interview, participants were asked if they knew of anyone else that
would be valuable to interview. The duration of the interviews ranged from forty minutes to
five hours. The average length of the interviews was one hour and fifty-five minutes.
Data Analysis
The researcher transcribed each interview. A total of 48 hours and 254 thousand words were
transcribed using the audio recording from a Live-scribe Echo pen. The Live-scribe desktop
software enabled the researcher to view the notes written during the interview, in PDF form,
whilst the audio recording played simultaneously. When names of people, mines, incidents
or companies would compromise a participant’s anonymity they were replaced with [name] or
[role], [mine], [incident] or [company] to aid comprehension. Some exceptions were made whilst
transcribing interviews from people who attended Pike River, when retaining names or roles
added to meaning to the data, e.g. di↵erent people speaking about the same decision being
made, however these details are not included in the thesis. The transcripts were formatted
prior to input into NVivo to ensure that interviewee text was easily distinguishable from the
interviewer text during analysis. Each interviewee, and corresponding transcript file, was given
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a unique and random identity code that had no link to the participant’s name, location or the
date of the interview.
Framework analysis [214] was used to analyse the data because of its logical progression
towards developing theories by first identifying themes in the data. Framework analysis consists
of five steps [214]:
1. Familiarisation
2. Identification of recurrent and important themes
3. Indexing and pilot charting
4. Summarising data in analytical framework
5. Synthesising data by mapping and interpreting.
The methods used within each step are case specific. It is the overall structure of framework
analysis that provides the level of rigour that enables transparency throughout the development
of the themes and theory. The methods used in this research for each step are outlined below.
Step 1: Familiarisation
This step is also referred to as immersion in the data. This was achieved by conducting
the interviews and transcribing them. For this research it was important to understand each
of the interviews as a whole before dissecting them into relevant themes for cross comparison.
This was achieved by creating individual excel workbooks, writing a memo and drawing mind
maps for each participant which documented the issues that they felt most strongly about. A
visual representation of each interview as a whole was drawn and proved useful to remind the
researcher of the context from which the components had been extracted in later analysis.
Understanding each of the individual’s beliefs was vital because each participant’s views are
valid data in their own right. This deep understanding of each of the participants’ beliefs prior
to comparing responses between participants enabled a more meaningful analysis [22].
Step 2: Developing a theoretical framework by identifying recurrent and important themes
The data were initially structured by creating a workbook in Excel for each participant that
captured all of the data relevant to that participant. The participant workbooks contained 7
template worksheets:
Sheet 1 - Instructions: This sheet was included to ensure the researcher to followed the
same procedure for each participant.
Sheet 2 - Memo for participant: Memos are a useful part of data analysis to capture any
in depth thoughts the researcher has when looking at the data [34]. This sheet contained
details specific to the particular interviewee and in many cases diagrams were also drawn
and these were stored with the paper mind maps.
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Sheet 3 - Demographic information: This included the participants number of years in
coal mining, involvement in mines rescue, employments status, experience in emergency
services, and the level of involvement they had in IMTs.
Sheet 4 - Non-technical issues sheet: An initial set of recurring themes was input into a
template and alongside these a summary of what the participant had said about each
was input. The initial theme list was relatively comprehensive to limit the need to add
new themes later and minimise the need to retrospectively re-assess already summarised
transcripts. The mind-maps (created in Step 1) were used to assist the completion of this
worksheet.
Sheet 5 - Decision sheet: Details were recorded about a specific decision if one had been
identified. It included prompts to determine what could have a↵ected a decision, the
category of non-technical issues that possibly a↵ected the decision, what the decision
was that it potentially a↵ected, whether the non-technical issues did in fact impact the
decision and if the outcome was successful.
Sheet 6 - Unprompted: This sheet was reserved for themes that the interviewee brought up
unprompted and felt particularly strongly about. This was included as a reminder, like the
mind map (Step 1), of which issues were pertinent to the interviewee. For instance some
would blame all poor decisions on a dominant IC, while others might blame everything
on a poor data collection system. Knowing the mantra of the interviewee was useful to
interpret their comments.
Development of the workbook was important to ensure an intimate knowledge of the themes
important to each participant. The essence of their viewpoints was captured, whether positive
or negative, without being buried in the superfluous words of a transcript. Further, this stan-
dard set of worksheets for each participant enabled them to be easily merged to form a master
workbook containing all the data from all of the participants in six master worksheets. Master
worksheet 4 contained all of the non-technical themes from each participant meaning that all
of the themes that one participant discussed could be skimmed by reading along a row, and a
snapshot of what all of the participants said about one particular non-technical theme could be
accessed by reading down the relevant column. This initial sorting informed the themes input
into in NVivo for the next stage in the analysis.
Step 3: Indexing and pilot charting
The transcripts and the themes from the master workbook were imported into NVivo. Defin-
ing the themes and sub-themes that emerged in the data was an iterative process and changes
were made during the analysis. The sub-themes input into NVivo were detailed, rather than
broad allowing the option of amalgamating them into larger groups later. Participant demo-
graphics were input, as were codes for unprompted statements, statements relating to Level 1
exercises, Pike River references and researcher and participant speech.
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The transcripts were re-read twice during this stage. The transcript was first read alongside
the field notes, mind maps and memos and any comments that the researcher had annotated
on the transcript relating to a particular statement made by the participant. The transcripts
were also re-checked for anonymity and if the intention of any statements were unclear, the
audio recording was accessed to confirm it.
During the second reading, statements made by participants were assigned to the relevant
themes or sub-themes that had been input into NVivo. This is commonly termed thematic-
coding [34]. When a comment was obviously related to a sub-theme, it was placed there, if it
related to an overarching theme but not directly relevant to an existing sub-theme it was coded
to the over-arching theme for distribution later if a new sub-theme became warranted because
similar statements had been made by others. This meant that the number of sub-themes grew
slightly during the coding exercise. Any themes or sub-themes added during this phase meant
the transcripts had to be retrospectively coded for the new sub-theme. Each statement was
coded to all of the themes and sub-themes it related to, for example, the following paragraph
was coded to stress, self-confidence, leadership and situation-awareness.
‘Oh and I’ll tell you another thing I have seen where the IC wants to rely too
heavily on, you know, ‘what do you think?’, what do you think?’, then all of a sudden
he’s running o↵ on tangents, he’s getting ideas from everywhere, I’ve seen that a
number of times and there’s a lack of confidence. Stress causes a lack of confidence.
And he’s clutching at straws. That’s probably one of the bigger ones I think I’ve
seen.’
Step 4: Summarising the data in an analytical framework
At this stage the themes and sub-themes were re-assessed. Several themes and sub-themes
were moved or combined with others to enable a more streamlined overview. Once all transcripts
were coded some themes seemed more suited to be a sub-theme of another. For instance,
‘agenda’, was originally an independent theme due to the frequent number of times interviewees
spoke of it, but was moved to become a sub-theme of trust because it appeared the root cause
of many trust issues. The analytical framework (how statements were coded) within NVivo
at this stage was a representation of how the researcher believed the data fitted best at that
time. It was a subjective process intended to capture the essence of the interviews by using
the interviewees’ terminology for the names of themes and sub-themes. This form of analytical
reductionism is essentially false and distorts the relationships between the themes. However,
for ‘convenience of analysis’ [118, p. 37], the distinction between themes was made based on a
knowledge of the data. Creating high level themes or categories at this stage was seen as having
limited value and the researcher felt that it could potentially result in over simplification of the
data before it was fully interrogated. For example, at the higher level (the themes) teamwork
and leadership are just as likely to be important in mining as they are in other industries.
Therefore, it is the detail within these themes, the sub-themes, that is important and captures
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the useful and unique information relevant to the mining emergency environment. This issue
of oversimplification was encountered inadvertently with the leadership theme. No sub-themes
were initially assigned to leadership and then when leadership was analysed the process of
breaking it into elements was di cult because most of statements coded to leadership were
already coded to other themes or sub-themes. This highlighted the broad nature of IMT
leadership.
Step 5: Synthesising the data by mapping and interpreting
This is the stage where theories can be developed from analysis of the data. ‘Theorizing
is interpretive and entails not only condensing raw data into concepts but also arranging the
concepts into a logical, systematic explanatory scheme.’ [34, p. 56] This was achieved by the
development of a non-technical issues taxonomy for decision-making in mining IMTs. This
taxonomy could be used to inform industry recommendations and future research. Each of the
sub-themes was analysed individually referring back to the raw data in the NVivo, the excel
master-spreadsheet, the memos, and the mind maps, to fully understand the concepts that the
interviewees were describing. The framework outlines these in terms of non-technical issues
categories and elements.
The participants’ general understanding of the decision-making process, and how non-technical
issues influence it is discussed first, followed by the presentation of a taxonomy of non-technical
issues as they apply to decision-making in a mining IMT. The subsequent sections provide a
detailed explanation of each category and element within the taxonomy.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Decision-making in the IMT
Several conclusions can be drawn from the interviews about mining IMT decision-making:
• IMT decision-making is highly reliant on accurate and complete situation awareness .
• The large number of decisions IMTs make are rarely recognised.
• There is a strong belief that only objective decisions can be good decisions.
• Most interviewees believed decision-making ability is an inherent personality trait.
• IMT decision-makers use multiple decision-making methods.
• The mining IMT emergency decision-making process encompasses a broad psycho-socio-
technical process that can impact decision-making directly, or indirectly, due to its reliance
on situation awareness.
Many decisions are made throughout a mine emergency management operation. Decisions
are made to work out who is underground, what has happened, what is happening underground,
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who to involve in the IMT, and who or what organisations should be called for assistance. Each
individual involved and each of their psychological and physiological reactions to the situation,
and to other members of the team, can influence the IMT decision-making process. IMT
decision-making is a broad and social process and includes everything and everyone that is
associated with it, including the emergency environment itself. The cognitive information-
processing type decision-making processes described by traditional decision-making research
form only a tiny part of a mining IMTs decision-making process.
This broader definition of decision-making was borne out of the realisation that each of the
interviewees’ comments about decision-making could also be coded to at least one other non-
technical issue, highlighting the inter-dependency of decision-making and non-technical issues
in the mining context.
In contrast, when interviewees were asked specifically about the decision-making process,
they were less able to articulate their thoughts and generally spoke of maintaining objectivity
and validity. This suggests that the participants understood the decision-making process to be
a narrower and more discrete process possibly involving analytical and procedural methods.
Many interviewees failed to recognise the large number of decisions made in a mining IMT.
There are three potential reasons for this. It could be because life or death decisions, such as
the re-entry decision, overshadow any acknowledgement of the strategic and logistical decisions
that must be made throughout the operation. This is partly evidenced by the assertion of
several interviewees that the formation of an IMT is almost useless because any decisions it
could make would have no bearing on the survivability of those underground.
‘Well you know what, once the incident has occurred, I think it’s too late to be
quite honest at times.’
‘As a matter of fact the IMT would probably only sort of come into its way in
about the next 4 to 6 hours after the accident occurs. And by that time it’s either
just stabilising or body bags. To be crude, but that’s what it is.’
Alternatively the lack of recognition of decision-making could be because few significant
decisions have been observed. In previous incidents, and exercises, decision-making has often
been delayed until the point it becomes irrelevant because the incident situation has naturally
developed into the next stage.
‘A lot of times in ICT people don’t tend to make decisions, in some cases it will
just sort of happen.’
‘I think it’s almost a fear thing I think. Like it’s, they are afraid of exposure.
It’s almost like the ostrich with its head in the sand, it will all go away soon, I’ll
pop my head up and it will all be gone.’
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‘There’s a lot of people who don’t make decisions, they procrastinate. Well if I
don’t make a decision within a day it will go away anyway. You can’t do that in an
emergency.’
Thirdly, some decisions may not be recognised because they are ‘intuitive’, meaning that
they are not the result of an overt and cognitively intense analytical process. In other words,
if options have not been generated, discussed and evaluated within the IMT, the outcome
may not be recognised as a decision or may simply not be recalled because limited cognitive
processing occurred. The industry belief that analytical decision-making is the only truly valid
and objective way to make a decision in an IMT no doubt exacerbates this decision blindness.
‘I think decision-making is about just taking the obvious course of action.’
‘Not really a decision ‘not really an option, it’s a must do.’
In contrast to many interviewees, one participant who was an IC following a serious incident
where there were no injuries but there was contention regarding re-entry of the mine, was
able to articulate that he was making ‘judgements and decisions’ ‘all the time’. Many of the
decisions he had to make were not technical. They were about the people involved; deciding
how to give them assurances that he (the IC) hadn’t given up on the mine, deciding on how
best to communicate with sta↵ in terms of when and where, but also how to personally deliver
bad or good news, deciding how much information to share and deciding who should be in the
IMT. He had to decide who he wanted technical and strategic help from, how best to use their
help and how to handle the existing relationships between the external agencies who became
involved whilst maintaining his position of authority. He had to decide how best to deal with
the psychological and physiological stresses that became evident in the team including deciding
when it was time to send people home to be with their families because they were becoming too
fatigued. He had to decide how to manage the personalities and emotions of those involved to
minimise disruption and maintain focus on the objectives. Without these decisions, the chances
of an optimal outcome were unlikely.
‘It’s actually your ability to manage people, manage process, manage a situation
and listen to all of the information to be able to make the right decision with the
right advice. That is so situational.’
An incident controller’s leadership and decision-making skills were commonly attributed to
his personality. In general, interviewees held black and white beliefs about decision-making
skills; That people either can or can’t make decisions. ‘There are people that shouldn’t be
allowed anywhere near decision-making’. Others o↵ered accounts of people ‘freezing’ and being
unable to make decisions. ‘I think it’s in their nature, it’s in their personality or whatever you
want to call it.’
ICs that don’t make decisions were often believed to have a personality that fears the personal
consequences of making a wrong decision. ‘To make a decision for them is threatening. And
so they will avoid making the decision’.
103
Good decision-making ability was strongly associated with having a courageous personality,
a willingness to take responsibility and also masculinity, several interviewees likening making a
decision to putting their ‘old fella’ or ‘balls’ on the block. These traits were believed by some
to be typical of a mine manger’s personality.
‘I think that’s a trait of a mine-manager. If you are the type of person that’s
afraid to make a decision, and frightened of the repercussions, I might go to jail,
the inspectorate might, I might end up in the dock at court, you’ll never ever get
to that position, because you just physically won’t because your anxieties will stop
you. So the people that do get to those positions, are people who can, wipe it. Risk-
take I guess, in a way. Prepared to take that level of responsibility and the possible
repercussions. If you are not, you’ll never get there so there is that it will never
happen to me.’
The interviews revealed that the mining IMT decision-making process is not simply the cog-
nitive or collaborative process that occurs in the isolated IMT room upon receipt of accurate,
and complete data, as the traditional models of decision-making imply. The decision-making
process is highly social and relies on many people to provide the decision-makers with accu-
rate information, and for the decision-makers to then be able to interpret and process this
information correctly to develop situation-awareness.
‘The decision-making really isn’t about that, it’s about getting a group of people
to focus and function. It’s got nothing to do with the technical stu↵ really, well,
you’ve got to know what you are talking about but it’s more about handling your
people. Which is not what miners do best I guess.’
The narratives also indicated that the participants have undertaken or observed di↵erent
types of decision-making methods in real IMTs including the choice, intuitive, rule based and
creative methods of decision-making outlined by Flin [73]. The type of method chosen seems
dependent on the situation. For example, the re-entry decision is one that was understood to
require full analysis and adherence to the QMRS re-entry guidelines. In the situation where
an IC had to decide how to impart bad news to mine employees, this was undertaken using
intuition. In other cases, where there were no precedents, creative decision-making tactics were
used but this seems a specialised skill.
‘you can give someone all the CDs, you can show them what happens, but the
people that make extremely good leaders in most cases are the people that are able
to analyse what’s happening and make a decision on about something that they’ve
not seen before using information they’ve got in their mind. So they piece things
together. Some people can’t do that.’
In summary, to accurately portray the IMT decision-making process, consideration must be
given to the vast number of social and cognitive issues that can influence it. The process is
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not simply a consideration of a number of options, it is not confined to the IMT room and it is
not independent of the people in the process. The IMT decision-making starts when the first
piece of information is discovered that indicates something out of the ordinary has happened
and only ends when the final IMT decision has been implemented by the teams. Each and
every person involved in that process, their social interactions and their psychological and
physiological states can influence the IMT decision-making process.
In an attempt to clarify and explain the many non-technical issues that the interviewees
believe have impacted decision-making, a taxonomy of non-technical issues has been developed.
This framework can be seen in Table 5.2 below and contains categories and elements that
summarise the many behaviours, feelings and attitudes that the interviewees have experienced
or witnessed impact IMT decision-making. These are described in detail in the subsequent
sections.
5.3.2 Situation Awareness
IMT decision-making relies on having an accurate understanding of the current and potential
future state of the underground-mine. However, the information on which situation awareness
is based is primarily supplied to the key decision-makers in the IMT by verbal communication.
It is this that makes the acquisition of situation-awareness in the mining IMT a social and
cognitive process as well as a technical process.
In addition, the IC must also maintain awareness of the incident management operation.
This involves monitoring the progress of the teams and how they are coping. In a protracted
response it is critical to ensure that the IMT and wider team remains focussed and do not
burn-out. Coordination is required to deal with the media, families and external agencies
providing assistance such as the emergency services, the Mines Inspectorate and perhaps other
organisations like the Red Cross. In this case, an understanding of the emergency management
environment, and how people are likely to behave within it would be beneficial.
Hence, two distinct types of situation-awareness are relevant to the mining IMT:
• Obtaining and maintaining situation awareness of the incident and the conditions in the
underground mine.
• Maintaining situation awareness of the emergency management operation (above-ground),
including the IMT members, the mine-workers, external stakeholders, the media and the
assisting agencies.
This understanding has guided the taxonomy development. The three stages of situation-
awareness of the incident will be discussed first, followed by situation-awareness of the emer-
gency management operation.
105
Table 5.2: The decision making non-technical issues taxonomy
Category Element
Situation Awareness Incident - situation awareness
Gathering Information
- Debriefing
- Validation
Understanding the information
Projection
Emergency management operation - situation awareness
Collaboration and Selecting the ‘right’ team
Cooperation Interpersonal conflict
Inter-group and inter-agency issues
Roles and responsibilities
Maintaining focus on the objectives
Trusting others Trusting and having confidence in others
Having an agenda
Respecting others
Caring for others Caring for the IMT
Compassion for those close to the incident:
- The mine workers
- Dealing with families
Personal strengths and Recognising and dealing with environmental stressors
limitations Recognising and coping one’s own emotion and stress
Recognising and coping with others’ emotion and stress
Fatigue
Self-confidence
Maintaining open To challenge and be challenged
communication in the Creating an environment where people can speak-up
IMT The communication transaction
How to speak to team-members
Leadership Remain calm and confident
Communicating externally from the IMT
Delegation vs micromanagement
Reprimanding team-members
106
Situation awareness of the incident - Gathering information
There is no doubt that having accurate situation-awareness is critical to maximise the chances
of a successful decision being made.
‘The fact is, your situation awareness, it’s right here, right now, and it’s how
to make sense of all that information, and it’s the quality of the decision you are
about to make. So it’s about understanding that context, it’s about understanding
what the competing goals are. Why is it? I don’t care about what happened in the
past, I can’t be biased from that, I can’t use that because it worked for me in the
past, I’m right here right now, what do I need to do to take a step forward. So
it’s understanding that process and you just cannot a↵ord to be biased either way,
forward or backward. So your prejudices, you need to make sure your decision is
valid.’
Significant evidence was presented by the interviewees to suggest that trust, communication,
biases, leadership, fatigue, social factors, self-confidence and stress were integral to the process
of deriving and maintaining situation-awareness of the incident and that these factors influenced
what information was used and how it was interpreted in the IMT.
Several participants spoke of the value of gathering some data prior to reaching the mine if
they were not at site when the incident occurs. The value in this was to start processing and
understanding the data, and even call others for advice, before arriving at the mine. This is a
strategy many incident controllers employ [68] and one participant claimed that doing this has
enabled him to arrive at the mine-site with more confidence.
Gaining situation awareness of the incident is di cult for the IC due to the IMT’s isolation
from the incident. The isolation means that the IC cannot use his/her physical senses to help
diagnose the issue and is wholly reliant on information communicated by IMT members.
‘The IMT still depends on people. They are only as good as the information
they receive. And they are only as good as what they basically do with that.’
‘The information coming in is as strong as the team you’ve assigned to go and
get that information for you. So if that info is not coming in an appropriate fashion
to you, then again, change the team.’
Some interviewees believed that due to this isolation the IMT cannot achieve full situation
awareness, ‘the IMT can be sitting in a nice comfy air conditioned room, so what’s the situation-
awareness there?’ Similarly, in response to the researcher asking how the IC acquires situation
awareness, another participant replied ‘I don’t think he can, if you haven’t been there you
wouldn’t have a clue at all. You can’t. I don’t think so.’
Some participants believed it essential for the IC to leave the IMT to identify information
that may not have reached the IMT meetings.
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‘You’ve really got to be there and you have to be involved in. You have to be
able to see all the monitoring and everything yourself, you can’t just sit in another
room and pretend to be in charge.’
‘There is times when there is an information gathering process going on as part
of the IMT. So the IMT is basically disbanded doing some info gathering. The leader
should take that opportunity to actually go to the control room and the monitoring
station and basically interact with the people, especially in the early days, the people
that are doing the debriefings, or their surface controllers, underground controllers
and all the rest of it, just to get a feeling about whether they feel the situation is
under control, whether they’ve heard something abnormal.’
In terms of what is acceptable within the MEMS structure, there seems some confusion as
some participants stated explicitly that the IC should definitely not leave the IMT room, yet
others thought the IC should. However, there was generally agreement that if the IC left the
IMT room, the IC must not interfere with the functional groups because this would lead to
micro-management, trust issues and confusion over authority.
Interviewees spoke of the di culty of not being able to look, feel, hear, touch, and smell the
environment to assess it.
‘And there’s another thing too, I work a lot on gut instinct. You know when
you get the old gut-feeling that something’s not right, generally it isn’t. And that’s
what I’ve learnt in the mining industry. I can walk into a part of the mine and go
whooa, something’s not right here. Back up. And generally something’s not right,
the roof’s or it’s going to fall, it’s just a gut-feeling and experience I suppose comes
into it. I believe in gut instinct. But they can’t use their senses in an IMT.’
However, an additional sense was stated by several to be required, a sense of the mine itself.
Most believed decision-makers needed to ‘know’ the mine. But simply knowing the mine, its
layout and its operations does not fully articulate what the interviewees were describing.
‘It’s
the mine
almost like a coal mine is a living creature, it does things and over time you learn
what it does and how it reacts especially around things like ventilation and gas
management. So it’s almost like a living animal and you’ve got to understand your
mine.’
This participant believed that knowing the mine is essential, to the point that if an emergency
occurs at a mine where the mine-manager is new, and unfamiliar with the mine, the mine-
manager should relinquish leadership to someone who does know the mine. This indicates
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a belief that the situation-awareness required in an incident is more than the technical facts
available at the time; that decision-makers may rely on intuitive knowledge of the mine to
inform decisions.
Notwithstanding that, the process of obtaining the data to guide the situation awareness
commences immediately following the realisation that something out of the ordinary has oc-
curred. The interviews confirmed that this is a time characterised by confusion because of a
lack of information. The IC must request others to gather the data that will assist him/her
to identify the current conditions underground. However, if the IC has a bias, either conscious
or unconscious, this could bias the direction of this initial data search. If the IC only seeks
data that is irrelevant or that confirms a bias, this can skew the IMT’s situation awareness and
subsequent decisions.
‘Experience also frames the direction in which you look [for information]. So
you start to make the situation fit the one that you dealt with successfully before.
Em, so I suppose there’s plusses and there’s minuses.’
It is also critical that the IC seeks the information that is missing but that could potentially
determine the true situation.
‘What do I need to know? What do I know? What don’t I know?’ (emphasis
added)
Further opportunities for bias occur when the IC receives information. At this point filtering
the data was said to be a necessity because the information can come from almost anywhere,
‘Like old mate over there could never have been underground in his life but he
was standing there and ‘Oh, I heard this, I heard that’ so it’s like squeaky wheels
stu↵ ’
its accuracy is sometimes questionable,
‘you are going to be fed a lot of information, some of which is shit, some of
which is good stu↵ or not really relevant’
and that
‘People are very good at making information up. They invent it. It’s not a
conscious thing that they do it deliberately. They get a piece of information and
they add to it and embellish it and then it gets passed on. And it’s really quite
strange and I’ve watched people do it.’
Some interviewees implied that the information provided to them may be deliberately mis-
leading, and that this filtering skill is needed to extract the truth.
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‘Some of the questions I asked, I know what the answer is and I can actually
tease them to a particular outcome or in a particular direction, it’s being able to go,
‘I’m not actually sure you are telling me the truth’. It’s about being able to, how’s
the best way to put it? Know when they are trying to pull the wool over your eyes.’
‘Don’t be aggressive but draw it out in a respectful manner. Probe. You can
usually tell if you are listening to someone giving you some information back, you
know yourself what is there. What he’s missed, or if there is something more that
you want to know.’
This ability to filter the data was perceived as a necessary skill of a good IC. Rarely was it
considered that it could be a potentially misleading.
‘Eh, I think experience comes into it in a big way. If you know what questions
to ask, you can steer them. You’ve got the capability of steering it the right way or
the wrong way and if you’ve got a basic understanding of what the situation is, and
what the hazards are and you know what to ask then you are going to steer them
down the right way.’
Interestingly, the participant quoted below, in a subsequent mine emergency exercise, seri-
ously biased the IMT decision-making by working on a false diagnosis of the problem under-
ground. He sub-consciously filtered out any information that did not fit with his interpretation
of the situation yet his statement below clearly indicates that theoretically he knew of this bias.
‘And you know what happens, the blinkers come on and then you convince your-
self that you are right, and then when other information comes in, you manipulate it
to fit your scenario. It’s people taking information away and rationalising it away.
Oh that’s normal. Oh yeah and just dismiss it. And then the smallest, stupidist,
little detail that fits that picture becomes important.’
The participants observed that decision-makers often sought excessive amounts of informa-
tion prior to making decisions. Their evaluation of this behaviour was that the decision-maker
was not confident of making the decision and was procrastinating.
‘They [people who avoid making decisions] are easy to recognise because they are
wanting, wanting, wanting more information, more information, more information,
so there’s a strategy of avoidance... this is very prevalent. There’s only probably a
handful of people who won’t avoid making a decision.’
‘It’s your level of tolerance as to how much information you need to have the
confidence to move forward, to move on. So it’s somewhere between there, paralysis
by analysis where you can’t make a decision, to I need this decision to have integrity.’
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A further point noted was that less assurance of the accuracy of situation-awareness is
required when the decision is of low consequence. Similarly, when decisions are life and death,
there must be absolute confidence that all relevant data has been sought and the situation has
been interpreted correctly.
‘It’s about the right balance. Paralysis by analysis, or see what’s my level of
tolerance to make this decision and ensure it has integrity. If I lower my level
of tolerance, I don’t need as much information, or if I raise the bar, paralysis by
analysis. This is where I need to raise that bar to if this decision is a life or death
decision. Versus a lesser decision, where you go down the track and monitor and
test your assumption.‘
Gathering information - Debriefing
Debriefing miner-workers who have exited the mine immediately before or after the suspected
incident is critical because they may have seen, heard or smelt something that would assist
the IMT. MEMS prescribes that a senior mining personnel should conduct debriefs to ensure
the relevant technical details are captured and interviewees believed following a process would
improve the timeliness and accuracy of debriefing.
However, one participant, from his own experience of being debriefed following a multiple
fatality incident, indicated that following a process and a having technical understanding of the
mine may still be insu cient to extract the most useful information from those being debriefed.
What he discusses below are clearly non-technical issues.
Participant:‘When people come out the mine in a real true incident, they know
a shitload of information. They’ve seen it, they know, and you’ve got to tap into
that, it’s a real big problem.’
Researcher: So who would you get to debrief them?
Participant: ‘You’ve got to have someone that knows the mine. And who can
emotionally divorce themselves from what they are being told. And not, you’ve told
me something , Oh Jesus that’s important, [and run o↵ ] and I didn’t finish with
you. So, yeah, you’ve got to have the right person, somebody the guys can talk to,
will give the information to, but also somebody can take charge in the heat of battle,
it’s a bit like herding cats, the boys, everybody reacts di↵erently and everybody has a
story to tell and they want to tell you. And it’s got to be one-on-one. You’ve really
got to have the boys all held somewhere and take them one on one into a room.
And I think when you are being interviewed there needs to be somebody there,
because there are very few people who think, who can actually get the truth out of
people. There was a really good guy, one of the [..], and I remember being interviewed
by all these other people and getting angry and emotional and all the rest of it. I was
111
up in front of this other guy for my final interview and he was just totally di↵erent.
And everybody said the same, whatever it took to get the information out of people
he got it. He’d probably been through something similar himself. I dunno, but he
was brilliant. And all the guys said the same that he was a pleasure to talk to and
he drew far more out of us than anybody else.
Big boys don’t cry so that’s how you are conditioned, you don’t want to talk, you
don’t want to tell the truth, you don’t want to open up because of the e↵ect it will
have on you.’
Gathering information - Validating data
Validating or ‘challenging the data’ was identified as a critical step in the process of data
gathering to ensure that accurate and complete data is used in the decision-making.
‘We didn’t validate enough. So I guess for me it’s validate, validate, validate.’
Validating data that does not fit with expectations was a strategy encouraged by most of
the interviewees.
‘Don’t dismiss data that doesn’t quite fit the mould, don’t dismiss that.’
‘Yes, you should always be confident that if something doesn’t ring true you
should analyse. Is that true? Are we missing something?’
‘Quite often you’ll jump to a conclusion, and then other facts will come in and
if they can be interpreted to support what your conclusion is then, you say, ‘yip,
they’re valid’. If they don’t, you can just say, ‘well, that’s probably not right, we can
discount that, the eye witness must have been wrong, or there’s something wrong
with that fact.’
However, this is only half the story. Only checking the accuracy of data that does not match
what is believed to be the case is insu cient. Not validating data that matches pre-conceived
ideas is dangerous and contributes to confirmation bias. Interestingly, only one participant
emphasised the need to focus on ‘collecting that evidence that de-validates the decision.’ Sur-
prisingly, one of the key criteria used to evaluate the validity of data was who provided the
data.
‘To challenge the info, has it been validated? Where did it come from? Who
gave it to me? You know, know your people, know your mine, there’s two parts to
that.’
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It was stated by several interviewees that if the person who provided the information was
trusted, the data was valid and no further validity checks would be completed, unless the
data was found to be potentially faulty at a later stage following the receipt of subsequent
inconsistent data. In essence they allowed social influence, in the form of trusting others, as
evidence of reality [153]. Conversely, information from an un-trusted source was scrutinised
more thoroughly. This use of trust, a subjective and emotion based attitude, as a determinant
of validity is completely contrary to the assertions that decision-making must be based on
objective data. Therefore, trust issues could seriously bias the information used and ultimately
the decisions made in a mining IMT.
‘It’s more about do I trust the person, he’s given me the right information, I trust
the person that he’s done the check. That definitely a↵ects my decision-making.’
‘I don’t trust him so everything he said I analysed.’
‘In a lot of cases you’ve got to take that on face value. You don’t have the time
to drill down to the finest detail. And it comes back to that trust scenario. Trust,
confidence, truth they’re all linked.’
Trust was seen as dichotomous, someone was either trusted or not, and this was established
prior to the incident occurring. Generally, participants did not consider that someone may be
trustworthy in normal situations but not trustworthy in the emergency environment. When
participants were asked if they would trust the data even if the person was obviously emotionally
upset, their responses stayed the same; if the person was trusted and the data looked okay to
them it would be accepted without validation.
‘I’d probably wait to see what the gas sample came out of. Being in the industry
a long time you sort of get an idea of what to expect down there if there is a fire or
explosion.’
Only one participant recognised the deficiency in this:
‘Someone who was, that you may have had trust, respect etc for, and they were
credible. That might have been through peacetime operations, and then, they fall
apart in a situation like this.’
Another aspect of validation was the importance of not making assumptions. Interviewees
spoke of false assumptions made in the past. These included assuming a roof fall occurred at
Moura when it had been an explosion, and at a more recent event, assuming that drillers were
reaching the depth required when they were not.
‘Document your assumption, cause your assumption can bring you unstuck, you
need to test the assumption. And often that step is missed out.’
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‘I’m going to find that bit of data, to make your assumption incorrect. Now I
may not find it but I need to go looking for it. Because once again, it’s out there.
The information to discredit the assumption is out there.’
However, despite the vehement calls for validation and to never make assumptions, several
of the same participants were willing to make the biggest assumption of all: the survival time
of miners. Four made matter-of-fact statements that, following a fire or explosion, if the miners
do not self-escape in the first few hours they are dead.
‘If they’re not out in two and a half hours they’re not coming out.’
Holding such beliefs may seem irrelevant in Queensland because the decision for rescuers to
enter a mine is only based on the safety of potential rescuers and does not take into consideration
of the survivability status of those underground. However, as events at Pike River highlight,
the issue of survivability is extremely important for those working on the emergency operation
and those who have family and friends underground. The impact of assuming that ‘everyone
is dead’ or ‘everyone is alive’, is di cult to articulate, but one interviewee who attended Pike
River stated that if anyone at the mine-site had openly said the men underground were all dead
in the first two days ‘they would’ve been lynched’. Fundamentally, to assume the missing miners
survivability status in any incident, without factual evidence, is to potentially be working with
false situation awareness that could influence decisions.
Situation awareness of the incident - Understanding
For the information gathered to be useful the IMT must be able to interpret it and under-
stand its significance. In this case too, attention must be directed at information that is not
understood
‘Most importantly identify those things you don’t understand. Most importantly!’
Some interviewees spoke of the necessity of contacting experts for technical assistance because
the IC may not be technically proficient in the problem area. This was where a reluctance to ask
for help was said to become problematic, as it could potentially impact the IMT’s understanding
of the situation.
‘I’ve got to be big enough to ask for help, I need to get the right people in the
right place. I don’t care where they come from.’
To improve understanding of the data in IMT meetings, one participant spoke of the impor-
tance of simplifying excessively technical data so that everyone can understand and maintain
focus on the strategy. He explained,
‘I can start to get intimate with 6 graphs. I can’t get intimate with 21 graphs.‘
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Another participant suggested that all incoming information should be marked on a mine
plan to help the IMT visualise the situation and think logically through what may have hap-
pened and what might happen next.
However, in addition to forming an understanding of the incident by working logically
through the data, understanding was also drawn from reflecting on their previous experience
or knowledge of previous incidents.
‘I was looking at a series of mine plans I’m running all the information I got in
the brief, I’m running through my head and I sort of said if there was an explosion
that blew those blast doors o↵ that fan, how could those two guys down that maingate
survive? And [name] was there and he said they were blown o↵ their feet. I said
I’ve been in this industry a long time, I know what those blokes down Moura No. 4
told me that survived it, and the guys from Moura No. 2 told me, and they were a
long way away from that explosion. And they were still blown over. You can’t tell
me those two guys would have survived.’
Situation awareness of the incident - Prediction/Contingency planning
It is important the IMT considers how the situation underground may develop so that they can
plan and prepare. In addition, they must be able to predict the outcome of enacting a decision.
This ability to project is critical for an IMT to maintain control of the situation and is about
knowing:
‘what the mine is going to do. It’s like when you make a vent change, you should
know instinctively what the mine is going to do.’
‘If this changes what will happen there etc.’
‘I suppose foresight but that’s as much technical as it is... It’s trying to project
forward as to, know what I mean?’
Successful projection was said to involve visualising what may happen next and this is
believed to be a skill that only some people have:
‘They know what needs to happen, but they haven’t got the ability to visualise
how it’s going to pan out... they can’t visualise what’s about to happen two steps
down the process’
‘when you can’t see something you’ve got to try and visualise what’s happening
and that’s something I’ve found I can do very well.’
Evidence that IMTs are projecting include the consideration of multiple strategies and
putting in place a contingency plan or ‘plan B’.
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‘you can brainstorm 20 di↵erent things that need to be done... and some of the
things may be left field but they still need someone to go and look at it in case in
two days’ time or 12 hours’ time, we need to do that thing. We need someone to
have planned how to do it so that we can instantly say, ‘Righto you guys have done
an assessment of the ventilation system, tell us what the alternatives are”.
However those who attended Pike River explained circumstances that prevented them prepar-
ing contingency plans, such as: being reprimanded by the police for discussing the survivability
of the miners; being instructed not to organise mine inertisation equipment because of the
message it would send to families (if a mine is inertised all life is extinguished); and the number
of people in the IMT room, including external agencies and a large number of police o cers,
meaning that brainstorming and technical discussions could not be conducted openly. This
reveals that it is not just the skills of those involved, but the environment in which they are
working, that can impact upon projection and meaningful preparation.
Situation-awareness of the emergency management team and environment
The IC must simultaneously maintain awareness of the teams working on emergency operation
whilst retaining awareness of the incident itself.
‘I think that was his [the IC’s] biggest strength, he was managing us more than
he was managing the incident.’
This awareness of the emergency management operation as a whole was commonly termed
the ‘big picture’. One participant explained some of the ‘big picture’ roles he had when he was
an IC:
‘I’ve got to make sure I’ve got the media covered, I’ve got to make sure I’ve got
the Government covered, I’ve got to make sure I’ve got the local community covered,
I’ve got to make sure I’ve got the families of the people who are working here are
covered, I’ve got to make sure my employers are covered, and I’ve got to make sure
the rest of the employees of the company are covered.’
This situation awareness di↵ers from forming an awareness of the incident itself because it
is not a technical interpretation of facts. To monitor for potential conflicts or personal issues
within the IMT, functional groups or even the mine workers and the response as a whole, there
needs to be an understanding of the emergency environment. This includes an understanding
of how people may react and this point was emphasised more by those with experience of
multiple-fatality incidents than those without. It was suggested that the IC must escape the
confines of the IMT room if he is to gather the information that will help him assess the success
or otherwise of the emergency operation as a whole:
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‘you can’t just sit in your glass bubble and hope to Christ it is. You’ve got to
go out and monitor it to make sure that it is. ... In a matter of seconds you can
establish if things are working or not.’
‘I know in my experiences if I’m walking around the pit I’m always aware of
what’s going on around me. And in an IMT situation, you need to be aware of
what’s happening in logistics, planning and operations, and that’s what I was saying,
he needs to come out and touch base with everybody. Because when they meet with
the IC it’s only the lead person out of each of those areas and maybe the mines
rescue bloke, but that’s it, and does he really know who’s in all these teams and he
might want to go, I mean I know I would, if I got a spare moment I’d be going ‘how’s
it going guys?’ , I’ve got what you want to do and we’re working to achieve that.
Is there anything else you think I might need to know. And it might just trigger
someone. [to pass on a bit of information].’
The skills the IC requires to monitor the teams, the stressors and the coordination have been
neglected as requirements for a successful IC in the historical mining literature, including the
Level 1 reports. These skills are di cult to define possibly because they are intuitive to some
and di cult to articulate to others. Additionally, the illegitimacy of intuition and gut-feel in
the mining decision-making process may mean that such issues are simply not recognised as
decision-making. However, the interviewees recognised the need for these skills, the di culty
was in defining them. This is possibly because ‘gut-feel’ would be a perfectly valid tool to use
to establish this type of situation-awareness in complete contrast to the industry’s rhetoric of
objectivity and validation which is required for developing situation-awareness of the mine.
‘And you need to know what you are looking for... And when you walk in the
room, this looks right, feels right, smells right, tastes right. Or, shit what’s wrong
with this picture. And don’t ask me to explain that!’
‘It’s just a gut thing. I can’t, on an individual basis, go well he’s short here, he’s
short there. It’s just on a gut-feeling, and it’s the mix, whether there’s enough people
with an understanding of the operations around him, know enough to be dangerous,
whether that person can be both a listener and a communicator, em but also too if
I see some sta↵ around them what sort of body language, emotion, respect so what
sort of conversations those people have. It’s all people things, subjective things, feely,
touchy. smelly things.’
One concrete indicator of the health of a response was rumours. Several participants spoke
of the importance of listening out for, and quickly addressing any rumours before they cause
trouble.
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‘Whether it be a hallway conversation or a meeting conversation, that is the
indication of how healthy the organisation it.’
The overall category of situation-awareness, including situation-awareness of the incident
and situation awareness of the emergency management operation reveals that the IC and the
IMT need both technical and non-technical skills to maintain an awareness of the situation as
a whole.
Coal mining is masculine, objective, it’s a technical and tangible environment, it’s about
cutting coal, it’s practical, it’s big machines, it’s getting dirty and it’s about making lots of
money. When an incident occurs, this environment changes to one where mates, emotions,
wives and children are at the forefront of people’s minds and the work-priority is about saving
lives and jobs. It seems that an introduction to this emergency environment and how those who
are required to work in it may react would assist the IC to maintain productive, collaborative
and cooperative teams.
5.3.3 Collaboration and Cooperation
The MEMS promotes collaborative decision-making in the IMT with the IC responsible for
decision approval. The advantages of collaboration are said to include greater adaptability,
productivity and creativity [172] a view echoed by several participants.
‘you need to involve the people around you, each one of them have got their own
experience and skills and knowledge and understanding of the logistics of the layout
of the mine and technical skills and you’ll get a better outcome if you use the team
approach to make decisions and not to try and be the know it all.’
‘In a real one [incident] no one consciously going ‘I’m in charge’. You become
more of a collective. And somebody will say why don’t we do that and everybody will
say yeah that’s a good idea and we’ll go o↵ and do it.’
However, establishing this collaboration may not be as simple as it sounds.
‘There are a lot of dynamics in that team and depending on how well they mesh
together, is how e↵ective and e cient the IMT can be about decision-making.’
The collaboration and cooperation category in the taxonomy is essentially about teamwork
issues, but because each IMT member is both a leader and a team-member, an incident com-
mand structure is applied and there are potentially many ‘teams of teams’ (a term used in
[174]), meaning that the term ’collaboration and cooperation’ is more appropriate than team-
work.
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Collaboration and Cooperation - Selecting the ‘right’ team
The IC’s ability to form a good decision-making team by selecting people with the ‘right’ skill-
sets, personalities and relationships with others, was deemed critical. The assumptions driving
this belief include that the IC has a working relationship with the team-members before the
incident and knows their strengths and weaknesses; that trust, rapport and respect have been
established;and that fundamentally, using a pre-selected and optimal team is physically possible.
The IC may not know the team members well or the IC may be unable to access his ‘first pick’
of team members for various practical reasons, such as someone is on leave or has been involved
in the incident.
‘So it’s just a matter of picking the right technical skills and the right personality
combined to do each of the roles. If you get the team right you’ll get a reasonable
outcome by and large.’
‘So, I guess a lot of it is, if you want success, it’s not trying to pull it together
at the time, it comes down to knowing the team that you assemble beforehand and
knowing what drives them.’
In addition, existing relationships may be poor, lacking in trust or prone to personality
clashes that could exacerbate interpersonal or intergroup conflict during the emergency. In
such cases participants have deliberately separated individuals whose relationship was known
to be volatile.
‘I’ve actually seen these two guys in a public forum how much they don’t respect
each other [name 2 and 3]. There was no way in the world I was going to let that
relationship, or the emotion of that, a↵ect our situation.’
Deciding upon the ‘right’ people for the team was perceived as an easy task, and was said to
involve ensuring a balance between their technical and non-technical skills, their personalities,
the type of situation (i.e. fatalities or not), and the skills left available for the backshift teams
in protracted incidents.
‘If someone is a bit aggressive you need someone that’s a bit conciliatory with
them to pull them back.’
‘If I’m the mine-manager and I’ve only got one VO, should I have him with me
or should I leave him for the guy that takes me o↵, to lift the skills at that job? It’s
not just looking at who’s the best person, it’s looking at who you are going to put
with people to cover their weaknesses.’
A common belief was that implementing personality testing would help the IC form better
teams. There was no appreciation of the theoretical and practical complexities and limitations
of this.
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The general strategy proposed by most participants was that the IC should construct a team
based on people the IC knows. Only one participant was opposed to this concerned that the
IC would chose to work with people he/she liked, trusted or generally agreed with.
‘they maybe select the people they want to deal with, they know how they work
and that worries me. I’d be quite happy to walk into a room of strangers as long as
I knew their credentials or I could find out.’
The same participant stated:
‘I have no problem with disagreements in IMTs as long as they are resolved and
there is an outcome.’
Collaboration and Cooperation - Interpersonal conflict
In addition to being the result of disagreements, interpersonal conflict develops when someone
feels they are not being treated with respect, when someone is not trusted, when someone
is suspected of having an agenda (an ulterior self-serving motive), when decisions made are
perceived as poor and when personalities clash.
‘Where it [teamwork] will fall down is if two personalities clash badly where you
can’t communicate, you can’t be bothered talking to that person because you think
they are an idiot. So it will never work, it can’t work, you need to be able to work
together.’
The tough masculine culture of the industry is not one that promotes conciliatory behaviour;
‘it’s that, ‘righto I’ll take you outside’ business.’
‘if you get two strong personalities one will not want to seem submissive to the
other. Giving in, in the mining industry unfortunately is a sign of weakness and
submissiveness.’
Interpersonal conflict within teams appears frequent and was noted as the source of much
anger, frustration and withdrawal from IMT discussions. The extent of people’s reaction to
conflict during the interviews was indicative of how problematic this can become. Participants
recalled occasions when interpersonal conflict had caused communication to break down com-
pletely, had resulted in team-members leaving the site completely and even becoming physical
in and around an IMT.
‘I can tolerate a fair bit of idiot, but it gets to a point where you can’t tolerate it
anymore and therefore you don’t want to deal with them.’
‘One of the young engineers got jumped on fairly heavily by the guy that was
running it at the time, and that was the last we saw of him for a couple of days.
You know, ‘screw you, I’ll go and work on something else.’
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Open conflict results when the recipient of the perceived wrong-doing retaliates, and this
seems common. People seem to personalise the other person’s behaviour by taking o↵ense and
this can result in them reacting emotionally or retaliating physically. Participants believed this
phenomena is exaggerated when existing relationships are poor and are magnified by fatigue
and stress when people are naturally more likely to ‘snap’ back. For example, one interviewee
justified his personal retaliation by explaining:
‘He was a little prick anyway.’
Two participants suggested that personalities get stronger in the emergency environment
and could therefore exacerbate interpersonal conflict:
‘So if you are highly aggressive and you are under pressure you will act in an
aggressive manner. If you are naturally an introvert, under pressure you will become
even more introverted. Which isn’t a good thing if you are a mine-manager.’
Interpersonal conflict is obviously bad for harmonious teamwork, but of more concern is that
it often resulted in a breakdown of communication potentially a↵ecting the IMT’s situation
awareness and decision-making because information may not be passed on or decisions may
not be challenged. Furthermore, even if communication does not cease completely, the persons
involved in the conflict appear to waste valuable cognitive resources on unproductive thoughts
rather than the team goals. For example:
‘...and one bloke, I thought he was a bit of a dick, and some of the stu↵ coming
out was just rubbish and I could see myself falling into the trap of just arguing with
this bloke because he was, if he opened his mouth it was going to be bullshit, so I
was going to show him how clever I was by proving how wrong he was. Fortunately
I saw, I’ve had enough experience with screwing up before, that I could control that
a bit.’
‘If they are not playing well with others in the team, it’s di cult to focus on..
The decision-making is more combatting that bloke rather than... What if he gets
one over on me or what if I say something wrong and he jumps on me, it becomes
about me instead of the incident. So batten down the hatches against this guy, by
putting up the defence, which is really not constructive at all. It’s not useful for the
process.’
‘And I can tell ya, towards the end I thought about just strangling this bloke [the
IC] and putting him out of his misery. And, I just sat there with a smile on my face
and thought you are the biggest wanker I’ve ever met and I could strangle you... but
I had a smile on my face. It wasn’t worrying me, it was just a thought that went
through my head a couple of times.’
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‘You can’t let your own feelings and emotions override the situation, or the needs
of the team or the situation, or the people you are looking for. And some people
can do that and some people can’t. And, if you allow that to happen that’s what’s
occupying some of those units in your brain, those, 5, 6, 7 units or whatever they
are, so yeah. And how do you train people to do that, just to say. I know heaps
of people, I mean I think I can go, ‘yeah, righto’ and get on with life but there are
some people that just can’t.’
Personal conflict instigated by the IC was deemed particularly disruptive and that to avoid
it, many believed the IC should not personalise issues. However, it was also noted that those
on the receiving end of any negativity should not take the IC’s behaviour personally and ‘drop
the bundle’.
‘You have to be able to deal with immense stress, and be able to stay reasonably
calm throughout. Now there were a couple of times where I lost my shit, there’s
no question, but the guys, I never once personalised it, it was always about the
transaction.’
‘I’ve seen a mine-manager verbally abusing his VO because the VO didn’t know
what to do, he didn’t know - yet the mine-manager wanted it, who was also the
incident controller, and he just lost the plot and he was so emotional about abusing
this guy that this guy just walked out. He was never ever going to get the information
he was looking for.’
‘Then it’s probably for the IMT leader to say well, ‘that’s very good what you are
saying but it’s a load of crap, shut up, and let’s listen to what this guy’s saying.’ And
if the people in the room are trained that they don’t get o↵ended by that. You don’t
want someone in the room, that the big guy at the end of the table says, ‘Ruth, that
was idiotic what you said there’, and doesn’t contribute to the rest of the argument.
But I don’t want Ruth to shut-up until the end of the day. I want you to come
back the next time when you’ve got an idea, and you will see that, some people only
get slapped once and they go into their shell. So when you think about it that’s
something you could train.’
Collaboration and Cooperation - Inter-group and inter-agency issues
Conflict is not restricted to individuals. In an emergency scenario many groups are involved,
these can be formal groupings such as those prescribed by the mining emergency management
system and other agencies who are responding (such as the police and mines inspectorate), or
informal-groupings such as those who were at the scene at the time and those who arrive later.
The creation of factions between groups is again not conducive to good teamwork and has often
resulted in communication failure.
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This issue was frequently commented on by those who attended the Pike River mine. The
conflicts included the police versus mining people, the NSW versus QLD mines rescue services,
the IMT versus the workers carrying out the tasks and Australians versus New Zealanders.
Interestingly, interviewees from both the QLD and NSW rescue services recalled the same
event and gave almost identical accounts of the discussions surrounding the same decision, yet
both felt that they were ‘railroaded’.
‘There was a massive friction with the mines rescue, the families, the pit and
the police. And it was like, I suppose, a lit fuse. That’s what I felt, you know.’
‘I became a bit of a target, this bastard from Australia won’t let us go in. I’d
walk into the room, and a cold cloud would come over the room with the rest of the
guys and I could feel it.’
‘they’d been totally ostracised from the IMT and they are sitting in their little
world, and they’re churning away, that’s the enemy over there, they are telling the
families and it’s really cutting us up, they are all Aussies this management team,
and they are our people down in the town, so there was this real hatred.’
‘There was a lot of vested interests, politics, you know the police were sitting in
the corner, we had a committee like an expert panel who were just a faceless mob of
people that we didn’t know that were reviewing our stu↵. So all the way along there
was this management of sensitivities, personalities and making decisions.’
The level of the conflict at Pike River was a surprise to some.
‘I didn’t expect that when I got there. I didn’t expect that that was the case, and
I worked it out pretty quick. And one of thing I felt was gee whiz, it’s going to be
a di cult thing to manage because you’ve got this split in an extremely stressful
situation.’
Interviewees identified that the biggest source of conflict at Pike River was the police taking
the lead role and not seeking advice from the mining personnel located at the mine-site. Factions
developed because the mining people felt they were not being listened to by the Police. This
meant that mining groups did their own thing until they were instructed to stop by the Police.
The delays to decision-making and some of the police behaviours caused severe frustration.
Despite the common goal of rescuing the missing men, the police also had a vested interest in
preserving the crime scene and collecting evidence. Several of their behaviours associated with
this irked the mining people whose sole focus was the rescue. One of the most disruptive police
behaviours noted was removing evidence such as computers from the mine o ces while the
mining people were working on the technical aspects of a potential rescue. The large number
of police in the IMTs and the fact the police sat down at the table during IMTs, while the
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mining people stood, were interpreted as a display of power. Another spoke of the police having
casual conversations as if it were just another day at the o ce, while for the mining people,
this was perceived a disaster of a grand scale. These issues, amongst others, meant that the
IMT meetings were avoided by some.
Pike River is not a lone case. Three participants spoke of the hostility they have received
and observed during other incidents when they arrived to o↵er assistance.
‘So it was a real bastard of a pissing contest in there. Which I thought was
odd.’
‘The IMT was in a small room like this and I was invited in, and the usual
suspicion when you walk in.’
‘So there was almost like the Hatfields and McCoys when you walked into the
yard, you had to be careful who you spoke to because, which group you were associated
with after that. It’s quite a strange place to be.’
Several participants spoke of how they tried to establish communication with those shutting
them out by trying to win their trust, agreeing with them or spending time talking to them.
However, in one case this was not successful and it was feared that if the in-comers were needed
to assist, their assistance would not have been accepted.
‘It was almost a closed shop there. We were... seen as the interlopers coming to
save the day. Quite low key, but hard to get information, people just shut down and
wouldn’t give us the information, and wouldn’t really be associated with us.’
The perspective of those at the mine, who are reluctant to interact with the said ‘interlopers’,
was explained by someone who had felt that way whilst recovering bodies.
‘people are more than prepared to go back day after day. And people would
actually be upset if they don’t go back. Other people want to get involved but the
people who are there won’t let them get involved. It’s quite bizarre.’No you’re not
going in there’, it’s you know. It was the same people and they will not su↵er anyone
else going. It’s really strange.’
Another participant who had also experienced body recovery over a period of days explained
that although many people can arrive at a mine-site following a fatal incident,
‘they are not a↵ected the way the people who work at the mine are a↵ected’.
In addition to it being their own colleague’s bodies that these men removed from the mine,
and the obvious distress arising from that, it is possibly more emotional for them because it
is their workplace and it could (or even ‘should’ ) have been them that was killed. It seems
important to recognise the ownership that those who work at the mine will want to take.
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However, group conflicts have also arisen between technical people from the same mine and
should be working together. For instance between the MEMS groups and also between an IC
and the sta↵ at a mine, when the IC was a contractor and most of the employees were sta↵.
‘When I’ve been involved in one particular fatality, people in the operations group
were blaming people in the planning group, potentially for the incident happening in
the first place.’
Similarly, conflicts have arisen between the mine and the mines inspectorate. Both have a
vested interest in keeping people safe, but the mines inspectorate do not face the same financial
repercussions the mining company will if the mine is sealed. If the mines inspectorate adopts a
policy of no risk, they could close a mine. However, a mining company will be more motivated to
quantify the decision risks, rather than take an overly conservative approach, because closing
a mine would have serious repercussions for shareholders and potentially hundreds of mine
employees. It is the mine, not the mines inspectorate, that will have to live with the financial
consequences of a closed mine.
‘That incident created a lot of tension, and word came back to our rescue guys,
‘Oh, they’re [mine management and the mines inspector] not making any decisions
in there now, it’s all to-ing and fro-ing and who can get the upper hand on some-
body.’
The concerns raised here echo those highlighted in the mining industry report on trust which
claimed ‘The relationship between mining companies and inspectors, in particular, is fraught
with sensitivities, and the opportunities for mistrust to arise are potent and plentiful’ [82, p. 21].
Collaboration and Cooperation - Roles and responsibilities
There was general agreement that people need to focus on, and remain in, the roles that they
have been assigned, even if it is the ‘dunny monitor’. The implementation of the MEMS,
and training in this system, has to a degree addressed the issue of defining the roles and
responsibilities:
‘So the MEMS program is designed so that decisions are made at ICT, planning
comes up with the plans, logistics gets all the bits and pieces that you need and the
operations puts them into play.’
However several participants implied that the implementation of an incident control system
is insu cient on its own to ensure that each of the team members are clear on their roles and
responsibilities. Roles and responsibilities in a mining emergency are dictated by the mine’s own
emergency management plan and duty-cards, which are only guided by the MEMS structure.
Duty cards are distributed upon discovery of an incident and list the tasks associated with
each role. However, duty-cards were often criticised for incorporating too much superfluous
information:
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‘The duty-cards are like that [indicates an inch thick with his fingers] with all that
information on them, fantastic information, but trying to transfer that information
into your head when you can see gas alarms going o↵. Not a chance!’
‘One exercise, I got half way down the page of my responsibilities and that’s as
far as I got. Alright, so those duty-cards we’ve got, they’ve got all this bull-shit on
them.’
Another problem is actually understanding the duty-cards and the management plan in the
stressful emergency environment:
‘Someone will hand me a duty card and if it’s not one I’m familiar with, I’ve
gotta really struggle line by line to go through it.’
‘I can’t, I’ve been given things under stress before. Someone will give me a
procedure, I can’t read it. I physically can’t read it. Even if it’s in letters that high
[about 5cm with fingers]. I either know it or I don’t. If it’s not in my head by that
stage, it’s [too late]’.
It was suggested that the following conversation should accompany the distribution of duty-
cards:
‘if I give you a duty card, I’d say ‘Ruth there’s your duty card, all the dot points
of what you are going to do, please before you go anywhere please sit down, read
them, understand them and tell me what they mean to you, because my expectation
when you walk out of this room is that you are going to deliver to me everything
that’s on there. And if you can’t deliver what’s written there I need to know why.’
Five minutes spent one-on-one with the respective card holder will make life so much
easier as your day progresses. ‘If you are not sure Ruth, you tell me what part you
are i↵y with and we will go through what it means’.’
It was seen as vitally important that everyone sticks to the tasks the duty-cards specify.
‘don’t jump in to someone else’s role. Allow people to do the role that they’ve
got. Each role has got a specific set of actions, and the duty-cards, it does set you
o↵ on the right path and you’ve got to follow it. And stick with it. Not jump around
from role to role. And not try to do your reportee, not try do his role for him. All
you can give is guidance if you pick the right person you are halfway there.’
The concept of clearly defining roles and responsibilities fits with the philosophy of making
sure key taskwork is completed but does not facilitate collaboration or cooperation and is
therefore not in-line with the social pre-requisites essential for successful implementation of
an incident control system. The ICS is reliant on cooperation and collaboration, yet there is
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no allowance for teamwork in the MEMS. The duty-card system not only tells people what
they should be doing but indirectly tells them what not to do i.e. if it’s not included on your
duty card you don’t do it. However, this unrealistically pre-supposes that the duty-cards have
been written with such accuracy that all of the tasks required for each potential emergency
management scenario are included.
Implementation of an ICS does not improve collaboration or cooperation and it seems that
perhaps the implementation of this structure, for use only during emergency situations, can
cause increased animosity. One example includes that of deputies who are statutory o cials at
a mine and report directly to the mine-manager on a daily basis, yet in MEMS they don’t.
‘You can’t take that system out totally or take it away from them because then
they don’t know what to do. They are like fish out of water. ‘Oh, what do I do now?’
They take their statutory o cials and sit them in a corner. It’s fucking bullshit.
And that’s what happens, because they won’t do it. They find their way around this.
So they have their little meetings over here, and little meetings over there.’
Collaboration and Cooperation - Maintain focus on the objectives
Participants identified that setting goals is crucial. Management by objectives is a key principle
of MEMS therefore it is unsurprising this topic arose. Participants believed that setting goals
and objectives was a good method of leadership because they helped to align the team and
maintained their focus.
‘And I guess can make the teamwork easier by defining what the objectives are.
It’s much easier for a team to work if they know what the goal is.’
Of particular emphasis was the need to have clear goals at the early stages of the incident,
when teams have been unsure about,
‘what they were doing. What the focus was, where they were going, why they
were doing, what they were doing, what needed to be done, what to focus on’
as the situation develops,
‘the goals and objectives may change rapidly due to new information being re-
ceived’
or when things start to go wrong,
‘Now there could be a time when it all goes wrong, and that’s still holding the
discipline of that’s what we’re here for. What’s the objective? Has the objective
changed?’
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In particular, goals were said to need redefinition when the emergency changes from a rescue
of live miners to a recovery of bodies. Participants explained that at this time, the objectives,
the pace of the response, the way decision are made, and the priorities all change.
‘it’s now not a rescue, it’s a recovery, and so then your thought processes change
because the urgency comes o↵.’
‘the objective then moves from finding people to getting people out of the mine.
And that part is much better because there is more information and more of an
understanding of what’s happening.’
‘One of the big things that I think is important in these situations is to determine
when escape changes to rescue / recovery.’
Some participants suggested that goals and objectives should be negotiated with the IMT
for socialisation,
‘the objectives may be something you want to negotiate with the team. So they
feel they are part of, being influenced if you like, and feeling a part of that social
process’
and because people may interpret them di↵erently:
‘the same four or five words don’t always mean the same thing to people so it’s
good to explore around the table, what do they understand in terms of the objective,
and what am I going to do to achieve.’
‘So it’s about articulating your objectives well and everyone agrees. It’s about,
unless everyone is aligned with the objective then people can be pulled by another
string.’
The setting of clear objectives was believed to help the team maintain team focus:
‘it’s really important to have objectives so that everyone in the room knows what
we are trying to do and there are great other things we can be doing but this is where
we are going.’
‘we all know we want to get them out. But you know some people have the airy
fairy objective of ‘the health and safety of all the coal mine workers’ rather than ‘the
objective is to extract longwall crew from there to here’, right that’s clear.’
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This category has revealed the complexities of working in a team when the environment and
the structure the team are working within are unfamiliar. People can be unsure about roles and
responsibilities whilst working in an environment where stress and conflict seems commonplace.
The two issues that seem to underlie many of the comments included in this section were the
need to trust and respect others and to have an understanding of one’s own and fellow team-
mates emotions and stress. The importance placed on these issues by the interviewees mean
that these are discussed in the following two separate categories ‘trusting others’ and ‘caring
for others’.
5.3.4 Trusting Others
This issue was so prevalent in the interviews and often one of the first issues mentioned, un-
prompted, that this seems worthy of a separate category.
Trusting Others - Trusting and having confidence in others
Trust was often forefront in many participants definition of what makes an IMT good at
decision-making. Of particular importance to participants was the need for the team to trust
the IC,
‘If the men don’t have trust or faith in your abilities, then it’s not going to
happen. You know, there will be the backlash.’
‘So first of all, you’ve got trust in that bloke, because at the end of the day there’s
only one boss and the rest are followers.’
and for the IC to trust the team, primarily to avoid micro-managing as discussed later.
‘You’ve got to trust the VO will do the right thing. You’ve got to trust that the
deputy and the men will do the right thing.’
‘The IC needs to trust, he cannot go in and micro-manage’
It was suggested that trust between the team and the IC must be developed in day-to-day
operations because there is no time to earn it when an incident occurs.
‘Normally the leader of the [IMT] is also in a senior management position, and
would have been involved in basically your appointment to that position, so actually
you trust that person’s capabilities. If that is not already there you’re in deep shit.’
In many cases, a lack of trust seems to have led to communication breakdown because the
untrusted person is not listened to or the message itself has become lost because the listener
focussed on the speaker’s agenda and motives.
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‘Destroyed any credibility that he had. The men had no respect for him after
that whatsoever. Including myself. We refused to take orders from him from that
point on because he was obviously more worried about himself than the rest of the
men.’ ‘So yeah, we didn’t want anything to do with him after that.’
‘Just the way he talked. You know how somebody can say exactly the same words
and get it across very realistically and someone can say exactly the same words and
the hairs on the back of your neck go up and you just think I just don’t believe this
guy.’
Consequently, building trust enables a more open flow of communication.
‘To a degree, once you won someone’s confidence they’d open up and tell you a
few things, nothing too sensitive but. It was just trying to break that wall down first
to have a chat with them.’
‘Communication is just so important, communication out, communication in,
you need to establish that high trust environment.’
The relationship between trust and decision-making seems reciprocal. Decision-making is
more e↵ective when there is trust in the team, yet one of the ways trust can be gained is through
positive appraisal others’ decisions.
‘We knew that the people who were making the decisions were making the right
decisions, so that gave us confidence in them.’
The transference of trust was also spoken of. One participant spoke of automatically trusting
an expert who was trusted by people he trusted. Another thought the only way that people
would trust him as a credible source was if a respected person had overtly handed control to
him thus indicating that he could be trusted and another spoke of the strangeness of being
the person that received this transferred trust from strangers because he was introduced to the
them as someone to be trusted.
Two participants discussed the role of trust in life and death scenarios such as rescue teams
re-entering the mine following an incident. One concluded that trust alone is an insu cient
basis, the other was willing to place all his trust in an expert.
‘I had my pit gear on and there was complete trust in that he wasn’t going to
blow me up. In that way yes. You’d struggle without trusting the people who were
making that decision. As far as making decisions in an IMT I guess so. Em...
Eh... yeah I’m struggling with that one because if decisions were going to be made
I wouldn’t want to take it on trust.’
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‘Em, I suppose because [name] is who [name] is. I knew, cause I’d quite often
ask him, ‘[name], if I asked you to lead the crew underground would you go?’ ‘Yeah,
no problems at all. If you want me to go I’ll go with them right now.’ So I tested
him quite a bit on that as well, to make sure.’
Only one interviewee was concerned by the fact trust had arisen as a key non-technical issue
for mining IMTs. This participant’s sarcasm in the first quote below, almost perfectly replicates
the point another participant legitimately expressed in the second quote below.
‘So you’ve been the boss since October, we all agree with ‘Bob’ because we all
like ‘Bob’, we trust him, he’s never made a bad decision yet.’
‘So you respect that person and the shit hits the fan and you go, ‘Well, I like
X, he’s very knowledgeable in his work, he’s a good problem solver so I’m going to
trust him make those decisions.’... That’s how I see it anyway.’
Trusting Others - Having an agenda
If a person was perceived to ‘have an agenda’ they were suspected of having priorities that
were self-serving rather than in-line with the objectives of the team. To have an agenda meant
you would not be trusted.
‘Agenda, that’s you trying to get me to do something for your personal gain.’
‘If you’ve got an agenda you’re screwed’
The most frequent person accused of having an agenda was the IC. The participants believed
that due to his legal responsibilities he would be highly motivated to make decisions that
would potentially absolve him, such as destroying evidence, rather than make decisions that
are focussed on the best interests of the miners. This was commonly termed, ‘arse covering’.
‘in our current format the IC tends to fall to the mine-manager, the SSE, in that
area of high management. And they are the same people that are more than likely,
or shall we say, possibly, caused the incident in the first place or were responsible
for the things, systems, procedures, processes that caused the incident to happen. So
initially that person, his response, or his first instinct, is to protect his own arse.
And you see it at every incident control team, that the controller is first and foremost
protecting his arse, the company’s interests, then he puts the incident itself. But
he’s never ever there as primarily and solely to control the incident alone. He’s
always got background or baggage or something else in the background influencing
his decisions.’
‘And that’s something that’s pretty unique for us in our industry as the person
who is culpable is the person who’s responsible.’
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‘Well you instantly know if you are the mine-manager and someone dies at your
pit, it’s your fault. It’s the opposite to innocent until proven guilty. It’s your fault.
You prove that it wasn’t your fault.’
Participants stated explicitly that they needed to establish that a person had no agenda
before they could trust them or have confidence in the decisions they made. As with trust,
agenda and respect were linked to maintaining open and honest communications:
‘So with [the name of the man he respects], he can actually challenge me, I can
challenge him, and I know that what he tells me will not have an agenda attached
to it. I know that it’s not political and I know that it’s not self-serving. What it is,
is a conversation about solving a problem. So I had a heap of respect for him about
problem solving. I had a heap of respect for [name] about problem solving, and it
wasn’t about personal agenda.’
Five participants spoke of people with personal agendas distracting from the goals of an
emergency management response,
‘All these little agendas going on while I’m trying to work out the explosibility
of the goaf.’
Some examples of the behaviours that gave them away include:
‘Concealing information, or keeping, once I’ve got it keeping information... in-
formation is power. Once I’ve got information that’s for me and me alone.’
‘The questions they asked, the jobs they give people to do.’ ‘everyone in the room
goes why? What’s that got to do with anything? So straight away people are going,
why? What’s your intention? Why are you doing that? So you know straight away
there is another agenda.’
Trusting Others - Respecting others
Most participants, but not all, spoke of the necessity to respect their team-mates, especially
the IC.
‘He’s [the IC] got to have respect. There’s no doubt he’s, the boys, everybody at
the mine has to respect him and needs to see him as the leader, cause if you’re the
leader and you’ve not got respect people are not going to follow you, especially when
the shit hits the fan. So yeah, you’ve got to have respect.’
Respect for the IC was believed to improve collaborative decision-making because challenges
are not perceived as threatening, people will put more e↵ort in for an IC they respect and
generally people are more likely to accept the decisions made by people who are respected:
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‘And to me what makes an IMT work well is that the IC has the respect of all
the people in the room, he consults with everyone in the room before he makes a
decision, so even though it’s his decision it’s a group decision.’
It was commonly suggested that having good social skills was important to gaining respect.
‘I can’t demand that you’ll respect me. I’ve gotta earn it. So how do I earn
respect? Speaking to you nicely, helping you solve problems, getting you to help me
solve problems in our everyday work and being a general nice person. And then
you’ll go well he’s a really nice bloke, and he’s really knowledge about what he does
and he helps me out, I’ve got a lot of respect for him. So you earn that respect.
Trust is much the same.’
Much of the di↵erentiation between trust, confidence, respect seems due to the di↵erent
meanings people attribute to these words. Trust and respect were often spoken of as a pair.
‘So I wanted to see how much they trusted and respected the SSE. And, So I
asked them, ‘Do you have confidence in what the SSE’s doing?’
Some participants clarified that it is less important to respect the person as a whole but to
respect their opinions, technical skills, ability, decisions, resourcefulness, technical competence
and their integrity.
‘if I didn’t respect his technical ability that would be a huge problem.’
‘I don’t care if he’s a wanker, in all respects, if he’s an expert in gas interpretation
I want his input.‘
5.3.5 Caring for others
This category was borne out of the many comments made about needing to care for, or have a
sensitivity to the needs of those in the IMT and also the mineworkers and the families of those
who have been involved in a tragedy. To have compassion for and display empathy towards the
people closely impacted by a tragedy was almost always believed to be the IC’s responsibility.
Caring for others - Caring for the IMT
Many participants highlighted the need for the IC to care for the IMT members. This generally
seemed driven by a desire to get the best out the team.
‘Researcher: What other skills make a good IC?
Participant: So, they’ve certainly got to have good mining experience. They need
to care, they need to be open to people’s questioning and able to interpret the way
people are feeling within the group.
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Researcher: What do you mean by care?
Participant: Well they need to appear to give a damn about the way I am feeling
at the moment.‘
‘Well if your care factor for people is zero, they are not going to work for you.
So you do have to be compassionate I guess is the word you’d have to use. Well,
you’ve definitely got to be empathetic. Empathy is important.’
‘I care about you, I care about your decision, I care about your input. So it is
about helping that team feel valued and that their contributions are being processed.’
Caring appears to be another aspect of leadership and teamwork that is inter-related with
trust, respect and communication. Caring was generally interpreted as being a mix of empathy,
humility, sympathy, compassion and having sensitivity to what other team members may need
or be feeling. Behaviours associated with showing care included how the IC speaks to people,
encouraging people to contribute to open communication, treating people as you would expect
to be treated, and actively looking out for people who may be struggling emotionally.
‘you still need to be an e↵ective leader, you still need to win the trust and respect
of people, and that is about caring about them.’
‘You’ve got to have empathy for your people and understand where they are and
not drive them into the ground.’
‘Caring has to come out in your choice of words and in the tone of your voice.
And eh, and that has to be genuine, because if it’s not genuine people will read that.’
‘I really think that that you know, understanding, having an awareness of people’s
emotional state, of their limitations of their experience, you know, there’s a whole
bundle there that you need to be able to sort of ...and people might say ‘I don’t have
time for that shit’, ‘I don’t have time to look out for you, you either fucking do it or
you don’t, simple as that’ but, that is not reality I’m afraid. We need to have that,
you know particularly at the higher level, you need to be able to manage it.’
‘I think, I don’t know if it’s to care. But it’s certainly to understand the feelings
of the individuals. What I try to do is visualise myself in that particular position,
whatever it may be, and then you might get an idea of what that individual is going
through.’
However, apparently a certain ‘degree of detachment’ is needed and there is a limit to the
amount of caring that is optimal for an IMT. This was often believed to be when it began
interfering with the functionality of the group.
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‘My caring, would stop in terms of an IMT if any of it interfered with the
functionality.’
‘I have seen an extreme example of that where they are all trying overly hard to
look after each other and it’s bullshit, going in the wrong directions.’
‘Yeah look. I think you’ve got to be careful about, as long as the caring doesn’t
cloud your judgement. I think that everything I did was doing was about caring
about people. I wanted people in there because I cared about the fact I wanted them
to see what we were doing and get confidence that I wasn’t going to put them in a
position of retrenchment. I cared about my team. The amount of times I said to
my assistant can you go and get everyone down because we are actually eating in
again so she’d go and get Italian or whatever. The fact that I was really thankful
about how much e↵ort they’d put in and all of that. So I believe all of that to be true
but there’s not one time when I let any of that cloud my judgement . If I thought
somebody was not up to their job or they were too stressed to do it, ‘you’re o↵ site.”
The IMT members are the work colleagues and potentially close friends or family of those
who may be injured or killed in an incident. Care and compassion in the IMT may be needed
due to IMT members relationships with those involved.
‘I mean no-one wants to lose anyone at a mine site and there’s a fair chance
you will know the people well, especially if you’ve worked with them a long time.’
‘A lot of us have relatives in the mines and you might have to say at that point
if he’s got a son down there or a brother or someone, it might be best to remove
him from there to get rid of that emotive side from it, because his decision-making
is going to be clouded if he does have a relative involved.’
Four participants spoke of losing their best mate in mining accidents. Two of them were
managers at the time and therefore key decision-makers during the emergency management
operation. However, despite this, they all played an active role in physically recovering their
mate’s body from the mine. In all but one case, their mate was one of several fatalities.
It cannot be guaranteed that IMT members will not be exposed to particularly emotional
stimuli and that this must be considered in mine emergency planning. O↵ering care and
compassion may prolong their ability to contribute meaningfully to the response while also
potentially helping them cope. The horror of some of the situations the interviewees have
experienced cannot be underplayed and it cannot be assumed that the IMT members will not
be involved. A real incident does not distinguish between IMT members and mineworkers,
simply who is underground at the time. Two incidents were discussed where would-be IMT
members were killed, one was the mine-manager, the other the under-manager.
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Another type of care includes the team’s physical and logistical needs. Managing an incident
can take several days or even weeks or month. This means that IMT members may be living
away from home, or be reluctant to go home, for extended periods of time. Some participants
spoke of the physical needs that develop after an extended period of time away from home
including the need for clean underwear, soap, razors, appropriate clothing, cigarettes, a homely
environment, a comfortable bed, toothpaste, a clean room, everyday food (i.e. not too rich)
and a need to take time out to be with family.
‘if you’re out at a minesite and fighting a mine fire and your bed’s shit and the
food’s crap, you can’t find your last pair of socks, you’ve got no more jocks left
because you’ve been in the pit for 4 days, it just doesn’t work!’
Caring for others - Compassion for those close to the incident - Mine workers
Survivors of a serious incident may have witnessed emotional stimuli or may play a part in
the rescue or body recovery. There is a practical and moral need to care about these team
members’ emotional state because these are the people that supply the IMT with information
and action their decisions in the immediate aftermath of an incident and they will no-doubt
turn up day-after-day at the mine if there is a protracted rescue or body-recovery operation
underway.
One participant who was a manager, and in the mine at the time of an incident, revealed
several issues that the IMT must consider when dealing with people who are physically working
at the incident site. He explains that because these men are actively focussed on the rescue
or recovery of their mates, passing information up to the IMT can be forgotten about. This,
and the general isolation of the IMT means that the IMT quickly becomes divorced from the
reality of the situation and the decisions they make can be seen as completely inappropriate,
or even o↵ensive, by those underground.
‘this is where you get a massive disconnect between the people upstairs, who
haven’t seen it, haven’t lived it and sometimes the messages that come down send
the people underground absolutely berserk.’
‘people underground went absolutely mad because they are in the thick of it and
these people are divorced from it [the IMT] and there was this massive disconnect.
And I tell you we had people underground that wanted to go upstairs and punch
their lights out. This caused a massive upset for quite a while until everyone calmed
down.’
The IMT must consider the emotional needs and cognitive limitations of those workers and
how best to communicate with them to minimise further emotional turmoil whilst work is being
undertaken. This possibly includes modifying communication strategies and the physical re-
quirements placed on them. Examples of poor IMT decisions that have caused conflict between
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the IMT and those working on body recoveries include: the provision of transparent body bags;
disagreements about the appropriateness of recovering the personal e↵ects from the deceased to
give to their wives; insensitivity in the use of certain words; making inappropriate comments;
and in one case making a poor technical decision, that would normally have been caught by
the underground workers but, due to their reduced cognitive capacity, they simply did as they
were told with potentially catastrophic consequences.
The IMT must also ensure the support required for those who have been involved under-
ground is available. The mining literature suggests that people who survive an incident in the
mine will undoubtedly try to help their mates [113] and this can involve extreme physical and
emotional exertion. Two participants spoke of men physically collapsing shortly after helping
with a body recovery and others going into shock. A similar situation arose at Pike River: it
was only luck that the man who managed to drag his colleague out of the mine had su cient
strength to call the control room when he exited the mine before collapsing. No-one met them
at the portal despite having the knowledge that they were exiting the mine.
A belief that mines rescue will always be the ones facilitating a rescue or recovery, and that
they are somehow more resilient, is unrealistic.
‘they [the industry in general] just assume we [mine rescue] are immune to the
emotional side of things.’
The assumption that sending those who are emotional o↵-site to rest will help them was
exposed by the interviewees as being too simplistic and untrue. Several participants stated
that going home and being alone were the worst times for them emotionally and that sleep
and rest were not achieved prior their next shift anyway. This was true of both hands-on team
members and IMT members. Four participants explained that coming back day after day to
assist with a long-term body recovery operation was to some extent ‘therapy’. They were not
alone in believing this and felt it gave them a purpose at this time. The mining literature
has highlighted the potential benefits of critical incident stress debriefing to assist people to
continue to function [110, 109], but most commonly the interviewees explained the best way to
cope was to spend time with mates that have been through similar situations, even if they just
talk ‘shit’.
Long-term e↵ects are not the focus of this research, however potentially the IMT can influ-
ence these e↵ects. Some participants outlined their own ongoing emotional struggles including
recurring nightmares. Seven interviewees became tearful during the interviews, others reported
physical reactions such as getting goosebumps and another reported seeing his dead colleague’s
face s he was talking. Experiencing a mine tragedy was described as a life changing event. They
spoke of many colleagues leaving the industry following major incidents and the psychological
impacts on their lives including several cases of post-traumatic stress disorder, divorce and
alcoholism. Any actions that an IMT can take to minimise these long-term consequences, such
as allowing people to return to site and perform less critical tasks, should be considered.
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‘Well there’s probably various tactics, and one is to, and I don’t know if it’s
wrong or right, I think if you keep people focused , that might be another word
for overloading, but if people are generally occupied there is probably less time and
opportunity for stress levels to fester, build up and get out of hand.’
Compassion for those close to the incident - Families
Several participants believed that the IC has a responsibility to care for the families of those
who are missing, killed or injured.
‘He has to care about what he’s doing and about the people that are a↵ected. And
as we talked about today there is a bit more than that there’s a bloke trapped under
there, what about his wife, what about his kids, all those things have to be thought
about and he has to understand all of that and I don’t think a lot of them [ICs] do.’
Although no participant explicitly stated that caring for the families directly impacts decision-
making, it was a topic many raised unprompted. The need to care for them was assumed by
most to be a role of the IC. Following a fatal incident families become important stakeholders
and interaction with them becomes likely.
‘Participant: Well if you’ve got to talk to a lady with a nine month old baby
in her arms and her husband might not be coming home, doesn’t matter how well
trained you are, it might have been the environment that caused the issue, you know
you’ve gotta, even though you are responsible for it you’ve still got to have that
compassionate side, know what I mean? The buck stops with the mine-manager. I
think that’s important.
Researcher: Who says you’ve still got to care about that woman with the nine
month old baby?
Participant: I would have thought that’s innate in everybody. I would’ve thought.
Gee, you’d have to be a bloody cold blooded bastard not to. But I don’t know if there’s
anyone out there like that.’
Dealing with the families of the deceased was said by all who had experienced it to be
extremely di cult, attending funerals was considered particularly di cult. One participant
with emergency services experience said that he has found interacting with the families a lot
more di cult than dealing with bodies.
Only one participant with experience at a number of fatal incidents spoke of deliberately not
interacting with the families. He focussed on making sure the families were cared for in practical
ways such as the provision of flights, accommodation or money and explains his reasons for not
showing his personal concern below:
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‘In all of these things I always remove myself from the a↵ected party. So I’ve
been to three fatalities now, and there was funerals and wives and all that sort of
stu↵. So what I try and do is go, no, very sterile, very much this is what I’m going
to focus on. But I stay out of that completely. Because I’m as human as the next
person, I divorce myself from it until it’s done. And then I’m happy to do what I
need to do [to care from them].’
5.3.6 Personal strengths and limitations
This category addresses the need for those involved in managing an emergency to understand
their own personal limitations regarding technical and non-technical abilities. In a team envi-
ronment such as an IMT, this involves realistically appraising one’s own ability to undertake
the job at hand and an evaluation of whether continued personal input is in the best interests
of the team. The importance of this ability was recognised by many participants:
‘I think one of the most important factors for that person is to understand his
own capabilities.’
‘I think if people are smart they will ask for the right assistance. They will know
what their own personal gaps are.’
‘Have a good understanding of your emotions at the time and how is that a↵ect-
ing your decision-making. Be open and honest with yourself. Are you capable of
performing that role and if not, be man enough or woman enough to say I can’t do
it emotionally and put someone in that can. And that’s a big decision... I’d respect
somebody tremendously for doing that.’
The physical and emotional stressors impacting IMT members were perceived to push some
team members to their limits. This category considers a person’s ability to recognise and with-
stand the stressors they may encounter during the management of a mine-emergency including
social stressors, physiological stressors and psychological stressors. Social stressors include the
emergency environment, the additional agencies this involves and how people are reacting to
others within it. Physiological stressors include how people are physically and cognitively af-
fected by the fight or flight stress reaction and long working hours. Psychological stressors
include the possibly unfamiliar, confusing and potentially debilitating emotions that may be
experienced.
Those who had been an IC noted that it would be helpful if others would recognise their
own limits and speak-up when they were approaching their personal limits to prevent mistakes
and poor decision-making. One IC stated that this would have helped him plan rest periods
for team members during a response rather than relying solely on his own evaluation of their
fatigue and stress levels.
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‘I think you need to be man enough to say, ‘listen, I’m really fatigued, I need
someone to relieve me.’ And that’s something people don’t realise.’
‘It would be good if we could get to the point where people put up their hand and
say look I’m under stress.’
‘[name] came to me and said, ‘Mate, I need a break’ and I already knew that
he needed a break but when he actually said that it actually brought it all forward
probably 3 or 4 days and I said, ‘Mate, o↵ you go.’ So some people I’ve probably
misjudged but it was a good enough relationship with the guys that I can tell, or they
could tell me what they had to tell me and nobody felt that they had to be heroes in
all of this.’
However, the macho and unforgiving nature of the industry seems a likely reason why admit-
ting that fatigue, emotion or stress is a↵ecting one’s performance is not a common occurrence.
‘I’m not tired I can push through to the end. It’s a macho thing and it cuts across
to the arguments. Once it starts it’s very, very di cult to repair in our industry.’
‘And the other thing is I guess once you’ve been broken by a lot of stress, the
mining industry isn’t very forgiving. Once you’ve stu↵ed up it doesn’t tend to give
you a second chance. You do tend to be tarred by the brush.’
‘I cannot admit that I’ve lost control. I am a first class mine-manager. He’d
rather let it fall to bits than ask for help. That was a major flaw. I’ve got to be big
enough to ask for help, I need to get the right people in the right place. I don’t care
where they come from.’
‘Like if I work dog watch and am exhausted, and then they say, ‘well someone
hasn’t turned up, we need you to work day work as well’ Sigh, ‘oh, no way, I can’t’
but you’re expected to be able to man up and be able to do that because that’s what
we do.’
Due to others’ reluctance to speak out when they are struggling with stress, emotion or
fatigue an ability to recognise and deal with others who are reaching their limits was deemed
a necessary skill for the IC and team-members.
As an industry, failure to recognise and plan for the reactions and limitations of the people
involved in the response is to omit a major component of the overall emergency management
planning process. Currently, the prevalent view is that people will function in the roles they
have been given, and those that are seen to be a↵ected by stressors should simply be removed.
However, it was noted by some that can result in the loss of vital technical skills.
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The interviews revealed many aspects of the mine emergency environment that has resulted
in IMT members having to deal with stress and emotion. It seems important to understand
what it is that can drive people to their limits when responding to a mine emergency to
potentially address these issues in the future. Emotion and stress are discussed separately, not
because they are distinct, but to better reflect the terminology used by the participants.
IMT members becoming emotional is a reality. One participant spoke of a mine-manager
who had to relinquish his role as IC due to shock, having been underground and seen the
incident occur. Other participants reported seeing people ’turn to water’ or otherwise become
incapacitated due to their reaction to the situation.
‘Certainly I’ve seen people that have been a↵ected [by emotion] because they know
someone that’s involved in the scenario, so I suppose that’s got to be emotion there.
And the symptoms there were very similar to that of high stress. He lost the ability
to make e↵ective decisions.’
‘Outside his normal character of, he was a good organiser but he wouldn’t have
been able to organise himself a pie for dinner that night.’
‘I haven’t got any problem with people being emotionally connected with the peo-
ple they are trying to save as long as they don’t let it get in the way of decision-
making. You’d be a pretty callous bastard if you didn’t give a hoot about the people
underground, but by the same token you’ve got to remain logical.’
‘My gut-feel would be that it [emotion] has the potential to, to impact decisions,
and depending on the circumstances, if there were people killed, then it might happen,
then yeah, it could really over-rule logical thinking.’
‘Oh [name] he was just a blithering mess. He was just hopeless. But there could
have been baggage there.’
The last comment highlights another aspect of emotion that an emergency can trigger that
has appeared in the psychological literature [181]. Participants spoke of the risk of latent
emotion, from a previous fatal incident, potentially biasing decisions in the future.
‘Especially people who have had direct involvement, these things scar them for
the rest of their life. And what that biases or does to future decisions they make.
Sometimes experience can be good, but sometimes the decisions from experience are
improved. But I wonder if sometimes after having been involved the next time, you
either don’t want to make a decision or I need to make a decision faster, what impact
that would have.’
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‘Even if you look at Moura No.2 , there’d be a lot of rescue guys, especially if
they had involvement at Moura, that would be saying, ‘there is no way we are going
to leave guys in a mine again.’ So that would have an impact on the decisions and
what they’d do.’
People who are carrying a wound, from a major failure or a major emotional,
I’m talking about an emotional wound, will start to operate through that wound, if
its anything related to their working environment or past working environment’.
The following statement is potentially an example of this:
‘Cause I’d rather be dead than have to live with the fact I could’ve got them, but
I didn’t. Because if I don’t go in I’ve got to live with the fact I’ve just committed
them to death.’
The extent of the emotion and stress felt during an IMT was clearly linked to whether or
not there were people harmed in the incident.
‘I initially thought we could have lost about 30 people, in the first 2 to 3 hours
I didn’t know if we had any fatalities or not. I mean we thought we were right but
until we got everyone out and on the surface. That’s when I aged about 10 years.’
‘[Once] we knew there was nobody involved, there wasn’t a fatality, to me the
pressure came o↵ straight away. I thought I really don’t care, it’s just a recovery of
the mine.’
Yet, even when lives are not at risk there is still an aspect of stress because:
‘I’ve also got the livelihood of all of these people on my shoulders I said and I
don’t know what decision to make.’
The di↵erence in the stress and emotion when people are or are not involved was explained
by some:
‘they are both time critical, both potentially dynamic and can happen quickly,
but the stress of this one is ‘shit I might lose my job, or we are not going to meet
budget’ or this one where it’s ‘oh shit, the world media is going to be here in 10
minutes and I’ve got families on the doorstep and I’ve got blokes that I know down
the pit and are possibly dead,’ The emotional state is totally di↵erent in that one
and the stress is horrendous. Or the potential stress.’
‘If there were people underground, of course there would have been stress. Be-
cause there’s that impact. Because the one thing we know in underground is that
if there’s any gaseous event, explosion or whatnot and somebody is underground,
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you’re dead. Right. It’s only a miracle if you survive... So now my mate’s dead and
I’m out of a job, and I have to deal with all of that right now. So I think that the
stresses are completely di↵erent.’
‘The real stress there was the lack of communications with the people under-
ground, and that people had to self-escape out of the panel and some nearly didn’t
make it.’
‘There’s obviously good stress and bad stress, there’s the stress where it overcomes
you the reality of the situation where I’m potentially responsible for the loss of a
life or many lives or even loss of the asset. Even the ‘I’m about to lose a billion
dollar asset’. ‘Maybe I’ll just take that chance, I might get those guys to go over
to that borehole, maybe I’ll get them to go near the fan shaft when they should be
nowhere near it, you know what I mean?’ You might, that should be sorted out in
the processes, the risk management processes and the checks and balances, but, I
think it can cause you to make poor decisions or shut down all together.’
‘It’s a di↵erent stress. Look the people. It’s a di↵erent stress for me. What it
came down to. Everyone talks about it, but no-one gets trained in it. I get trained
in heatings and technical shit, but they haven’t trained me in all this other stu↵.
You know. And that’s the bit that I guess I lacked. And I freely admitted it.’
Most interviewees were concerned that emotional people would make irrational and subjec-
tive decisions in an IMT and that, therefore, they should be removed.
‘They are gone. They are out. It’s just black and white. Em, as soon as someone
starts to twitch they’re gone. The trick is to recognise if you are twitching’.
‘So, you’ve got to remove that person. Then you’ve got the task to get him, ‘look
that’s very upsetting, we’ve got to be professional here and get the focus back, get
back on track and solve the problem. So that’s what I would do, remove the person
and I wouldn’t let them back in unless they had changed their frame of mind.’
Only one participant spoke of trying to work with someone a↵ected by stress or emotion to
extract whatever work they could from them.
‘If I could get half-an-hours good value out of you, and it is good value, then I
want it. But if that’s your limitation, I’ve got to know that I can’t expect you to
work for two hours.’
Generally, emotion was viewed as the antithesis of being objective and professional.
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‘As soon as I walked into that IMT I forgot about [the emotional issue] The
professional side kicks in and you’ve got to divorce yourself from that. And you
can’t let that cloud your decision-making. I’d like to think I was professional about
it and I just didn’t give it another thought.’
‘You’ve gotta put, you’ve gotta try to put the emotional side of it aside and
concentrate on the professional.... you need to be as professional as you can possibly
be, and there will be time for the emotional things afterwards.’
‘Eh, yeah. [name], we had to ask him to go. That’s the last thing you want when
you try to be objective is the..., bring emotion into the..., something I guess that
needs a technical solution.’
Further, it was implicit in many interviews that to be emotional was to be weak. However,
those with multiple fatality experience expressed more compassion and towards others than
those without such experience.
Recognising and dealing with emotion and stressors - environmental stressors
This element is about understanding the external stressors that exist in an emergency envi-
ronment and how they can impact decision-making. Pressures exist that are not prominent
in daily operations such as: pressure from the families of those involved in the incident; the
media; police; political interest; dealing with external agencies on-site; the knowledge that col-
leagues and perhaps family are in imminent danger; and generally working in an emotionally
unfamiliar environment where people may not be behaving in their normal manner. The com-
bination of time pressure and the severity of the consequences of many of the decisions makes
decision-making in this environment particularly di cult.
‘I felt the competing for time. People wanted an answer. And I felt that I was
at risk of making a decision that potentially wasn’t the right decision... So I felt the
pressure. But I knew what it would look like and how important this decision was.’
Real and perceived pressure from the families was believed to have the potential to impact
decisions due to a desire to appease the families.
‘the pressure of even knowing the families were outside, and people wanting to
interview us about what the hell we were doing, and just hearing them chat when we
were out having dinner.’
The IC in particular was thought likely to feel tremendous pressure within the MEMS. If a
mining company does not have public liaison sta↵, it is the IC who briefs the families and,
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‘It’s a double edged sword for the IC because not only might he have to potentially
go and speak to the families... but he’s probably had something to do with causing
the incident in the first place. In his mind, he would think that they know that. So
that’s certainly going to mean some emotional stress for him.’
There was concern that people may make decisions in reaction to the media to get ‘good
press’. Accounts of the media pressure directly applied to rescue workers at Pike River and
indirectly by the constant media coverage were considered highly stressful:
‘how he handled that, phew, I’ll never know. It was quite incredible the pressure
and stress he was under. He came down in the street at one point and every second
person wanted to talk to him, the media calling him.’
‘very few people have been exposed to the onslaught of media. And it’s relentless
and so easy to say something that comes back on you like a tonne of bricks, you
know that’s not what you said or it’s out of context or...’
Advice o↵ered for the future included:
‘Don’t listen to the TV, don’t listen to all the politicians making all those stupid
promises’,
a view echoed by a third:
‘Try and avoid reading the media, not only reading but exposure to the media,
and that’s outside of the IMT. So your time when you are not in the IMT, try and
avoid it at all times.’
Another environmental stressor seems to result from the historically tough, macho and mas-
culine mining culture, and how individuals believe they are expected to behave.
‘You’ve got to remember, 40 years ago the meat wagon came every day. Every
day we were sending some poor bastard o↵ in a meat wagon. And we were tough
coal miners, you know, you get hurt in this industry, that’s why we were paid so
good.’
‘It is, mining used to be... when I started in the mines a very aggressive culture.’
One participant who was struggling to explain why some IC’s were better than others at Pike
River, resorted to gender as a descriptor, highlighting that these cultural norms are retained in
the emergency environment.
‘Some of them were just more blokey. That’s the wrong word to use because there
were some lady police o cers that fitted in very well and did a great job. Just maybe
more..., you’ve been to the mines you know what I mean.’
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To have this familiar ‘blokey’ working environment change to one where men are struggling
not to cry and are fighting real or perceived external pressures within a strong cultural norm
to behave in a manly fashion, will likely add to the stress by being an unfamiliar working
environment.
‘And then when you go back on the job, and it’s bizarre. You could see people
were upset and you could see tears in people’s eyes and look I’ve got no doubt people
could see that in me but when you’ve got those same people back on the job, ‘right,
what are we doing?’, totally di↵erent. Expressionless faces, quite blank faces but
you could see in their eyes that they were alert. It’s hard to explain.’
‘He said you know, ‘hello’ and welcome and we said, ‘hello, how are you going?’
and he just, that was it, he just really had to hold himself together. ‘not good, not
good’. And that just makes you think, look this is real, it’s horrible.’
Several participants explained that a need to preserve their masculinity had dictated the
likelihood of them, and others, admitting to personal limitations:
‘males are pre-conditioned from, you know. I’ve said it to my son, ‘Big boys
don’t cry mate, pull yourself together mate’, you know for a grazed knee. And we
are conditioned right the way through so... you don’t want to open up or show any
emotion, you don’t talk about it’
‘you’re expected to be able to man up and be able to do that because that’s what
we do.’
The term ‘macho’ was used to explain the pressure some interviewees felt to over-ride their
personal limits during emergency operations,
‘I’m not tired I can push through to the end. It’s a macho thing and it cuts
across to the arguments.’
Similarly, admitting to becoming stressed is not a characteristic supported by culture:
‘Oh, I’m stressed’, ‘well you are as weak as piss, aren’t you’. It’s not the right
word. Stress is what a housewife gets when the kids are playing up. That’s the
archetypal stress. It’s not a manly thing.’
One participant explained that once you succumb to stress you become ‘damaged goods’, it
also seems that there may be career repercussions for ’stu ng-up’ in this way, only adding to
the stress.
‘once you’ve been broken by a lot of stress... the mining industry isn’t very
forgiving. Once you’ve stu↵ed-up it doesn’t tend to give you a second chance. You
do tend to be tarred by the brush’ (emphasis added)
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There was a sense amongst the interviewees that some mine-managers don’t believe that an
incident could happen at their mine, and if it does, that they should be able to control the
event themselves. This may account for the frequent delay in calling for assistance, both in the
Level 1 exercises and in real events.
‘it’s certainly something I’ve got, and I think it’s a bloke thing, ‘it won’t happen
to me.’
‘there’s a sense of ‘geez, if I call [mines] rescue it’s a blight on my, you know
I’ve lost control, it’s saying I’m not in control and I need help from these guys. Now
I’ve got mines rescue here and it’s on the 6 o’clock news.’
Interestingly two of the participants who had a long history working in the fire service noted
cultural di↵erences between emergency management operations conducted by mining personnel
and those by the fire service.
‘The mining industry is very interesting because we are dealing with some very
sensitive egos more so than in civilian authorities and I’ve been very fortunate to
see both.’
‘Yeah. And it’s always very di cult for people to take criticism. But you don’t
tend to see that in the fire service strangely enough. If we are doing a job in the
fire service you can swear at someone, you can do whatever you need to do, but as
soon as the job’s finished there tends to be a switch o↵ to a certain extent. Not that
people are rude, but there’s certainly a disconnect there.’
The interviews revealed four distinct emotional stages in multiple fatality responses: The
initial stage; the rescue stage; body recovery; and the post-recovery stage. This initial stage,
immediately following recognition that an incident has occurred, is characterised by confusion,
feelings of helplessness, panic or denial.
‘that first half an hour to an hour you feel helpless you don’t really know where
to start and what to do.’
‘when we got there these people who were making the decisions, they were run-
ning around like chooks with their heads cut o↵.’
‘people were just wandering looking, wondering what the hell to do next watching
the smoke coming out of the tunnel.’
Secondly, there is the rescue stage where rapid decision-making is required amidst the op-
timism and hope of rescuing the missing miners. One participant explained this as being in
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‘suspense’ at Pike River. Thirdly, is the realisation that the missing miners are dead, and, if
conditions allow, the commencement of body recovery.
The following account details the atmosphere at Pike River when the mines rescue teams
were told of the second explosion. This was the point of realisation, that there was no hope of
survivors.
‘Well, the outpouring of emotion. And it was the noise. I’ll never forget the
noise. Sort of that collective groan. And it was a groan, it was a sigh, it was... you
know. Some guys went just dead... deadly quiet, and another couple of blokes just
said,’ thank you so much, that we are not in there,’ and things like that and, ‘now
we understand why all this has gone on’. It was a very emotional period of time.’
In mining IMTs this time has been characterised by feeling deflated and a loss of morale
‘you could see everybody’s shoulders sort of dropped.’
‘when you get to the point of knowing where the missing people are you feel
really sad and you are really despondent about it but at least there is then sort of,
the actions are then, the objective then moves from finding people to getting people
out of the mine.’
Fourthly, there is the post-recovery stage when any legal proceeding will occur and this can
run concurrently with the emergency management operation inflicting additional stressors such
as people starting to ‘lawyer-up’. This stage can potentially take years to conclude and several
participants spoke of the ongoing stress they experienced associated with that.
When people are killed at a mine, they are colleagues and often close friends, family or
neighbours. The distinction between work, family, friends and community is no longer real.
The mine becomes part of all of them. For example, at Pike River, one man was observed
pointing to his son’s photographic ID tag that was hanging on the tag-board and heard saying
‘meet my son’. His son was, and still is, in the mine. Four interviewees spoke of recovering
their best mate’s body from a mine. One spoke of the survivor’s guilt he felt and the heartache
dealing with his friend’s wife and children.
‘people feel guilty. When you go to the funeral and you see the wife of the bereaved
and the kids, and they look at you, and there’s this girl, the wife, and the children
and they are just totally in shock.’
He explained that he and his fellow surviving colleagues perceived his friend’s wife to be
saying, ‘why are you still alive and my husband is dead?’ even though it was ‘Totally not true.
There was just a young girl, just totally, you know.’
Others spoke of the agony of attending multiple funerals.
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‘No Ruth, you don’t want to hear this. I had to attend [number] funerals. I mean
not only that, you don’t only go to the funeral, you go and see the people the day
before the time, and you meet them and you sort of, yeah.’
Another interviewee spoke of a fight breaking out between a mines rescue person and a local
in the midst of a protracted body recovery mission.
‘And the townspeople in [place] were calling us cowards for not going down and
getting them out. See they didn’t understand what was actually happening down
there... Someone called him a coward and he took o↵ence to that and it just went
from there.’
And, another interviewee told of the following incident upon returning home from a fatal
incident
‘[I]went home, still had blood on my shirt, I walked in the door, and my son who
would have been four or five, he blurted out ‘what happened to the dead man dad?’,
that nearly destroyed me.’
There seems few places to escape the reality of a serious coal mining emergency situation
and for those impacted the most, being alone is no solace. Being alone was considered the
hardest time, and perhaps contributes to the historical reluctance people have had to leaving
site during an emergency response. Some compassion around this issue is required.
These emotional aspects of the emergency environment are all relevant to the e↵ectiveness
of incident management at a mine because they potentially occur concurrently with the man-
agement of the incident. It was the issues described above that most frequently caused the
interviewees to become emotional in the interviews highlighting the intensity of the emotion
that they must still have.
Recognising and dealing with one’s own emotion and stress
When initially asked about emotion, most interviewees spoke about interpersonal or intergroup
conflict and the resulting anger and frustration.
‘Like there’s been thousands of times I’ve been in meetings, where I’d love to
jump up and strangle someone but you control it and you know. You can’t avoid in
high pressure situations that people disagree. You’ve just got to get over it.’
‘Emotion certainly if we are dealing with people in the IMT, the emotion can be
driven by being forced to work with people we wouldn’t ordinarily work with. And
you know, personal di↵erences you’ve had prior to that point.’
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It was clear that emotion was not something that was well understood. It was often de-
scribed as being high or low with little distinction between emotion types. However, those
with experience in more severe incidents mentioned feeling hopeless, deflated, guilty, horrible,
despondent, numb, confused and shocked.
The IC in particular is perceived to be under severe pressure because of the legal respon-
sibility placed on him. A mine-manager acting as the IC has a lot to lose in such a scenario
including his career and possibly his freedom, which is the reason several participants believe
he should not lead the IMT.
‘I said, ‘Are you right?’ and he said, ‘no, not really’ I said, ‘tell me what you’re
thinking’. And he was worried about the ramifications, him going to jail, the public
outcry, him getting the finger pointed at him and all that.’
The impact of IC guilt on performance has not yet been explored su ciently in the mining
literature given the situation that the mine-manager is both legally responsible for the incident
and the response. This factor is suspected of encouraging the IC to have ‘agenda’. All of the
participants who spoke about IC guilt were those with experience in multiple fatality incidents
indicating that this issue is one that may not be expected by those without such experience.
An interviewee who has been a mine-manager and the IC at the time of a multiple fatality
incident explained:
‘Yes definitely, if you, as the responsible mine-manager for the place, you feel
responsible for what happened and it probably takes the general manager or the HR
manager or somebody to start interacting with you for you to understand that it’s
not just your personal problem. It might be a problem with the systems or the
equipment but it’s not just your personal issue. So at that point, relief is probably
not the right word, but you feel less guilty about what’s happened. You sort of move
past that point and move to more rational thinking.’
It is implied in this statement that whilst feeling guilty, guilt is not really the right word,
yet he can’t articulate it any better. It is possible that his struggle with the terminology is a
result of him trying to regain emotional homeostasis by distinguishing between being personally
guilty and legal guilty and possibly being guilty in the eyes of the families. He chose the term
‘less guilty’, implying some sort of guilt, but if he doesn’t feel personally responsible, he can’t
feel personally guilty. The word ‘guilt’ is not necessarily the correct word, shame may be more
accurate but nevertheless, it highlights how heavy the legal responsibility must feel on the
shoulders of a mine-manager in this situation and how, because it does not tie up with the
individual’s own view of himself, cognitive dissonance may be employed to try and right the
situation. How could he be blamed legally for the deaths of several men, when he personally he
would never kill someone? However it is labelled, the resulting emotions are likely to be highly
disruptive:
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‘It’s a double edged sword for the IC because not only might he have to potentially
go and speak to the families, looking at Pike River, or Beaconsfield, but he’s probably
had something to do with causing the incident in the first place. In his mind, he
would think that they know that. So that’s certainly going to mean some emotional
stress for him.’
‘The buck stops with the mine-manager, righto, so that means there’s been a
system failure in a manual system so you’ve got this burden of responsibility.’
It is possible that this assumed guilt may even unconsciously drive the behaviours that
others see as having an ‘agenda’ or ‘arse covering’ because the IC will be highly motivated to
right the situation as much as possible by desperately seeking evidence, or possibly creating it,
to show that it wasn’t his/her fault. The reason for this would be to try and make the legal
viewpoint more like his/her personal viewpoint i.e. innocent. Therefore, it may feel more like
exposing the truth than tampering with evidence.
A mine-manager’s fear of the personal consequences was considered a significant source of
stress. Participants spoke of the stress that they have observed in others, felt themselves or
spoken about with mine-managers whilst managing emergencies. These included: a fear of
litigation; concern regarding the consequences of decisions; scrutiny by the industry; their pro-
fessional and personal reputation; the repercussions on their career; stress from being evaluated
by the inspectorate and union; pressure from the families and media; and the feeling of being
out of control.
Participants commonly spoke of feeling frustration because of not being able to do what
is required because the IMT has set goals that are too high or too abstract; because there is
insu cient resources or information to do the task or because ‘Mother Nature has a completely
di↵erent outlook’. Three mines rescue interviewees recalled the frustration of being called to
mines but not deployed. Frustration at not being deployed was also problematic at Pike River
compounded by a breakdown of communication:
‘These boys they were climbing the walls and ready for mutiny, it was the word
they used.’
Every interviewee who attended the Pike River mine during the response e↵ort spoke of
the frustration they experienced due to the ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘disjointed’ decision-making
process. Dealing with the police who needed the most basic of mining terms explained to them,
and then again explained when a new shift took over, caused intense frustration. Delayed
decisions due to the delegation of decision approval to higher echelons of the police force and
the fact technical groups were prohibited from working on contingency plans also significantly
added to frustration. Frustration also arose because some felt the families were being given
false hope.
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‘The mining people incredibly frustrated . It’s hard to fully articulate the depth,
feeling that the guys, when you walk into the room of rescue men that are sitting
there and they can’t do anything. You know. That total and utter helplessness that
they were feeling.’
‘I stopped actually stopped attending some of the IMT meetings for a while, I
just found it so frustrating. You know that, you just knew the mine was going to
blow up again, just the seriousness of the situation was just lost on the people. And
there were so many political, command structure factors that were coming into play,
it was so messy.’
The decision made by the police that caused immense frustration at Pike River was the
decision to delay ordering inertisation equipment from Australia. Inertising the mine can
prevent further explosions, but its use would kill anyone who remained alive underground.
The police did not want this equipment brought to the mine because of the message it would
send to the families, whereas the majority of the Australian mines rescue services personnel in
attendance considered that having it on-site would be a sensible contingency plan.
Interviewees saw stress as integral to many non-technical issues:
‘Well stress is an end result of fatigue, emotion, self-confidence. How do I,
and the, you’ve got to have a shitload of courage. So, and courage is related to
confidence, so yeah. If you haven’t got the confidence or the courage or the other
things I’ve just mentioned you are going to be stressed.’
And provided some examples of what being stressed feels like and the impact it has had on
them or others.
‘It’s put my mind into neutral a little bit, from time to time, when I’m worried
about more things than, rather than just assessing evidence on its merit I’m clouding
the whole thing with a lot of other things, my minds not with it. Thinking about,
shit, ‘what happens if [not audible] and the pit blows up’ or, have I informed these
people in the right fashion, and the stresses of. And what’s my family thinking, they
know I’m out somewhere, I’m not telling them every 12 hours and they’ve heard
on the radio. So there’s, not focussing properly, and it’s distracting, di cult to
concentrate at times.’
‘You just function, but you’re almost numb. You know when you’ve been punched
hard and your head goes a bit numb and a bit swimmy, that would probably be the
nearest sensation I would say to being in charge. You just kind of, you’re kind of
divorced.’
152
The participants attributed stress to an inability to make decisions, a loss of problem solving
ability, a diminished ability to achieve outcomes, being closed to ‘suggestions and ideas and
solutions’ and having di culty taking in information.
Because of the prevalent belief that professional and objective decision-making cannot oc-
cur when emotion is present, most felt that individuals should ‘Separate themselves from the
emotion’ until the work has been completed and deal with it afterwards.
‘you need to be as professional as you can possibly be, and there will be time for
the emotional things afterwards.’
‘I don’t care if you break down into a basket case, weeping and all that. That’s
fine, but do it somewhere else. Do it tomorrow when we’ve got some time.’
Those that could not control their emotions were considered a risk to objective decision-
making. One participant likened dealing with emotions to dealing with a spot fire,‘you need to
get on top of it early’.
‘It is, it’s gotta be controlled though. You can’t be on an incident control team
if you’re letting emotions run your decisions.’
‘You’ve got to contain your own state of, whatever that is, arousal, emotional
arousal. Or whatever, I don’t know what the word is, but whatever the word is.’
‘You’ve got to get on with it. Worry about that later.’
Several participants revealed that this is how they dealt with their emotions when they found
out close mates had been killed.
‘How I learnt was very, very early in my career, there was a bloke killed, we did
everything we could, but we lost him, and e↵ectively we carried him out and all the
rest of it. And then I just walked down the back of the paddock and cried my eyes
out. I was a blithering mess. And then I went back and I had all the what did you
do and all the rest of it, and the lesson that that taught to me was that because I
was so involved with trying to save this guy’s life at the time, I didn’t have time
to be emotional. All those things we just spoke about. But, if I had, I didn’t, just
by pure circumstances, I also realised that when I did walk over the paddock, that
I was an absolute blithering mess. So I said to myself then, if ever you are in the
same situation again, never ever forget this. Because what you need to do, is do
what you need to do at that point in time and then you can go over the back of the
paddock and be a blithering idiot. Now, unfortunately I got to do that a number of
times over my career. But that again comes all the way back to where you started
from, what people are exposed to, life’s lessons, and those things happening outside
the industry as well.’
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‘It’s when you are not on the job anymore because all the other emotions come
through, because you do, you suppress your feelings, and your anxiety and all the
rest of it and you do, you just become this machine. But then when you are taken
away from the incident because you’ve done your time and you are coming out on
the transporter and you are in the shower, I’ll be honest with you, I broke down in
tears, I was on my own, did the debrief with the IMT, and went to the shower and
I was all alone and that’s when I had like a mini breakdown, I sorted myself, got
dressed went back to the IMT and went home than came back the following day.’
‘Well, I went round the corner, [pause] cried my eyes out for about 10 minutes.
Had just lost a best mate. And I sat there and I said, ‘right I can sit here and fall
to pieces or I can get up and go and do the job I’ve been trained to do.’ And, that’s
what I did... That was a really big learning curve for me and that’s when I knew if
the shit hit the fan, I could keep control. And that’s, I’ve never ever forgotten it.
You can’t a↵ord to lose control, because it could cost other people’s lives.’
Another coping strategy that participants used was avoid the emotional stimuli. For example
one participant tried to block out the wreaths placed on the bridge at Pike River describing
it as ‘horrendous’. Two others, avoided finding out the names of those underground at Pike
River by avoiding the tag board and not looking at the sta↵ list. One explained this as ‘trying
to stay as walled as possible’.
Two participants used the term robot to explain how they have felt working on recovery
operations:
‘I think for me, you almost become a robot, you just operate, it is strange, you
are just doing what you need to do, it’s almost as if a part of your mind switches
o↵. And this is the most comforting thing after an incident, after you’ve had the
shock and you are still involved the following day, you actually feel better, well and
in control when you are back on the job.’
‘almost robotically went through the motions, it was fine, and that sort of helped
me really, that sort of focussed me into, I suppose I shut out the emotions, I don’t
know how, almost clinical, almost robotic. I found the tactics easy to do then got
back to the station and lost it.’
Recognising and dealing with others’ emotion and stress
This element is about understanding and being able to deal with others’ reactions to stress and
emotion when the IMT is dealing with a serious fatal incident. Understanding that potentially
unusual or o↵ensive behaviour may be the result of stress, and unintentional, may reduce the
observer’s likelihood of taking others’ behaviour personally and retaliating causing increased
conflict.
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’I’ve never been hugged by men more, than at explosions.’
‘I mean I know someone that I know will yell at me when he is under stress.
That’s kinda what I’m thinking. What do I do there, you know? Tell him nothing?
Just tell him what he wants to hear?’
‘The IC needs to be that special kind of bloke that really understands the team
and those emotional things.’
Some interviewees recognised that the environmental stress placed on those involved in an
emergency has the potential to alter the behaviour of team members to an extent that makes
them unfamiliar. One claimed that you can’t know how people will react when it’s ‘crunch
time’ and another spoke of ‘skitty’ people who have surprised him by being good under stress
and the opposite was also noted of ‘strong’ people. However, others believed that if an IC
knows the team the IC will know how they will react.
‘You can assemble a good team around you that in peacetime are very good
technically etcetera. But then, when it’s crunch time they just can’t handle the
stress. And that’s something that you can’t really determine.’
‘I would hope that I have a good understanding of their experience, their perfor-
mance under pressure, in a workplace, I mean you can never, if it’s a big ding, well,
unfortunately sometimes people just snap or they step up’
‘for persons in a senior management role, under managers and managers, that
they should have to do some, some psychology, I don’t know if that’s the right word,
some psychology - understanding people’s emotions, and reactions or potential. Be-
cause I’ve seen perfectly logical people going to screaming neeby jeebies when they’ve
been faced with something challenging. And I’ve seen other people stand tall, and
not necessarily the people that you’d expect. So to see that happen, it’s scary to think
of the people that we’ve got in control of these people that wouldn’t understand, or
couldn’t deal with it.’
‘If you don’t have a personality or psychological profile of the people, you don’t
know what you get. Because when things become dynamic and emotional, or when
you are involve dynamic situations and emotions, people change.’
‘You might be a fantastic ventilation o cer that can give me any kind of sets
of figures but now we are making decisions that might kill someone or help them
survive... can you do it?’
Another noted that this should be planned for:
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‘They could do what was asked of them, but you knew then not to ask above that’
so a strategy of ‘being aware of it, but also having a plan B in case someone does
let go or just can’t handle it. A reserves bench that you can just sub them from’.
Monitoring others’ personal limitations was deemed important and therefore having the right
team was considered important so that others listened to those telling them to take a break.
‘If someone sees it and they tell you, and you move aside.’
‘[if ] someone says, [name] you’ve had enough, go and have a lie down, because
they will identify it before you do. That’s why it’s important you’ve got the right
people.’
Other participants acknowledged that the ability to perform under stress was intra-personal.
That one day a person could be OK, yet struggle the next due to circumstances in their home-
lives.
‘in England 25% of the population are depressed at any point in time. In some
cases that might be for a day, or it might be for a year, so on averages. If you have
10 people in the room that form you’re IMT team, 2 are suss to start with, 3 of them
probably haven’t had enough sleep, 4 of them might be mortgaged up to the hilt, and
the other one might be in the middle of a divorce, or 2 of them in the middle of a
divorce, bang, bang, bang, and the IMT leader is a raving idiot.’
‘And one day you might be right to go and the next day you might not be. Because
your dog has died or your uncle is very, very sick. Or one of your kids is in hospital
and it plays on your mind.’
‘Well all you can do is emergency exercises and see how you go. But you’re still
not going to know how you’re going to go in a real one.’
‘Look you don’t know who’s going to perform or not going to perform until it
happens.’
The behaviours that participants believed indicated that others were not coping with stress
included: becoming snappy or short; being aggressive; becoming reclusive and quiet; their voices
go up in pitch; they ‘take a personal attack and make it into an argument’ ; only hearing what
they want to; not taking information in, making technical mistakes they wouldn’t normally
make; focus on one thing only (usually what they are achieving success with) and losing the
overall picture.
‘In one particular case, one person almost broke down, their posture and their
demeanour, broken voice and crumbling if you like. It was a matter of propping him
up or exiting him.’
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‘this one guy really surprised me, he really just fell apart. He became so obsessive
about little things that he wasn’t even thinking of the big picture stu↵. He really fell
apart.’
‘I’ve seen it, where they get swept up in the emotional side of it and they’re
fixated then on one particular part of it’
‘You wouldn’t believe, people will follow a path where they get success. So if at
the beginning of the day your objective is to rescue 6 people. And you can have a
couple of objectives - save the mine. If that involves getting the fire brigade involved
and laying 4 km of hose and put a pump here and 4 people there and 6 people there.
If you start getting success on that, that will become the focus. And you’ve got to
say that’s been done, forget it, let someone else do it, let’s get back to how we are
going to do this. And yeah, success breeds. You get satisfied because you’ve had
success so you keep focussing on what you are doing, not what your objective is.’
Participants noted a need to know yourself well, and ‘understand your own personal failings’
as a pre-requisite to being able to evaluate others. One participant described how learning
about his own behaviour has helped him reduce conflict with others by not retaliating to their
behaviour:
‘Well if they are a bit prickly then I’ll match their prickliness, I’ll match you
a swear word and I’ll throw a couple more in. So that was just poor. So a bit of
self-reflection on what I’ve done, and how I’ve badly handled people in that type
of situation, I’m trying to develop my own coping skills about how to handle the
pressure, and not to get swept up in that emotional type stu↵.’
Fatigue
Fatigue management and succession planning are now an integral component of emergency
management planning in mining. Almost all participants spoke of the importance of managing
fatigue and it seems accepted that cognitive functioning reduces as fatigue increases.
‘I said, ‘get outta here, you actually can’t even construct a sentence.’
‘I know I’ve made some ordinary decisions being tired.’
Four aspects of fatigue highlighted in the interviews, that are not common within mining
literature, include:
1. the e↵ects of adrenalin on fatigue;
2. the e↵ectiveness of fatigue management plans;
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3. the role of fatigue in increasing interpersonal conflict; and
4. the attitude that fatigue is an issue for everyone else, but not me!
Most participants thought that if they were running on adrenalin they were not fatigued
‘Well it is, but , when you are actually, fatigue doesn’t set in, from experience,
when you are in the thick of it. Your body just doesn’tsuccumb to it, you know what
I mean, when you are really on with it. But once you get pulled away from it it hits
you hard. It’s a strange one fatigue. And the stress of it makes you more fatigued.’
‘To a point. I don’t know what the scientists say, but when you are running on
adrenalin you can go for a long time. As long as the brain is continuing to work,
you can go a lot longer than what you think. And I’ve seen, I think up to about 20
hours, might have been longer, but they were still going, I don’t know if they made
any bad decisions but they were still going. And that’s probably not acceptable. I
guess the issue is if it’s a big recovery and you need to be there every day, then
you’ve got to get to the point where it’s, ‘I can’t be here tomorrow if I’m here past
this time of night tonight.’ Cause otherwise it will just, down the track you’ll just
hit the wall and need replaced.’
Fatigue management plans are implemented to ensure that workers get su cient rest be-
tween shifts. Most fatigue issues arise in the first days of a protracted incident because people
are reluctant to leave site. The desire to stay usually a↵ects those most closely a↵ected and
the mine-manager/SSE who would remain technically responsible even if he/she was resting.
People working on a protracted body recovery operation have been especially reluctant to leave.
Participants spoke of not wanting to miss anything and the ‘excitement’ or ‘buzz’ of the ongo-
ing recovery e↵orts. Both participants noted the inappropriateness of these words but couldn’t
think of a better alternative.
‘it’s like you are pumped up on what you are doing. You almost get a buzz out
of it for want of a better word. It’s really strange honestly.’
The benefit of leaving site was questioned with participants speaking of setting up beds
on-site. However, they held conflicting views on the benefits of this. Others spoke of not being
able to turn-o↵ when they got home anyway meaning that IMT members may not be any more
rested after having taken the obligatory time o↵.
‘yeah right, you’ve got 29 men in a pit how can you possibly go and get good
rest? And not being told stu↵, when you are at, when you do go home, to try and
get the rest, the thing that keeps me up is not knowing what’s going on at the pit at
the time.’
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‘And then the problem is with a real incident, you live the incident, and then
you go home for your rest and you can’t sleep. And then you do return to work
fatigued but once you are in that job again, I don’t know what it is whether it is the
adrenalin or whatever it is just totally takes over.’
‘But when I sat in my car I still found it hard to wind down. It wasn’t until I
got home I started to, but when I went to bed I’m still playing over everything that
happened. Because I knew if I went to sleep I might forget things so I burnt that
into my brain so that first thing in the morning when I get up I can make notes and
then I could write my report.’
‘And if I do take 2 days o↵ am I actually going to rest? I’ll probably be worse.
You actually function better at work when something is going on. I don’t know, well
I do know why, it’s the involvement, and the knowing what’s happening and the not
making it up.’
During a protracted incident it is not only rest that is needed. Several participants spoke of
the need return to normality for a time and to see their family to ensure ongoing productivity.
‘I never got too tired at any stage. What I needed was a weekend where I got
home for the whole weekend. I wanted to see my kids. Just to hang out with them
and not think about the mine.’
The third point is that although interviewees recognised that fatigue could a↵ect their own
and others’ behaviour, and that this can increase interpersonal conflict, when it came to their
own poor behaviour due to fatigue they assumed others would understand this and deem their
behaviour acceptable.
‘And I suppose I, the fatigue bit, yeah, we were all pretty tired, by the end of it
I was a cranky bastard. And, I remember having some very big arguments with my
management team, but we all knew that none of it was personal.’
‘I was trying to save the mine, I was trying to save the jobs of our employees,
but a couple of days when I lost my shit. I think people sort of went. Anyone who
was there during the whole time knew how many hours I had done.’
‘I’m terrible on nightshift... if I’m tired my fuse get that long [small space between
fingers]. It’s very unpleasant. I’m sure I made some pretty wrong calls in my time
too. When people have told me stu↵ that, ‘let’s do this’ ‘No, screw you, we are doing
that, that’s just what we are doing, cause I’m telling you, that’s what we are doing’
and it’s just, you get out of the mine and have a cup of co↵ee and you look at the
report and think ‘oh shit, maybe we should have done.”
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‘talking about fatigue and emotion, they certainly, things that a↵ect the way we
deal with other people. Certainly for me, they are all connected, the fatigue will be
the catalyst for emotional change for me. I tend to shut down, look to take a quieter
role in some situations.’
‘But, they could tell that I was tired. And I can tell ya, towards the end I thought
about just strangling this bloke [the IC] and putting him out of his misery. And, I
just sat there with a smile on my face and thought you are the biggest wanker I’ve
ever met and I could strangle you - but I had a smile on my face. It wasn’t worrying
me, it was just a thought that went through my head a couple of times.’
The fourth issue was the tendency to see fatigue only as an issue for others.
‘I’ve fallen into that trap myself. I’ll tell my team they have to stay the night,
then I’ll jump in my car and drive 4 hours home instead. That’s just what we do.’
Two accounts of the same incident revealed this tendency. One participant spoke of a con-
versation he had had with friends who had been working 16-18 hour shifts during an emergency.
They told him that adrenalin just took over and fatigue was not an issue for them. Yet, another
participant who actually attended the mine stated:
‘they were all pretty buggered’, ‘they were pretty much screwed physically’, there
were a lot of interpersonal plays we could see in the background. He wasn’t talking
to him and if you wanted to get something done you’d ask this bloke round the back
of the bikeshed type stu↵ ’.
Self-confidence
Self-confidence, if too high or too low can be a limitation. Several participants with experience
in serious incidents stated that they had observed low self-confidence in others. This was based
on their observations of endless searches for data and decision-making procrastination. If the
interviewees’ perception that low self-confidence is at the root of this behaviour, self-confidence
could be an important issue to address given the frequency of this behaviour being observed.
However, only one participant spoke of his own battles with self-confidence. It seems possible
that others have felt this but were unwilling to share it.
‘Yeah, the self-doubt is a killer, I’ve found that to be crippling’
‘those guys can look at it and make a determination fairly quickly and accurately.
Me, not as much because I don’t have their experience and I’m not as confident.’
‘Being able to control that [self-doubt] in the last few incidents, and having the
confidence in my ability to operate, technically, dispelling that self-doubts, so having
a bit more confidence in myself, that’s helped immeasurably’.
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Low self-confidence may be at the root of some of the situation-awareness and decision-
making issues that have been noted in Level 1 exercises. Participants interpreted behaviours
such as ‘clutching at straws’, ’ running o↵ on tangents’, ‘wanting more and more informa-
tion’, ‘procrastinating’ and decision-making ‘paralysis’ as evidence of low self-confidence in the
decision-makers.
The participants believed it was particularly important for the IC to have self-confidence to
be able to ‘question things that don’t ring true’, to be able ‘to manage highly intelligent, highly
competent people’, ‘to keep going when things go wrong’, ‘to be able to make the final call on
decisions’ and to keep things moving at a reasonable pace.
‘I’ve seen mine-managers freeze and doubt themselves but at the end of the day
you’ve got to make a decision and you’ve got to hope to God you make a good one.’
‘The more self-doubt that comes into it the less confident you are to make a call
and the more other people you want to tell.’
‘the ones that I’ve seen, [he lists the IMS he’s been in] the decision-makers really
don’t want to make a decision until they have some sort of consensus with every
man and his dog, I don’t know if that’s to share jail cells or not..., I don’t really
think they had the confidence to make a call that seemed to be way outside of what
they normally do.’
‘They procrastinate, it may be their level of understanding, outside of their com-
fort zone. Also a males ego, doesn’t want to say they don’t know.’
Interpretation of the participants’ comments suggests that people need enough information
to be confident but if they lack self-confidence they may never feel that they have enough
information to make a decision. This may be a serious contributor to the delayed decision-
making often observed in simulations.
‘If it reaches that point where we don’t know, whether we don’t know because we
don’t have the information, or whether we don’t have the level of knowledge to make
the decision that must push that stress level up to the boiling point, where they don’t
have the ability to make e↵ective decisions.’
‘How much information is enough information is a problem’ Every group I’ve
been in that’s been dealing with a fire or explosion, or a spon-com, is the thirst, the
lust for information and if you’ve got this much and you are still not confident you
need that much (hand gestured), you need more and more. You are never happy
with the amount of information you have, so to make a decision on that much, ‘No,
no we couldn’t, we should wait til we get a bit more.”
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‘It’s your level of tolerance as to how much information you need to have the
confidence to move forward, to move on.’
The stress experienced in the emergency environment may be partly attributable to lacking
self-confidence yet others noted that low self-confidence could be a result of stress.
‘when there’s dead people involved and there’s smoke and fire involved, when
there is an explosion involved, it all seems to unravel and no-one can make a decision
because they are not confident and they really don’t know what to do with it. Or,
don’t want to make a call just in case it’s not the right one.’
‘Well stress is an end result of fatigue, emotion, self-confidence. How do I,
and the, you’ve got to have a shitload of courage. So, and courage is related to
confidence, so yeah. If you haven’t got the confidence or the courage or the other
things I’ve just mentioned you are going to be stressed.’
Self-confidence may directly impact decision-making because of the IC’s own personal limita-
tion with self-confidence issues, but may also indirectly impact decision-making via its influence
on other social issues. Participants’ accounts of low self-confidence indicate that it may be the
catalyst for some behaviours associated with interpersonal conflict such as ‘ranting, raving,
yelling and screaming’. This could impair collaboration and communication and the IC may
find himself becoming more isolated and stressed, creating a vicious cycle of events that continue
to diminish his/her self-confidence and decision-making ability.
It is possible that the common call for more assertiveness in an IMT is partly a self-confidence
issue.
‘Also knowing when to speak-up and having the balls to do it.’
‘hopefully that person would have enough balls to say, look this is what I think
can we go through it in case I’ve missed something. Because we are not all experts
on everything.’
‘Being able to give the IMT confidence that people can speak their, if they’re not
sure they can say look I’m not sure about, I don’t know if that’s right, what about
this?’ ‘at the moment about 50% of management in coal mines have an aggressive
style. This links to the confidence of people in the IMT, they may not want to
speak-up for fear of being skinned alive’.
Two participants noted a distinction between being competent and being confident. A lack
of self-confidence is not necessarily directly related to not having su cient technical ability. It
is the individual’s perception of their ability that is the key, and this may be a↵ected by the
stress of the emergency.
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Training and experience in technical and non-technical skills was believed to enhance self-
confidence. Other strategies discussed included phoning a trusted colleague to run ideas past
before getting to the mine-site, bringing in technical experts, reflecting on past performance
and undertaking personal development.
‘Going through in my head about what priorities we should have, what things we
should do, what questions I should ask when I get there. But the best thing that I’ve
been able to do is ring up [name] or [name] and say listen this is what I’ve got, this
is what I think is happening , this is what I intend to do. You know, what am I
missing? And just from them saying ‘have you considered this’ or ‘that sounds fair
enough’ is enough to settle me down and I can walk in confident.’
Over-confidence was not explicitly raised by the participants, yet it seems implied in the
discussions about the mine-managers who believe they can control the event single handed.
The literature suggests high self-confidence can be good to minimise stress [118], but can lead
to over-confidence in the predicting how the situation may develop [201].
5.3.7 Communication in the IMT
Items discussed in this category are relevant to all of the other non-technical issues discussed be-
cause verbal communication is the primary mechanism by which situation-awareness is achieved.
For example, interpersonal trust and communication appeared highly dependent. If someone
was not trusted, or suspected of having an agenda, the content of what they are saying was not
listened to and communication ceased completely on a number of occasions discussed.
‘You can virtually feel it amongst a group of people if somebody’s speaking and
the group doesn’t trust the person it doesn’t matter what they say.’
Communication breakdown is a recognised failure mechanism for teams [172], and uninten-
tional communication errors and failure can occur during the communication transaction, when
messages are misheard, misunderstood or otherwise distorted. However, the large number of
examples of people deliberately failing to contribute to IMT meetings or with people they had
conflict with, is concerning given the critical role of communication.
‘I just ignored what he [the IC] said’
People have intentionally stopped communicating in IMTs for several reasons, but the most
prevalent catalyst was conflict between individuals. Similarly, intergroup conflict has a↵ected
communication in the past, when agencies have had, or been perceived to have, di↵erent goals
and priorities.
In summary communications have failed for the following reasons: taking what others said
to them personally and withdrawing from communication; when there was a lack of respect;
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when they felt their comments were not listened to; when others were overloaded with work;
when personalities clashed; when they felt intimidated by external agencies such as the police,
or the mining inspectorate; when team members were perceived to be interlopers at the final
stages of a rescue or recovery; when people were rude and spoke over others; when people
felt emotional or froze and shut down completely; when people were frustrated with others,
when the process or the quality of the decisions were deemed poor; when they were scared of
incriminating themselves; when the listeners were not trusted; when they were being recorded or
minuted; when their contribution was not valued; when the IC was too dominant or aggressive;
when someone was perceived to have an agenda; when the other person was disliked; when
people were not seen as competent enough to use the information and a fear of the reactions
from others including ridicule or aggression.
‘I noticed that that was being recorded, so that shut that down pretty quickly. I
learnt not to say anything in the [IMT] room.’
‘If someone’s hammering me with all these questions and they are not listening
to my answers. I’m going to shut-up, everyone does it. So people have to be mindful
of, ‘shit, are we loading this guy up?’ ’
Communication in the IMT - To challenge and be challenged
This element addresses assertiveness issues but the term assertiveness was not well understood
and was commonly interpreted as aggression, dominance or being o↵ensive. If the word was
used, participants tended to lessen its impact, for example, ‘a little bit assertive’.
‘So there’s a reasonable amount of assertiveness but not that overarching domi-
nance.’
‘Yeah, in a sort of... assertiveness in a respectful way. I mean if you do it in
the right manner.’
‘Well, I don’t think necessarily the assertiveness thing comes into it at that stage.
They don’t have to be like, ‘no, you are wrong’ but willing to say, ‘well, have you
thought of this?’
However, most participants recognised the need to ‘challenge the data’ provided by others
and to be prepared to be challenged themselves when presenting data as part of the validation
process. A supportive environment and mutual respect was seen as a prerequisite to facilitate
this without people taking o↵ence or feeling frustrated or threatened.
‘Challenge the process. Don’t challenge the person. So by challenging the process,
you know, ‘how did you get to that decision?’ ‘Where’s your process?’ Yeah, don’t
attack a person.’
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‘If you challenge basically, you can challenge respectfully and basically you can
go through a what-if exercise to get to the, to confirm to yourself that what you’ve
been told is the complete answer.’
‘We’ve also got to be prepared to question, and the team itself has got to be
prepared to let somebody challenge them.’
‘And also I found it myself when people listening to me, and they want to question
the stu↵ I’ve came up with then I sometimes feel threatened by that.’
‘We’ve also got to be prepared to question, and the team itself has got to be
prepared to let somebody challenge them, even if it’s a dumb question. Sometimes
they are the hardest to answer.’
‘And some people, when you do question them, they start calling you. They take
o↵ence to someone of my limited experience questioning them... So calling you ‘son’
and trying to pick holes in your technical knowledge.’
‘One of my philosophies of life is don’t ever go into a meeting with an opinion
if you are not willing to voice it. Now I’m quite happy to have that overturned, or
logically argued out that what I’m saying is not the best way. But don’t stop me
from saying it.’
Similar to the co-pilot to pilot assertiveness issues identified by non-technical skills re-
searchers in aviation, some ICs wanted the team to challenge them more:
‘if someone thinks I’m making a wrong decision I want them to tell me. I don’t
want them to just bloody accept it blindly and move on. That’s how we make mis-
takes, so you want them to be honest and tell you.’
‘people need to feel comfortable challenging him [the IC], right.’
‘people are sometimes afraid to speak-up with information they think might not
be what people want to hear, and prefer to tell it one on one instead.’
Communication in the IMT - Creating an IMT environment where people can
speak-up
Maintaining communication in an IMT is reliant on creating an environment where people feel
comfortable to speak-up. It was viewed to be the IC’s role to develop an IMT environment
that encourages open communication. Many spoke of dominant or aggressive IC’s behaviour
as being detrimental to this because people will not speak-up for fear of being ‘skinned alive’,
thus impacting communication and reducing the likelihood that decisions would be made col-
laboratively.
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‘We’ve got some good ... managers out there but there’s some Nazis amongst
them who scream at their people day in and day out. And I’m telling you now that
there are people out there that would be afraid to come in in an incident and say,
challenge them, or dare bring in the wrong information.’
The IC who does not create an IMT environment conducive to communication, was often
described in terms of his personality rather than his behaviours. Example include: ‘big tough
bastard’, ‘overbearing bastard’, ‘overbearing person’, ‘very strong willed people’, ‘those types of
people’, ‘big bombastic bastard’, ‘dominant personality’, ‘strength of personality’, ‘strong person-
alities’.
‘One of the other things that is really challenging is when you get a really domi-
nant person, that can be counterproductive too, where they have such an aura or rule
by terror that logical, intelligent people that have valuable things to say are either
howled down or ridiculed and it becomes a one man show. And that’s so dangerous.’
‘A dominant person can sway a group.’
‘The baseball bat theory is based on fear.’
Such leadership has encouraged team members in the past to resort to doing their own thing,
without IMT input, further eroding communication and collaboration.
‘Yeah, cause they were scared of this bloke. You’ve got to imagine that a good
make up of that IMT was people from their mine. So they’re sort of. You hardly
heard boo from them. And when they go out you’ll see them in a huddle with him
and then go o↵ their di↵erent ways and do whatever they are going to do.’
Several of the older participants explained that they had used an aggressive management
style earlier in their career but had found that this approach, and in particular the way that
they communicated with people, did not get them the desired results so have since changed
their leadership and communication style.
‘also in the way I’ve reacted to, to, people in a bit of an agitated way at the pit
in the past, in not so good management mode I’ve managed to match their agitation
and that hasn’t helped in the slightest.’
‘I’ve probably been in a position when I was a lot younger, a feisty... in my
youth, where I don’t know, it was probably perceived back then that the louder and
more upfront you were the easier it was to get things done. As opposed to with age
and maturity saying well that’s not necessarily the best approach because people will
walk away and say, ‘Geez, he’s a cranky bastard’ rather than ‘I don’t mind doing
that for him, because he’s always..’
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‘Respect or caring. I suppose history has taught me, if you take an aggressive
approach to people you are wasting your time. So I like to speak to people in the
manner I like to be spoken to.’
‘You get in my way, I run you over. Then when I became a mine-manager, and
I’m in charge of 300 people, I can’t be like that anymore, you know.’
‘I listen to people a lot more. I was a very aggressive undermanager. ... More
thoughtful of other people’s feelings and definitely more thoughtful of thinking about
what I’m going to do, or tell people what I’m going to do before I do it. So maybe
that’s more safety conscious, perhaps it is. Certainly more attune to other people’s
feelings and less aggressive. Definitely less aggressive.’
Communication in the IMT - The communication transaction
Communication can unintentionally fail when an issue arises during the transmission and receipt
of a message.
Listening serves a dual purpose, it is required to ensure receipt and understanding of the data,
but it has also been highlighted as a critical component of showing respect and maintaining
communication in the IMT. Participants highlighted the importance of being acknowledged
and appreciated if they were to continue contributing to a team.
‘So when the listening time is on, you listen. And when the talking time is on,
and it’s your turn, you talk. The other thing is that person has the capability of
when they are listening, at the same token jot important points. So I’m listening to
you talking away and you mention Joe Bloggs saw smoke, I’m not going to cut in
and say is that at 7 cut-through? But when it’s my turn, I will say please clarify
this, this and this.’
Participants had observed people who had not heard messages at all because they were
preoccupied or had not taken-in the information because it didn’t fit with their understanding.
Others explained the need to listen carefully because di↵erent people may explain or choose to
do things di↵erently, but that does not mean that what they are saying or planning to do is
actually wrong or even di↵erent.
‘I’ve seen problems at mines where we’ve had roof failures and someone said
something and it’s just gone over everyone’s head. And I’ve heard it and said well
‘so and so just said this before and no one reacted to it’. Say it again. Oh I didn’t
hear that, because they only want to hear what they want to hear. They are focussed
on, we want to get this done. They are listening but not listening.’
‘It’s people’s perception of the words you say.’
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‘I have been aggressive before and direct and I have found out through experience
that what I necessarily want, someone else mightn’t perceive it the same way and
what they deliver is exactly what I wanted but it might not be in exactly the same
order as I wanted it but the end result is the same. Listen to them.’
‘what we need to remember is that there is more ways to skin a cat. And just
because someone wants to skin the cat this way, and someone wants to do it that
way, the end result is the cat skinned. And this is where people, ‘oh, you’re doing it
my way’ and they won’t listen to how somebody else wants to do it. And at the end
of the day, if the end result is the same and either are just as safe as each other,
then fair enough. Some people are not good at listening to others’ point of view.’
Communication in the IMT - How to speak to team-members
The participants indicated that the way a person is spoken to can precipitate a communication
breakdown, and can encourage or discourage the best performance from others in the emergency
environment. Participants highlighted the importance of being acknowledged and appreciated
if they were to continue contributing to a team. This element is therefore about how people
speak to people rather than what is said.
‘it’s not the time to go shouting, the last thing anyone can do is shout and rant
and rave, cause that just brings everything to a grinding halt, [and] takes the focus
o↵ where they are,’
Aggressive and rude behaviour such as ranting and raving, shouting, outbursts of anger/tirades,
screaming at people, and talking over people were all seen as particularly unacceptable and have
been seen to disrupt the emergency management process. This is particularly unfortunate if
these behaviours are precipitated by low self-confidence as these behaviours will not engender
support from others.
‘His little outbursts really upset the dynamics of the meeting. Instead of asking
in the IMT they were coming behind the scenes to get information.’
‘If someone’s standing and screaming at you, you don’t feel motivated to go and
help them.’
‘screaming down the controller’s phone is not going to help me get information
any quicker. You’ve got to understand that.’
Participants stated that people should speak in a manner they would like to be spoken to,
that the way people spoke could indicate care and respect, that eye contact can make you feel
valued and was important, as was diplomacy.
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‘I suppose history has taught me, if you take an aggressive approach to people
you are wasting your time. So I like to speak to people in the manner I like to be
spoken to. ‘It’s just how you deliver your request.’
‘I would be very conscious, of how am I going to tell Ruth that what she just
said was absolutely silly and we need to look at it another way. This guy would just
say,’ Ruth you are a dickhead’ and I’d cringe. I mean he could have done that in a
better way. But I got used to him and I could see when he was going to be brutal.
And it wasn’t always good that he did it because he had that e↵ect that I said before,
people just shut up.’
‘And one should be careful not to shut people down, if someone is talking give
him the floor so he can justify what he’s trying to promote. Because if you are in a
rude manner or way you talk over him or you ignore what he’s saying he may shut
down and just not participate.’
‘But the environment, and once again all that will be driven by the IC. If you
bring it up and he goes, ‘I told you [and bangs fist on table], that ain’t gonna work.
People start to shut down and you can’t have that.’
Another communication skill identified was the ability to talk to di↵erent people di↵erently,
to ensure the message was delivered in a way the recipient would understand ranging from the
underground crew to external stakeholders.
‘You’ve got to be able to understand what they are saying, you’ve got to basically
talk in their language, describe it in their ways and understand enough about what
they do to actually test what they are telling you and validate it’
‘The way that he deals with people at di↵erent levels, so he can change the way
he speaks to people at di↵erent levels. Like a coal mine worker, he’s talking at that
level, not technical.’
‘I suppose it’s all down to relationships with people. I know I’ve got a group of
people and I know I talk to this guy di↵erently to the way I talk to this guy because
each one has di↵erent needs and wants and you need to understand and acknowledge
them needs or wants and treat each person as an individual not the same. Because
if you treat everyone the same, one might be happy when the next one isn’t.’
Similarly several participants spoke of times they had to modify what they said to suit the
context of the situation. For instance there are times when the IC needs to be ‘strong in giving
directions’ whilst at other times, especially during fatal incidents, more diplomacy is required.
One person spoke of a time when he was trying to get information from a man who had been
involved heavily in an ongoing emergency response operation
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‘it felt wrong in how I was going about it but it seemed to be helping, I generally
wouldn’t be buttering up, it would almost turn your stomach if it was day to day
work type stu↵. But because he was so far that end of the emotional scale, it was
di cult to get through to him any way but the nice way approach.’
‘There is a time to be clinical and direct and there are other times you need
to....it’s the way you broach the information like, ‘I could be wrong, this is what I
think’ , you never told them, ‘this is the way it is.’
Finally, it seems that general care around word choices and topics of conversation are also
important. Poor word choices have resulted in interpersonal conflicts, physical altercations,
and guilt on the part of people who have unintentionally said the wrong thing. Terms such as
‘skeleton crews’ and ‘victim’ have caused upset in the past as have people being too cavalier and
having inappropriate conversations at inappropriate times. However, those who had worked
with emergency services, acknowledged the role of humour, often black, in helping people cope
[68].
5.3.8 Leadership
Coal mining is not a people centred industry. The focus is on production, and the skills valued
and rewarded in a mine-manager are those that maximise production and profit. Whilst some
saw it necessary for the IC to have good technical skills, some thought the IC only needed
enough technical expertise to challenge the data in the IMT and that it was more important
that the team had the appropriate technical skills.
The non-technical skills needed to be an IC were perceived in most cases to be di↵erent to
those required in on a daily basis, and were said by some to be completely absent in several
current mine-managers. Most interviewees believed that more people skills were required of
an IC than a mine-manager during daily operations. Few claimed that a good mine-manager
had the necessary skills to be a good IC, and only one stated that there was no di↵erence in
the skills needed in an emergency. However, it is di cult to believe that mine-managers have
honed their interpersonal skills, such as communicating with and understanding the limits of
emotional or vulnerable people to the level of individuals employed in caring industries where
they use their skills in emergency situations daily, such as members of the emergency services.
‘Anyone can be trained to run a coal mine. But not anyone can be trained to
run an incident management team when there’s been a disaster, because everything
changes. It changes from normal production mode to everyone’s got personal feelings
involved in a disaster.’
The ability to be a good IC was often attributed to their personality, and therefore that
some people that just cannot be, or even be trained to be, a good IC.
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‘I don’t know how you train someone to do that. I think it’s in their nature, it’s
in their personality or whatever you want to call it’
‘it’s not the technical ability, it’s their personality, so it’s, and you can’t. How
do you teach people? You can teach people, but it’s very hard.’
‘Like, some people, have got it or they haven’t. Like and you can’t, and some of
that stu↵ you can’t teach.’
Participants also noted that good leaders had a certain presence, something that was harder
to define:
‘I don’t know specifically what it is but some have the, almost an air of authority,
I don’t really know how to...’
‘The person who is going to lead an e↵ective ICT is the person that is perceived
as a leader before he goes into the ICT.’
‘The boys, everybody at the mine... needs to see him as the leader.’
A good IC is one that motivates the team to work because they want to, rather than because
they are told to:
‘You can tell he’s a good people person, so he can get people to do what he wants
them to. And they all look up to him.’
‘I think a good IC would be a good leader, not necessarily a good manager. A
good manager is a person that just gets people to do the right thing. But a leader
gets people to want to do the right thing.’
‘He’s got to get the best out of people.’
‘He just had good people management skills. He could get people to work for him,
he could get people to do what needed to be done without pressuring, he had good
authority, he was seen as an expert in that field, even though he could have been one
of the people responsible for what happened, he didn’t change from the job at hand,
he was the Incident Controller.’
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Leadership - Communicating externally from the IMT
This is one of the bigger picture roles the IC is believed to have. Interviewees emphasised
the importance of controlling what IMT members say outside of the IMT room to manage
perceptions of the IMT’s e ciency.
‘Communication is just so critical, once again because you may be able to draw
in some information, plus it’s also keeping people informed and confident that you
are in control.’
Experienced ICs explained that communicating with the mines inspectorate, head o ce
and the mine-workers is necessary to build these others’ confidence in the IMT. The mines
inspectorate must have confidence that the IMT decisions pose no risk to employees, because
they can take control of the mine if they believe safety is compromised. Those of higher
authority than the IC in the mining organisation must have confidence that the IMT decision-
making is optimal for financial reasons. Equally, the mine-workers must be informed of progress,
to maintain their confidence in the IMT, because these are the people actioning the IMT
decisions.
‘Have the confidence in the IMT that we are actually doing stu↵, and there’s
something happening, time flashes past when you are in there, but when you are
outside it drags. And I’ve been on both sides of the fence. Outside thinking what
the bloody hell are they doing, it seems like hours and hours and hours.’
Control of information that leaves the IMT is vital to ensure that external stakeholders
and the mining teams receive a complete and factual account rather than rumours or snippets
information that can be misinterpreted. Maintaining the confidentiality of some issues discussed
in the IMT is seen as imperative, and when confidentiality has been broken, trust has been lost
and this is detrimental to progress.
‘And that’s a really important skill, non-technical skill, is to be able to be dis-
creet, confidential, because that’s what breaks down the team, you know the rumour
mongering and that sort of thing.’
‘They also have to realise the power, if they walk out and go, ‘fuck I don’t believe
that shit’ that also has an impact.’
Leadership - Delegation vs micromanagement
MEMS relies on delegation to enable the IC to focus on decision-making and this was one of
the more recognised elements of leadership. Within MEMS, micro-managing is evidenced by
someone interfering with, or carrying-out tasks that are the responsibility of someone lower in
the hierarchical structure.
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‘I’m going to let planning, logistics and operations do what they need to do, and
don’t interfere.’
All but one of the interviewees believed the IC must delegate because: one person physically
can’t do everything that is required in an emergency; jumping into other people’s roles means
that you are not doing your own; and if you don’t step back from the detail you will miss
something critical.
‘It’s not all about one person, one person can’t do everything, so we’ve got to be
prepared to delegate.’
‘But when the shit hits the fan they are physically not capable of getting the job
done cause there’s too much.’
‘[The] IMT leader has to take that holistic approach and stand back and allow
people to do what they need to do. I mean I could look at several of the roles and feel
like I could jump in and do them roles equally well or better but I’ve got to refrain
from doing that because the Incident Management is the whole thing. It’s not just
one little aspect. So by jumping in and doing this guy’s role you are not doing your
own. I think a good IMT leader is one that can do that.’
‘let’s go o↵ and do this, let’s go o↵ and build a stopping here, let’s go and put
that fire out, it’s no good. That’s for the other people to do, and the guys that are
in charge, and that’s one thing it’s definitely taught me is you’ve just got to stand
back, delegate and make sure that you are over everything , because if you are not
you will miss a piece of the puzzle that is just critical, absolutely critical.’
However, delegation is not easy task for some.
‘In hindsight, when you go back and reflect on what happened in an incident you
feel like you were bombarded by information and by requests but when you looked
outside you saw there were a lot of people doing nothing but you didn’t have the
opportunity to shed work or to manage it. So, sometimes I don’t think I’m a very
good manager.’
The likelihood of micro-managing was also often attributed to an IC’s personality. ICs who
think they know everything and others know nothing were perceived to be the worst micro-
managers.
‘Control freaks have every faith in their own ability and no faith in others. I can
do it. You can’t. And control freaks fail to delegate and the whole thing turns to
shit.’
Alternative explanations included that micro-managing is a result of not trusting the team.
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‘The IC needs to trust, he cannot go in and micro-manage’
‘you have to trust your people because if you don’t trust them you are going to
be stepping in and sitting on their shoulder. You’ve got be able to let them go and
get on with their job, so you’ve got to trust them.’
A novel suggestion from an interviewee was that micro-managing may occur because those
issuing the tasks have di culty communicating what is required or can’t visualise the outcome
of the delegated tasks. This could be a problem with projection - the third level of situation-
awareness.
‘I think trust is a di↵erent thing to the delegation thing. Delegating, I know that
they’ve got the ability to do the job. Trusting to me is more of a feeling word, you
know I don’t have that big an issue with requiring trust.’
‘I think people sometimes make a rod for their own back, if you don’t give
someone enough instruction to go o↵ and do the task, perhaps they don’t understand
themselves exactly how to communicate that or perhaps they don’t understand exactly
what’s going to happen when they do something.’
IC micro-management has been seen to completely disrupt the management system, with
roles and responsibilities becoming unclear and the big picture management of the incident
compromised due to the ICs attention being focussed elsewhere.
‘Understand your role, understand what that role is, and don’t do someone else’s
role, don’t dip down, and that’s really hard, that’s the classic, keep having that reality
check, understand you own traits, if you do someone’s job, they’ll do someone else’s,
then there’s no one looking at the overall perspective.’
‘That comes down to management skills. The micro manager at a mine would
be at risk of getting distracted and [inaudible] down when he has other resources
there to take care of that. And he should be looking at the big picture.’
In addition, possibly due to the association of mistrust with micromanagement, it can lead
to conflict within the team.
‘If that Incident Controller starts micro-managing then the whole thing is going
to turn into a piece of shit. And I’ve seen that happen.’
‘If you start to micro-manage it’s all over. I’ll go, cause this is where it breaks
down, ‘You fucking do it, there you go, you do it!’ You know? I’ll go and sit over
there.’
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Most of the participants who thought the IC should not leave the IMT room between meet-
ings explained that this was necessary to prevent the IC micro-managing. Of those that believed
that the IC should observe the teams to get a feel for the emergency management process, all
except one believed the IC could observe but should not interfere with the team’s assigned
tasks.
‘If I’m a decision maker I’ll make the decisions. There’s a structure around
emergency management, and the discipline that’s holding that structure. Don’t break
it up. Don’t contribute it to it coming apart because you want to get involved.’
‘That’s why the IMT process is pretty cool because it’s pretty lean. So yes, that
is part of a leader’s role. They shouldn’t be waiting to get back to the next meeting
to find out there are issues’
‘if you want to walk in the planning room, sit back and observe, give yourself the
confidence that they are thinking it through, so don’t go in and take over. Because if
you go and take over, they are now going to defer to you and look for your decision
and that’s not what you are there for.’
‘Do not micro-manage. Do not go in and harass the controller, ‘what’s going
on?’, you are not going to get any better results by standing over people’s shoulders
and harassing people and that sort of thing. And in fact you are going to miss
things. It’s not to say you have to sit in your big chair and, you know, come to the
mountain. It’s that subtle thing again, the boys have gone o↵, there’s a meeting in
an hour, you might just, ‘Oh, shit, something’s just popped into my head’, you go
and see the planning guy, ‘look Ruth, I’ve just had a thought, I know you are busy,
but you might want to consider that or chase that bit of information, you might
want to consider that as well.’ There’s no problem with that.’
Leadership - How to reprimand
A topic that has not arisen in previous non-technical skills literature is that of how to reprimand
or keep the team on task if they stray. Several participants discussed the skill of doing this
without causing additional conflict.
One participant stated that a good IC he worked for ‘would take someone outside if he needed
to talk to them’ and another spoke of being reprimanded in ‘a way that didn’t dent our egos I
guess. Didn’t undermine us at all, but got us back on track.’
In contrast, some ICs claimed that publicly reprimanding team members has worked well in
incidents. One spoke of a time he deliberately ‘lost it’ with a mine worker:
‘I had to pull this guy into line in front of everybody. And actually do it, and
I think that actually helped doing it in front of the whole workforce, they saw, ‘he
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[the IC] is trying to do the right thing’ and I’m not going to be heckled by this one
person all the time’.
Another stated:
‘And I remember times when I walked in and they hadn’t done the work and I
said ‘get out, ‘I’ll see you back in here in an hour with the answers.’ Right, so when
we walked in there, there was a few times there was some complacency or dawdling
so ‘get out, see you back here in an hour’ and let me tell you, don’t people get their
shit together after that!’
However, he also stated that
‘I don’t think you need to be aggressive, I think you need to be direct and you need
to be consistent. And people need to know what’s coming. So I wasn’t aggressive
as in that I didn’t yell at people... If they started to speak shit to me though, that’s
when I would actually go and start asking very pointed questions and keep going,
keep going, keep going so it wasn’t aggressive, but it was passive aggressive.’
One participant spoke of the e↵ect a stern and autocratic IC had on those working for him:
‘The e↵ect of that IC was that you got your stu↵ right. By calling the experts
and getting every second opinion and asking people to look over this before I take
it into him. So his autocrat style created a democratic management environment
below him.’
A strategy used by another IC is to ‘take them close to the edge but not over the edge’.
The IC must maintain control of the people and the processes in the IMT meeting, whilst
maintaining the team’s involvement.
This was said to potentially require the IC to raise his/her voice slightly but not to yell, or
to
‘have enough authority in his voice, or the way he presents himself, to be able to
draw people back to an objective for example’.
Similarly, if the IMT cannot come to a decision the IC
‘needs to be authoritative because at the end of the day he needs to make the final
call, if, as a team, they can’t make a consensus’.
However, one participant seemed confused by this concept and didn’t see the arrogance in
his statement:
‘I usually try to actually bring people around to my point of view through the
consultative process.’
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Leadership - Remain calm and confident
This element overlaps with the self-confidence element, but is included here because appearing
calm and confident on the outside is not necessarily dependant on actually being self-confident.
An IC’s calm and confident external demeanour was considered important because this influ-
ences the perceptions and behaviours of those working for the IC. An apparently calm and
confident IC was said to inspire confidence in his team. Similarly, this doesn’t mean that team
members suddenly become more self-confident individuals, but that they become more confi-
dent in the process and become more focussed. Other adjectives used to describe the ‘calm
under pressure’ IC included: ‘rational’ ; ‘stable’ ; ‘not have the panic factor’ ; ‘keeping a cool
head’ ; ‘logical thinking’ ; ‘the ability to control or manage yourself ’ ; and always being ‘the same
and not moody or di cult’.
‘One guy I did see in action, when he walked into the management room, he
always looked confident, he always looked calm, and you could instantly see a, in
the blokes he was, that operated through him. Instantly a calm came over. People
seemed a little bit more focussed just looking at how he presented himself.’
‘Back at the fire brigade I’ve seen the ambos do that, do a brilliant job of that.
When there’s death and destruction everywhere and smoke, blood and guts, and they
walk in as casual as you like, cool calm and collected.’
‘I’ve been involved in some pretty horrific fires and fatalities with the fire-brigade,
and the senior guys that are really good at, the ones you had confidence in, they
seemed to be confident in themselves, they just seemed to, even though the place was
collapsing, they didn’t seem phased by it. They almost seemed to be, they had their
process working really well, they could, they spoke clearly with a firm tone, they just
looked like they knew what they were doing even though they might not have, the
place was tumbling around their ears but they inspired confidence.’
‘I think having gone through it you understand the importance of staying cool,
calm and think.’
‘I stay calm. I tell myself to stay calm and listen to every word that’s being
said. Because I don’t want to miss any key piece of information. I try to analyse
everything I get as quick as I can, you know.’
‘He needs, without a doubt, demonstrate control to start with. Because, people
are going to look at him and go, ‘Oh dear it’s bad isn’t it’, or ‘OK, I’m confident’.
So I think there is a distinct quality in a person that needs to be able to hold it
together I suppose and exude a little bit of confidence when things aren’t so great.
It’s something that people need to be conscious of.’
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It cannot be determined from the current research whether one leadership-style is more
or less likely than another to lead to a successful IMT outcome. It could be the case, that
in an emergency, a highly authoritarian incident controller may be more successful than a
collaborative one if the IC has the necessary technical skills and his team are willing to support
him/her. Decisions would no doubt be made quicker, and the issues surrounding collaboration
and cooperation would become irrelevant. It is also possible that any conflict that arises may
be more honest and short-lived if issues can be sorted out on the spot, even if it involves some
shouting or aggression. If this were the case, the IMT may be more likely to progress without
the lingering toxic withdrawal and belligerence that was observed in the exercises discussed
in Chapter 3. However, this is too simplistic a summary. This research cannot prescribe a
preferred leadership style because ’leadership is a process not a person’ [87, p. 71]and is equally
dependent on the leaders and the followers’ perception of the IC and the resulting overall leader-
follower relationship [86]. Most of the elements identified in the taxonomy relate to how the
IC should observe, speak, act, trust, collaborate with and care for his/her team. Essentially,
all the elements in the taxonomy are equally valid for the leader and the team members. The
leadership category simply highlights elements that are more commonly associated with leaders.
Essentially this research supports the assertion that leadership is not only about the leader but
how he/she can engender followership and this is dependent on the team members perception
of him and if they are willing to support and work with him/her [31].
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6 Discussion
6.1 Decision-making in the mining IMT
This research was inspired by the Pike River Royal Commission recommendation that ‘Emer-
gency Management in underground coal mines needs urgent attention’ [162, p. 354] and the
repeated calls in annual Level 1 emergency exercises to improve mining IMT decision-making.
The Level 1 reports have continued to note decision-making deficiencies despite the implemen-
tation of structural decision-making processes, such as MEMS and MRAS, suggesting that
non-technical issues, which are not addressed by such systems, may impact the IMT decision-
making process.
This research has demonstrated the mining IMT decision-making process to be a broad
psycho-socio-technical process that encompasses many sub-decisions made during the process of
acquiring, communicating and understanding data to develop and maintain situation-awareness
as the basis of further decision-making. Consequently, the information gatherers’ and decision-
makers’ reactions to the psychological, physiological and social issues generated by the mining
emergency environment become an integral part of the decision-making process because these
issues can impact upon how data is acquired, understood and communicated and the resulting
IMT situation awareness and decision-making.
Consequently, this research has exposed and refuted the mining industry’s assumption that
the decision-making process in an IMT is an objective analysis of technical data in pursuit of
an optimal choice. This is actually only one small element of mining IMT decision-making
solely relevant for decisions of high consequence when all data is available, complete, accurate
and not open to multiple interpretations [205]. Such a situation is rarely encountered.
Despite this, the Level 1 reports and many senior mining personnel, claim that the only valid
and legitimate decision-making process for the IMT is predefined, rigorous, fully-justifiable,
complete, analytical, objective and uses only validated facts. This method of decision-making
involves the deliberate rejection of psychological and interpersonal issues that are believed
to negatively influence decision-making. However, this deliberate exclusion of intuitive and
non-technical issues in the decision-making process may contribute to the poor, delayed or
even absent IMT decisions observed in previous exercises and incidents as decision-makers try
to over-ride their natural decision-making tendencies in pursuit of the ‘legitimate’ decision-
making process. Wholly analytical decision-making is time consuming, is more susceptible to
stress than intuitive methods and is generally most suited to technically inexperienced people
who need to work through the details of a problem from the beginning. Furthermore, it is
di cult to apply to situations where many inter-related sub-decisions are required (dynamic
decision-making)[106]. In complex and highly coupled cases, such as a mining emergency, an
analytical solution may not even exist [18] and pursuit of it could lead to confusion and further
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delays. It has long been recognised in the psychological literature that the rational choice
model is not normative [207] and that in real-life decision-makers are more focused on solving
the problem rather than developing options that can be evaluated rationally [228]. Individuals
naturally make decisions in a range of ways, from purely intuitive to wholly analytical or a
combination of both [2, 135] and from this research it is clear that it is no di↵erent in the IMT.
Indeed, despite their assertions that decisions must be objective the interviewees with IMT
experience could not explain how they ‘just knew what to do’ or ‘why a course of action was
obvious’. This di culty in articulating the cognitive processes they used, and their recollections
that the decisions they made were made quickly and responsively, suggests that they have used
intuitive decision-making processes during previous incidents.
To ignore the human influence on the information used within the decision-making process
is to be blind to the issues that can impact decision-making such as unknowingly basing a
decision on incomplete or biased data. Further, to only consider tangible technical information
and process it in a structured and technically rigorous manner, potentially discounts the benefits
the implicit knowledge a group technically experienced people with varied skills could add to
the decision-making process. There is a di↵erence between striving for objectivity in decision-
making and isolating it from reality. The mining industry’s rhetoric suggests that both are
possible and ideal. This research suggests that both are unachievable an undesirable in the
mining IMT.
Objectivity in the mining IMT cannot be achieved due to the social process prescribed by
MEMS where data is analysed at lower levels and communicated to the IMT at meetings.
The drive for objectivity may potentially blind decision-makers to the value that their implicit
knowledge, or the intuition of a colleague, based on many years of relevant experience, could
add to the decision-making process. It may also mean that the inherently subjective activities
they undertake such as trusting others and only checking data that don’t match expectations
are not recognised.
Whatever decision-making process is used there are two key steps: recognising the situation
and taking action. Consequently, there are two key ways decision-making can fail. Either the
situation is not recognised or is interpreted wrongly (situation awareness is inaccurate) meaning
the chances of making a good decision are slim, or the situation-awareness may be correct
but the wrong decision is made. Therefore, non-technical issues have two key opportunities
to impact decision-making, either by a↵ecting the development of situation-awareness or by
impacting the course of action selected (the decision itself).
The mining IC and IMT, in almost all cases, develop their situation-awareness using infor-
mation communicated to them in the IMT meeting. Therefore, what information is shared,
how information is delivered and how it is discussed can shape their understanding of the sit-
uation. Therefore the development of situation-awareness in the IMT is highly dependent on
both social and cognitive factors that can impact communication and their ability to process
the information. The interaction of many people’s construction of the truth, which may or may
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not be based on fact, determines the IMT’s and IC’s situation-awareness. In the mining IMT
the development of situation-awareness is particularly important because if the IC’s or IMT’s
situation-awareness is inaccurate, it is generally only by luck that a good decision can be made.
The development of situation awareness also seems highly vulnerable to social and cognitive
factors. Many interviewees stated that only if information did not match the IC’s expectations
would it be validated. Clearly, only checking data that does not fit with pre-conceived ideas
is a bias yet this ability to ‘probe’ or ‘steer’ until the desired information was received was
considered a skill required of a good IC rather than a bias. This indicates that despite striving
towards objectivity some subjectivity may not be recognised or is selectively accepted.
The reality of decision-making in an IMT is that the information used in the act of decision-
making, is influenced by the people involved, consciously or otherwise. Therefore, obtaining
true objectivity in the decision-making process is impossible, and rather than naively assuming
it occurs, or striving to achieve it, the sources of the inherent subjectivity should be identified
and understood. This involves a realistic appraisal of how the environmental, personal and
social issues that arise in an IMT, can impact the IC, the IMT members and their teams. This
research has begun this search and highlighted several areas for future consideration in the form
of a non-technical issues taxonomy. The key issues identified in this research that impact the
IMT decision-making process are situation awareness, collaboration and cooperation, trusting
others, caring for others, leadership and personal strengths and weaknesses which primarily
includes dealing with emotion and stress in oneself and in others resulting from the emergency
environment. All of these factors can impact social interaction, which in turn can impact
communication, situation-awareness and ultimately the decision.
This research makes the following observations: The mining emergency environment is in-
tegral to the IMT decision-making process. The IC’s behaviour is critical in determining the
level of communication and cooperation in the IMT environment. Communication frequently
breaks down due to emotional reactions to interpersonal conflict. A sense that the IC cares for
others is essential to engender team-members’ best performance. Trust impacts interpersonal
behaviours and dictates whether information is accepted or requires validation. It is important
to be cognisant of how one’s own and others’ emotion and how behaviour may be a↵ected by
the emergency environment to prevent interpersonal conflict. Low self-confidence may result in
behaviour associated with decision-making procrastination. The IC’s situation-awareness must
extend beyond the situation in the underground mine and encompass the ‘big picture’ of the
emergency management operation.
The emergency environment is a significant component of the decision-making process be-
cause it can fundamentally alter the decision-makers physiological and psychological state and
how they interact with others. The emergency environment is characterised by confusion, a
lack of information and high stress. Aside from the details of the incident, the environment at
this time is guided by the people in it, the agencies involved, the social interactions occurring,
the level and type of emotion present and appropriate behaviours dictated by the culture of
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the industry. The emergency environment is an unfamiliar working environment and dictates
that the emotional and physical safety of people becomes the work focus. Unlike other indus-
tries, such as healthcare, where the day-to-day goals and emergency goals are generally aligned
towards caring for others, this is not the case in mining. Miners who have responded to fatal in-
cidents recognised that the psychological environment of a mining emergency is fundamentally
very di↵erent from the day-to-day environment and that more, di↵erent or better interpersonal
skills are required of an IC in this situation than of a mine-manager in daily operations.
The IC’s psychological and behavioural reaction to the emergency environment was believed
to determine the success of the IMT because this would determine if the team would work
with him/her. This research supports the assertions of followership researchers that the leader-
follower relationship is a critical part of leadership because ’without followers there can be no
leaders’ [31, p. 179]. It is the followers’ perception of the leader’s attributes such as their
perceived confidence, trustworthiness, motivation, personality, loyalty, and the support they
provide [87, 86] that dictates whether the team will choose to work with the leader.
In this research most interviewees believed that the skills of a good IC could not be taught
and that it was IC’s personality that would dictate success or otherwise, possibly due to their
di culty in articulating leadership skills. A key issue raised was the need for the IC to care for
the team. This reflects findings from the military where trust and caring are interdependent;
the team-members must trust that the incident commander cares for a mutually supportive
relationship to develop [10].
In terms of trust, the aspect of leadership that was of particular concern to most of the
interviewees was that the mine-manager acting as the IC is legally responsible for both the
incident and managing the emergency (in Queensland). If fatalities occur, the IC’s performance
would be subject to a police inquiry and possibly a criminal investigation. The IC is therefore
believed to be working under the burden of assumed guilt during the emergency response and
there is significant scepticism that a mine-manager, in the role of an IC, would make decisions
based solely on the best interests of the personnel involved. There is a strong belief that
the IC would be highly motivated to make decisions that would conceal evidence that could
potentially lead to personal repercussions. This inherent mistrust of the leader of the IMT, is
not conducive to open and honest communication, collaboration, or e cient decision-making
and the increased accountability placed on the IC will undoubtedly lead to increased stress
potentially impairing his/her cognitive decision-making abilities.
During previous incidents, where there has been suspicion that the IC’s or other team mem-
bers’ first priority is themselves, potentially a result of ego or agenda, valuable energy and time
has been wasted analysing the decisions and behaviours of others. A lack of trust, based on
fact or intuition, has resulted in complete communication breakdowns and interpersonal and
inter-agency conflicts. Primarily this is due to refusals to speak to or cooperate with others
who are not trusted. Miners in an IMT would rather work with people with whom trust has
already been established. The level of trust has determined the collaboration and cooperation
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achieved in and around previous IMTs and individuals or teams trusted before the incident
were trusted during incidents despite potential changes to their cognitive states or agendas. Of
most interest, was the impact trust seemingly has on an individual’s evaluation of the validity
of information. If an information provider is trusted, validating this information is generally
deemed unnecessary.
Many of the issues identified in the taxonomy are problematic to decision-making due to
their impact on social interaction. The common vector is communication; if the information
transaction fails it will impact situation-awareness and decision-making. Individuals’ reactions
to emotion, including stress, and how this manifests in their behaviour can impact social in-
teraction. Existing conflict or personality clashes, from daily interactions, were believed to
become exacerbated in the emergency environment. The stress of the situation means that
tempers can flare and people can be spoken to in a manner that o↵ends them. This often
causes retaliation or withdrawal, resulting in a breakdown of communication. In particular,
when the IC is perceived as being dominant, uncaring, not receptive to IMT suggestions, or
speaks o↵ensively, people withdraw from discussions in the IMT.
Social issues arise not only at the interpersonal level but also between real and perceived
groups, such as the functional groups or external groups arriving to help later in a response.
At Pike River the poor interaction between the police and the ‘mining people’, and the factions
that developed within the mining people was particularly detrimental to decision-making. This
‘us and them’ attitude, highlighted in previous mining literature [82], was also observed at
emergency simulations and was highlighted by several interviewees as being problematic.
Many interviewees believed emotion is best dealt with by either controlling it until the work is
completed, or if this is impossible, removing the person from the IMT. Emotion was frequently
described in terms of being high or low, it was seen as prohibitive to the ability to make ‘objec-
tive’ decisions, and it was primarily understood as a reaction (normally frustration or anger) to
interpersonal conflict or personality clashes. However, those with multiple-fatality experience
also spoke about emotional issues such as guilt (real or perceived), a fear of the repercussions, a
loss of self-confidence, grief, sadness, hopelessness, despondency and frustration. The emotion
felt at a mine-site during, or immediately following, a multiple-fatality incident is unlike the
emotion experienced in daily operation. The likelihood of losing family members, close mates
and colleagues becomes real and the resulting emotion is less likely to be overcome by simply
telling oneself, or other IMT members, to control their emotions until after the work is done.
These emotions have the potential to influence decision-making directly or via situation-
awareness, but it is not a definite and not easily pre-determined by arbitrarily making calls on
who should be removed based on their relationship with the deceased or injured, as was often
considered appropriate by interviewees. Given that emotion is the result of how the person-
environment relationship is appraised [118], the facts of the situation alone do not automatically
dictate the levels of emotion individuals will feel. Furthermore, the existence of emotion does
not automatically preclude objective and rational thinking or provide justification to remove
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a person whose skills may be highly beneficial to the IMT’s decision-making. Individual dif-
ferences in coping ability, appraisal of the situation and motivations are the factors that will
determine if a person can continue in the IMT, this was recognised by few.
A behaviour observed frequently in IMTs, and that may indicate an emotional reaction, is
the insatiable desire for more and more information before making a decision. Several inter-
viewees attributed this behaviour to low self-confidence induced by stress. However, it seems
equally plausible that a lack of self-confidence could increase stress by artificially lowering their
evaluation of their perceived resources (ability) to deal with demands. This behaviour is high-
lighted here because previously it has been considered to be due to a lack of technical skills,
a situation-awareness issue or simply a decision making problem. However, the issue could
be a complex emotional reaction based on an individual’s evaluation of their own skills, the
consequences of making a faulty decision and the appropriate behaviour for the culture of the
workplace. For example, not making a decision may actually be a rational choice for some.
Short term it has been shown that people feel greater regret over action than inaction [133],
therefore taking no action may be more logical choice if trying to prevent regret from poten-
tially making a wrong decision. Several interviewees used the term procrastination, this implies
an intention to act [3], but this may not be the case. Some people may have no intention of
making a decision. Therefore, requesting more and more information is a rational tactic that
meets their own goal of not making a decision, whilst maintaining ego by behaving in a manner
that is acceptable within the constraints of the mining culture i.e. it is more respectable for a
decision-maker to continue requesting more and more information than to admit he/she is too
stressed, fearful or lacks the confidence to make the decision.
Another consideration for the IMT is understanding the emotional needs of those who were
working at or near the site of the incident and who often become physically involved in the
rescue or body recovery. Several interviewees spoke of breaking down immediately before
entering the mine or upon leaving the mine once intensive body recovery activity had stopped.
This helped them cope su ciently to allow them to complete the work required of them. The
mine workers at and around the scene of the incident are critical to the success of an IMT
because they potentially hold vital information and implement the IMT’s decisions. Therefore,
consideration of the shock, trauma and critical incident stress these miners experience must
be considered by the IMT in terms of how to communicate with them, the tasks they are
assigned, how to physically and emotionally support them and how to respect their dignity.
Acknowledging that emotion may occur in perfectly rational human-beings may be a first step.
This research has highlighted that the IC in must maintain an awareness of the ‘big picture’
regarding the overall emergency management operation, not only the technical details of the
underground mine. The big picture includes actively maintaining an awareness of the teams
and individuals involved in managing the emergency, how they are coping, when they need
rest and interaction with other agencies, the media and families. MEMS training considers
the IC’s interaction with the media but the essential subtleties identified by the experienced
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miners and the literature, such as listening for rumours, boosting moral when it fades, and
addressing conflict are not addressed. The social awareness required includes an ability to
predict potentially problematic interpersonal or intergroup issues before they arise to enable
timely intervention. The MEMS process adopts the span-of-control model, which states the IC
looks after up to five people, those below him look after five and so on. However, it is clear
that the IC actually needs an overall perspective and engagement with the overall strategy
and everyone involved. The findings support the assertion of Murphy and Dunn (2012) who
identified that the IC must be willing to step out of the hierarchy and communicate with those
at lower levels if they request his or her input [141]. However, the viewpoint of some interviewees
was that the IC should not leave the IMT room meaning that this cannot be achieved and may
reduce the workers’ trust in him/her [82].
The isolation of the IMT is symbolic of a view that anything other than factual, tangible and
objective data is irrelevant to decision-making. However, through the course of this research
it has become apparent that this binary approach to technical versus non-technical, or in the
terminology of most of the interviewees, objective versus subjective, may potentially limit
the situation-awareness of the IMT and IC. The active suppression of anything that is not
considered ‘objective’ may deny the IMT of vital clues surrounding the incident and may even
put more lives at risk. Evidence may not be considered objective simply because of the di culty
in justifying it but this is not a reason to dismiss the information that is available. The summary
of the first hour following the explosion at Pike River at the beginning of this thesis supports
this assertion, where what was perceived as gut feel and instinct (”something just didn’t feel
right”) was actively suppressed (the electrician who entered the mine rationalizing the missing
reflector sticks and signs). At Pike River this delayed activation of the emergency plan for over
40 minutes and in this time more lives were put at risk including the electrician who entered the
mine and the senior management who stood at the mine portal chatting without considering
the potential for a second blast.
Immediately following an incident the IMT must decide which information to seek out and if
biases exist these can seriously influence the direction of the data collection and interpretation of
the data potentially leading to poor situation-awareness in the IMT. The information provided
to the IMT is rarely complete yet the omissions may be just as significant as the data that is
available. The ability to detect what is missing and the potential significance of it is heavily
reliant on a mix of technical skills, social skills, mining experience and an ability to undertake
complex cognitive functioning at a time when this may naturally be impaired.
It is explicit in the Level 1 reports that the industry expects decisions to be made by following
a fully documented process. However, this recommendation may be driven by the understanding
that each decision must be documented in su cient detail to stand up in a court of law, rather
than from a genuine intention to improve outcomes. The focus on accountability is likely to
add stress [50, 90] and inhibit decision-making by impairing cognitive function and driving
people towards a defensive position. For example: ‘you’ve got to ensure the decision has got
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integrity, it’s been built up correctly, and protected, and the assumptions have been protected”
and ‘if there’s no integrity, they’re the ones that potentially get challenged for being negligent.’
One participant explicitly stated that incident management should be conducted in exactly
the same manner as a post-incident investigation to ensure that any subsequent investigation
cannot find any additional information that was not accessed and considered during the inci-
dent management. This would undoubtedly mean that no decisions could be made in a useful
time-frame. In addition, benefits that could be achieved by using the team’s implicit experience
and expertise are likely to be lost as individuals become less willing to put their ‘balls on the
block’. Some suggested that audio recording pens should be used by all IMT members to ensure
the capture of all communication. However, the psychological impact of this must be consid-
ered because other interviewees’ spoke of adopting behaviours to avoid implicating themselves
especially when communication was being recorded or minuted. Their actions included not
speaking up in the IMT and working and sharing ideas in groups formed outside of IMTs. Such
behaviours undermine the MEMS by rendering the IMT and IC’s knowledge incomplete.
Almost all interviewees spoke of the IC needing to have mining experience (a view also
expressed by the Pike River Royal Commission). However, the interviewees were also adamant
that the decision-making process had to be objective and based on fact. The bulk of the decision
making literature would see this as a dichotomy. Analytical decision-making uses only facts.
Intuitive methods allow for recognition of the issue and coming up with an action thereby using
the decision-maker’s experience. Therefore, it seems likely that that a mixture of intuitive and
deliberative methods are needed to make a timely decision.
In contrast to the mining industry’s stance on striving for objective decision-making, other
industries with incident commanders, such as the emergency services, recognise the need for
ICs to use intuitive decision making processes at times when the risks are high and a quick
decision is required before the situation gets out of hand [106]. Therefore, the mining industry
must consider whether the desire for the overt, analytical, well documented and procedural
type of decision making is actually improving IMT decision-making.
Currently mining IMTs are trying to adhere to a decision-making process that is ill-defined
and bounded by broad criteria such as being objective, documented and analytical. This is
bound to cause confusion and delays in the IMT, especially during Level 1 exercises when
the focus of the assessors, and by default the participants, is on the process rather than the
outcome [119]. A better approach may be to provide IMTs with an understanding of the context
in which emergency decisions are made including recognition of the impact of non-technical
issues and that di↵erent decision-making strategies are valid for di↵erent people, situations and
types of decisions. Decision-makers could be equipped with knowledge of the advantages and
disadvantages associated with di↵erent types of decision making methods including a realistic
appraisal of the subjectivity within them, the types of decisions they may be called upon
to make in a real incident, the biases that may occur and a familiarity with the emergency
environment and the collaboration issues that have arisen previously so that these issues are
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not unexpected in the event of an incident.
6.2 Contribution to academic knowledge
This thesis has contributed to the body of knowledge in the human factors and emergency
management literature. This research is the first study of non-technical issues in the field of
managing mining emergencies. It has determined a number of new issues, including trust and
caring, that may benefit from non-technical skills training and has expanded on the existing
situation awareness, decision-making and communication literature.
The context in which decision-making was explored is unique to the literature in terms of it
being conducted by persons inexperienced in the emergency environment, working within the
structure of an ICS and managing a coal mine emergency. By way of the findings, this research
has highlighted the social and emotive issues that can impact emergency decision-making due to
the dependence on communication for situation awareness. Decision-making has been shown to
be influenced by the emergency environment and that emergency decision-making incorporates
several theoretical decision-making methods such as naturalistic decision-making and dynamic
decision-making.
This thesis has expanded knowledge surrounding situation awareness by exploring how it is
achieved when people cannot use their senses to understand the situation. The research has
shown the vulnerability of achieving situation awareness via communication alone and how the
mining emergency environment; where individuals are working in an emotive and unfamiliar
work environment, are relatively untrained in the emergency environment and are constrained
by the hierarchy of an ICS, can influence situation awareness.
This research has added to the communications literature relating to mining by revealing
that communication is more than a transfer of information and that the emotional and social
factors that are experienced in a mining emergency can impact the e ciency and accuracy of
communication.
This thesis has added to the emergency management literature by exploring the application
of an ICS within an industry not experienced or well trained in handling emergencies. The
findings support previous researchers’ assertions that an ICS is not useful without training,
practice and existing personal relationships and expands on this literature be having explored
the non-technical skills that support the implementation of an ICS in a mining emergency.
6.3 The way forward
There are several potential ways to address the decision-making problems evident in the in-
dustry. Each of these are discussed in turn below. Understanding the limitations and benefits
of MEMS is seen as the first step, followed potentially by making some structural changes
to MEMS, training could be implemented to address the social and cognitive skills needed to
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optimise use of the MEMS, and the Level 1 exercises and reports could be modified to address
more of these issues. However, as a priority the Australian coal-mining industry needs to clarify
the issues of Police involvement and the legal responsibility during an incident.
6.3.1 The limitations and benefits of MEMS
The issues identified in this research could undermine any benefits potentially gained from
the implementation of the MEMS. The MEMS is reliant on good communication and team
collaboration to ensure the IC and IMT is provided with timely and accurate information
that can be discussed and challenged to facilitate the development of situation-awareness and
optimal decision-making. Therefore, interpersonal issues that break down communication and
collaboration destroy the integrity of the MEMS by breaking the links between the functional
groups and the IMT. The MEMS (without these links) is neither a system nor a reporting
structure.
MEMS has been adopted with the expectation that the structure it prescribes can fix the
mining IMT’s decision-making problems. This is understandable. Mining is procedural and
standards driven: there are standard operating procedures; emergency response plans; trigger
action response plans; principle hazard management plans; goals to be achieved; objectives
to be met; and responsibilities to be assigned. The implementation of the MEMS is simply
considered another process. Yet, despite its implementation, and evidence that the problems
still exist, the belief that if the process is right then the decision will be right, continues to drive
the Level 1 recommendations. However, now they imply that if only the MEMS was better
adhered to, the correct decision would automatically result. The perceived validity of a process
driven decision is based on the assumption that all decisions are based on technical facts that
are independent of the people involved in the process. This seems not to be the case for most,
if not all, IMT decisions.
Rather than a process, MEMS is better described as a reporting structure that outlines the
roles and responsibilities people are expected to adopt in the event of an emergency. MEMS, by
defining each role, facilitates a coordinated and rapid start-up of task-work that is completed in
parallel by di↵erent teams. This is obviously beneficial. However, alone this is not su cient to
achieve optimum emergency management performance, and is not what the ICS was designed
to achieve.
The ICS, on which MEMS is based, does not engender collaboration or cooperation, this was
not its purpose. The ICS was designed to build on existing social networks where collaboration
and cooperation already existed based on the interpersonal knowledge and trust developed
through extensive experience working together in emergency situations [103, 132]. The accounts
of ICS failing where these pre-requisites have not been met [215] suggests the MEMS system
may only be e↵ective when the necessary pre-requisite social requirements already exist.
In MEMS the IMT meetings provide the opportunity for the teams to coordinate tasks,
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develop situation awareness and make decisions. However, these meetings are rarely optimal.
The IMT meetings observed were generally a forum for team members to list what they had
already done. The success of IMT meetings appears dependent on the environment created by
the IC and the level of interpersonal conflict between IMT members. These are supplementary
to teamwork factors such as trust and monitoring others as identified in previous research [132].
The isolation of the mining IMT is deliberate feature of MEMS to detach decision-making
from any emotion [161]. This means, in comparison to IMTs in other industries, the mining IMT
is an odd mix. Like the emergency services they are on-site and make technical and operational
decisions, yet unlike the emergency services they are isolated from the incident and cannot use
their own senses to understand the problem. The mining IMT, because it develops situation-
awareness predominantly through information transmitted by communication from others, is
more like a group of senior government o cials managing a civilian crisis who remain distant
from the activity. Yet, these senior Government o cials are only tasked with making high-level
strategic decisions and rely on others, on-site, to make operational decisions. This research
has shown that the mining IMT is vulnerable to some of the issues that plague command
centres during such large scale civilian crises including a lack of situation-awareness [215] and
a breakdown of communications [154].
The decision to isolate the mining IMT would be justified if the negative e↵ects of emotion
were found to be more debilitating than the benefits gained of interacting with the teams. It
is unlikely this has been explored and raises two issues: Firstly isolation is not always possible;
Interviewees spoke of senior management being underground at the time of the incident, wit-
nessing the incident, witnessing victims exiting the mine, becoming physically involved and in
two cases members of mine management were killed. Secondly; this research has shown that
isolating the IMT from the rest of the team does not mean that decision-making is immune
to emotion. Many emotions arise within the confines of the isolated IMT that can impact
communication, situation awareness and the decision-making processes. It may be better to
replace the strategy of trying to eliminate emotion with the development of skills to recognise
and deal with the e↵ects emotions may have on decision-making.
The implementation of MEMS in the mining industry fundamentally assumes that the correct
people, with the pre-requisite skills, training and experience can be neatly slotted into the roles
the system dictates and will perform as required. However, it cannot be guaranteed that the
people have been trained in MEMS, that they have emergency experience or that they are
the predictable, knowledgeable, stable, calm, confident, logical, agenda-free, social, cooperative
and trusting individuals they need to be to make an ICS work. It is the people that make the
system, not the organisation chart, and therefore perhaps the system needs to be built around
the people and their skills, rather than mould the people to suit the system [205].
Mines generally develop duty-cards to slot into MEMS that clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of IMT members and other key roles. These are useful to initiate action [45],
but they do not encourage collaboration. Telling people what to do, also tells them what
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not to do. Further, it is unlikely that every task, for every role, for every potential incident
can be documented prior to it occurring [215, 185]. Over-reliance on procedures in emergency
exercises has the potential to raise the status of them to ‘hard and fast rules that must be
followed blindly’ [185, p. 443] and reduce abstract thinking in novel situations [73]. The Level
one reports have historically stated that duty-cards should be used as an aide memoir rather
than a list to be worked through chronologically, yet this is exactly what has been observed in
recent Level 1 exercises.
This research does not suggest that procedures and processes should be abandoned, but
simply that there is a need to understand that there are issues that cannot be included in a
procedure that can impact decision-making and that potentially the industry may have a false
sense of security because written procedures exist [16]. The type of decision-making processes
applied in an emergency should be appropriate for the severity of the decisions being made. The
blanket use of analytical processes may capture the ideal decision-making process for the re-
entry decision, but such processes may be too time consuming and result in delays and confusion
if they are used for every decision. Procedures are useful to guide progress, but it is not rational
to attribute more worth to issues simply because they were written down pre-incident or to
routinely discount anything that was not pre-defined. Speculating and articulating all of the
issues (both technical and non-technical) that may impact decision-making in the emergency
environment is impossible, a fact that may not be realised by workers if they are trained to use
procedures and are assessed on their ability to follow them. Simply, the existence of a good
emergency plan does not preclude poor decisions from being made [198].
6.3.2 Suggested changes to the MEMS system
People like MEMS. The feedback from the courses is positive. It makes sense to those who are
trained in it and it has improved emergency management performance generally. However, for
continued improvement to decision-making, there needs to be an acknowledgement of the social
and emotional pre-requisites of a team that is required for the MEMS system to work optimally.
There is no evidence that implementing an incident control system alone can optimise decisions,
only assertions that such hierarchical structures can impair teamwork and information sharing
[210, 4, 105, 175] which are essential to the mining IC’s acquisition of situation-awareness.
MEMS does not enhance collaboration or cooperation, rather, its focus is on holding one person
accountable [215, 178] which has been shown to cause increased conflict and suspicion in IMTs
of the past.
Changes to MEMS that may potentially improve performance are listed below:
• The addition of an IMT role solely focussed on the needs of the people who are un-
accounted for. People who are unaccounted for often appear to be forgotten. No-one
meeting the two men who managed to exit the Pike River mine following the explosion is
one real example. Many other examples exist in the Level 1 reports such as the common
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lack of urgency in undertaking rescue e↵orts. A role in the IMT that advocates for the
needs of the individuals involved in the incident may help maintain momentum in the
IMT and keep the focus on the main goal: keeping those miners alive and doing what
can be done to help them escape or be rescued safely. This IMT member can push for
the IMT to locate them, identify them, consider the consequences of IMT decisions for
them, monitor their rescue or recovery, update the IMT on their status and identify their
needs.
• Another addition could be a separate data gathering/intelligence group. This was raised
by one interviewee, who noted that the planning group has a significant workload by
being responsible for both data gathering and planning. Research from natural disaster
crises has recommended improved intelligence be supplied to the planning teams [141],
and this research highlights the extensive and on-going nature of data-gathering in an
IMT. Further, a separate group may be less prone to biases if their only responsibility
is to identify and validate a broad spectrum of potentially relevant information. Some
guidance may be required to ensure their information search is neither too wide nor too
narrow. It is envisioned that the team leader of this group would be an IMT member
and would be responsible for debriefing to ensure that, as a team, all of the intelligence
is gathered in the one place and vital debriefing information can be directly reported to
the IMT.
• Two roles, the Devil’s advocate and the process checker, that have uno cially been
adopted by MEMS following Level 1 recommendations have their benefits and drawbacks.
The purpose of the Devil’s advocate role is to increase deviance in IMT discussions to
potentially minimise team convergence biases such as groupthink. However, other in-
dustries have had problems with conflict by implementing a Devils advocate role [205].
Therefore, with the apparent frequency and ease with which conflict appears to escalate
during mine emergencies care must be taken, by both sides, not to over-react. Mining
interviewees during this research criticised people who were overly pedantic in this role,
causing frustration and holding up actions. The process checker’s role is founded on the
assumption that sticking to MEMS will ensure optimal decision. This research highlights
that the structure alone is insu cient to ensure this. Therefore, the e↵ectiveness of this
role could be enhanced by also ‘checking’ the important non-technical issues outlined in
this thesis.
6.3.3 Training to address the social and cognitive skills that can
support MEMS
Future emergency management training must consider the whole decision-making process. This
spans from the data gathering stage, through to confirmation of decision action, and includes
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the environmental, physiological, psychological, cognitive, inter-agency and interpersonal issues
that have been identified as influencing decision-making directly and via situation-awareness.
Social issues are important because these appear to be a particularly weak link in the process
yet are critical to the acquisition of information and an unbiased evaluation of it. Further, it
may be beneficial to train IMT members to recognise when and how they are making decisions,
enabling them to evaluate the validity and potential biases that they could bring to the di↵erent
types of decisions being made.
The critical assumption behind implementing any training is that it will work. However,
there is no guarantee that training relating to non-technical issues would improve IMT perfor-
mance. In aviation, a crew resource management training package was developed to address
the non-technical skills required of pilots and has been branded a success, so long as training is
delivered regularly to prevent skill decay [93]. However, there are some significant di↵erences
between the role of a pilot and the role of a mine-manager that could impact the e↵ectiveness of
a training program. Pilots go through extensive personality testing during recruitment to deter-
mine their ability to function in an emergency whereas this is not the case for mine-managers.
Pilots undergo rigorous and continual emergency training to ensure technical expertise whereas
there is no guarantee that a mine-manager will ever experience a Level 1 exercise in their career.
Pilots essentially work in a dyad with an equally qualified pilot whereas the IC is responsible
for a team of equally inexperienced individuals in the emergency environment with all of the
social, physiological and psychological variables this involves. Thus to develop e↵ective training
for mining IMTs considerable preparatory work and ongoing research on its e↵ectiveness will
be required to justify its implementation. The taxonomy developed in this thesis has gone part
way by identifying the key areas that training should address.
Identification of the co-dependence of technical and non-technical skills, for example, in self-
confidence, stress, situation-awareness and recognition primed decision making, suggests that
training that increases the technical experience of decision-makers would be useful, especially
if it is combined with non-technical skills training. Providing potential decision-makers with
experience, either through simulations, analysis of case studies or decision games based on true
emergency scenarios would increase the number of schemas the decision-makers can draw on
when confronted with an emergency scenario. Pattern recognition, such as the acknowledgement
that the combined outage of power and communications signifies a serious problem (as was the
case at Pike River), can speed up the decision making process by activating some intuitive
decision-making processes. These can then be verified using appropriate methods depending
on the criticality of the situation. It was evident from the interviews that this tactic has
been used by several IMT members in the past. Therefore building understanding around
this, including the biases which can unintentionally drive this process, would potentially be
more beneficial than prescribing a method that is unintuitive to the decision-makers. Intuition
does not mean that technical data are unimportant [138], nor should it replace the rigour
and analytical processes that are required for life and death decisions, but a quick intuitive
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understanding of the situation is not automatically subjective or invalid simply because it is
di cult to justify immediately. It has been proposed recently that individuals identify the issue
intuitively and then structure their analytical processing around this to determine if it is indeed
true [2, 135] Acknowledgement of the validity of using intuition in certain circumstances has
the potential to speed up decision-making and save lives.
6.3.4 Level 1 reports
Level 1 reports are powerful in the industry. Many interviewees quoted from them and the
principles they have outlined were generally accepted and respected. The reports clearly shape
the issues that the IMTs focus on in the Level 1 emergency exercises as the IMTs generally
focus on what they think will be assessed based on previous reports [182]. This means that the
limited reporting of cognitive and social issues, potentially because they are di cult to observe,
seem too subjective or are considered insulting or irrelevant, contributes to the invisibility of
these issues and potentially the perceived irrelevance of them in the wider industry. Conversely,
the focus on following procedures, having a process and maintaining objectivity elevates the
status of these issues.
Similarly, collaboration and teamworking skills are unlikely to improve as long as the Level
1 exercises continue to be understood as a test rather than a learning opportunity. Currently,
the Level 1 reports focus on what is tangible and can be assessed. Issues such as whether
a duty-card holder has fulfilled their obligations can easily be determined. Ambiguous tasks
such as participating in genuine and fluid collaboration and coordination with colleagues are
much less tangible and unlikely to be commented upon in a Level 1 report. The recognition
and the associated personal rewards are likely to be greater for sticking to one’s own role and
completing the tasks assigned to them by their duty card than for taking on un-defined tasks
in an e↵ort to collaborate. Consequently, team-members strive to avoid receiving a negative
assessment, rather than focusing on the team goal. The fact that mines inspectors act as Level
1 assessors can only exacerbate this issue, and possibly induces a di↵erent type of stress to that
which may be experienced in a real event [94]. In the words of one interviewee:
‘We, all of us, want to be stars. Every one of us wants to get 10 out of 10. So
you are in this situation, it is a training exercise for you and the rest of the mine
to learn. But each and every one of us wants to shine.’
Given the concerns raised over others’ agenda and impending legal inquiries, it seems highly
likely that individuals may be even more focussed on their personal accountability in a real-life
incident and be even more motivated to minimise their personal risk by sticking rigidly to their
own tasks rather than helping others.
The recommendations following the Moura disaster that instigated the development of these
exercises have been complied with. However, the spirit of them seems to have been lost within
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an overly legislative, fearful, untrusting and sensitive environment. These are issues the industry
must address if it is serious about improving IMT decision-making using Level 1 exercises.
6.3.5 Level 1 exercises
Training is only one element of improving performance in IMTs, they need knowledge of the
systems, but they also need experience and practice [47]. Simulations are the only ethical
method of building experience and providing practice opportunities in the mine-emergency en-
vironment. Simulations can be e↵ective if they represent the conditions likely to be experienced
in the real situation [54]. However, previous Level 1 exercises have generally only simulated
the technical components of an emergency and have focussed on following written procedures.
Thus, it cannot be assumed that the current format of Level 1 exercises is adequate to provide
the participants with a realistic appreciation of the decision-making di culties that may be
encountered in a real emergency because there has been little success at creating psychologi-
cal fidelity [1]. A similar issue was identified in the training of o↵shore installation managers.
These managers were assumed to be competent in emergency management following training
in simulations. However, this assumption was unfounded and the deaths of 167 individuals due
to the Piper Alpha disaster were attributed to the inadequacy of the training and selection
of OIMs [76]. A personal inability to cope with making critical decisions and leading others
under times of extreme stress was also blamed and since then o↵shore installation managers
have been assessed in terms of their competency to be an IC during an emergency [68].
There is a need for future emergency exercises to increase awareness of the psychological,
environmental and social issues that are critical in an emergency. For simulations to be e↵ective,
considerable e↵ort will be required to ensure psychological fidelity in the IMT because this is
the aspect of the emergency environment that would-be ICs and IMTs are not experts in.
Replicating, in simulations, the stress that participants would experience in a real emergency
is seen as an essential part of IC training [47, 54]. Realistic simulations require realistic levels
of complexity, dynamism and opaqueness [19], time pressure, uncertainty and tension [150] and
a feeling of immersion in the situation [1]. The Level 1 exercises have not yet replicated this.
Several interviewees spoke highly of a mine emergency simulation that was privately organised
and that had attempted to replicate reality by the creation of news bulletins and the arrival of
families who needed to be briefed. Those who participated in this seem to have been totally
immersed, one interviewee stating ‘you’re just sick in the guts. And that was just role-playing
and I was crook.’ The success of this exercise indicates that it is possible to replicate more
psychological fidelity than that which is currently achieved in Level 1 exercises.
The process of feedback and reflection is required for individuals to learn. To enable this, a
fair assessment of performance is required. Behavioural marking systems are generally the tool
used to assess non-technical skill performance and to determine the e↵ectiveness of any training.
Improvement in non-technical skills will only occur when non-technical skills are critiqued to
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the same extent that technical skills are. This thesis has gone part way to developing such an
assessment tool.
6.3.6 Industry clarification
There are some issues that the Queensland and NSW coal mining industry must address to fa-
cilitate improved performance in a future emergency management operation. The most critical
is to determine if the police will assume the role of IC in the event of a serious incident at a
mine.
It is respectfully acknowledged that the Pike River Royal Commission made the following
statements:
‘In Queensland, the incident controller is the mine-manager’ [162, p. 349]
‘In both states the police are involved but they do not take control’ [162, p. 349]
‘The incident controller at an underground coal mining emergency must have
mining expertise and, together with the incident management team, must be respon-
sible for coordinating the emergency e↵ort and approving key decisions. This does
not prevent a government agency such as the police from being the lead agency or
from maintaining its command structure.’ [162, p. 355].
However, the facts are: The police filled the role of IC at the Pike River mine; the Queensland
police have the jurisdiction to take control of a situation where lives are at stake and that
this authority supersedes the Mining Act; that Queensland Government district or state wide
disaster management plans would most probably be activated in the event of a multiple fatality
incident at a coal mine [80]; and the police-o cer at the 2013 Level 1 exercise stated that if it
had been a real incident he would have taken control (personal communication).
The NSW ICCS acknowledges that the severity of some incidents will dictate that the po-
lice will have responsibilities under the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989.
However, it is unclear precisely how this will fit in with the NSW Mines Rescue ICCS.
Working out how MEMS and ICCS fit within with AIIMS is imperative to create an e -
cient emergency management process. Maximising performance of multiple agencies requires
significant preplanning as indicated by research surrounding recent bushfire events in Australia
[154]. Not determining this relationship before the next major incident could seriously impact
the IMT’s psychological state and their social interaction with other agencies. Pre-determining
these relationships could alleviate much of the stress and frustration from what seems an oblig-
atory ‘pissing contest’ between those at the mine and external others, including the police, as
was the case at Pike River. Furthermore, the stress and responsibilities placed on the mine-
manager will be very di↵erent depending on the role the police take, therefore, it is critical that
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this is established to inform the development of non-technical skills training because di↵erent
social and cognitive issues and skills may be relevant.
This research also suggests that the Queensland coal-mining industry should consider the
impact on emergency management performance resulting from assigning personal responsibility
to the mine-manager in the role of IC as per the Mining Health and Safety Act. The mine-
manager receives little training or practice in the role of IC in comparison to other industries
yet is given more personal responsibility than them. If the mining industry is planning to be
reliant on mine-managers as ICs and put them up in court if they fail to act appropriately it is
imperative that they are trained and their ability to perform in emergency situations is assessed
and used in their selection criteria. Otherwise, other options must be considered. Determining
the role of the police may clarify this issue.
Furthermore, the psychological and social impact of this responsibility on the IC and the
team must be considered. The fact that the mine-manager is responsible for both the incident
and the emergency management played heavily on the minds of interviewees. Several suggested
that a specialist and independent IMT, but more often an independent IC, should be called in
to make decisions because of concerns the IC would be motivated to make decisions based on
self-preservation rather than the best interests of the team. This may be less important if the
police take charge, but even if it were an independent team making decisions, its interaction
with the police would need to be determined. Further, the industry would need to consider
the practical implications of such a strategy including how to train this independent team, how
to fund them, how to get them to a mine site quickly enough to be useful, who would take
responsibility for the decisions that are critical to the financial future of a mine and the role
the mines inspectorate and mines rescue service would play. The social and emotional issues
that would a↵ect this team would be very di↵erent, they would have the advantage of being
less emotionally involved but the team may not ‘know’ the mine as well as employees which
was deemed essential to forming situation-awareness.
Other suggestions from interviewees include hiring a leadership coach to assist the IC in
dealing with the social and management issues that arise during an incident. This role would not
necessarily need mining experience, but rather someone who is perceptive and knowledgeable
regarding social issues to assist the IC with leadership, collaboration and coordination. Another
suggestion was that the mine-manager should not take the IC role but should take a supervisory
role where the mine-manager can observe the IMT, the IC and the teams but does not become
involved in decision-making unless he or she believes something is wrong. The mine-manager
will retain responsibility under the Mining Health and Safety Act whether or not he/she adopts
the role of IC so it was believed that by overseeing the operation the mine-manager would better
placed to spot deficiencies in the process by maintaining focus on the bigger picture.
The systems used in an emergency should be those that are used on a daily basis. Several
interviewees suggested forming IMTs in daily operations to solve smaller incidents to practice
working within MEMS. However, for this to be e↵ective, this must include practice of the social
197
and emotional systems that support MEMS meaning that they may be more intuitive in an
emergency. The recent implementation of Associated Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) training in
NSW is a step in this direction [38]. Finally, if technical systems are used routinely, such as
MRAS to collect data, these will be familiar and up to 70% of the facts will be available at the
time of an incident potentially reducing the time needed to gather data [143]. Familiarity with
these social, personal and the technical systems, and their interrelatedness, should theoretically
lower stress and free up cognitive capacity for making decisions.
6.3.7 Future research
It is suggested that further research would verify the taxonomy presented, identify the non-
technical skills that are required to address the issues in the taxonomy, develop training ob-
jectives and develop a behavioural marking scheme to be used for feedback purposes and to
evaluate the success of any training course.
6.4 Conclusion
This research has explored the non-technical issues that may be responsible for the poor
decision-making processes observed during mine emergency exercises and during the Pike River
rescue and recovery stage. It has revealed that the mining IMT decision-making process is a
complex and highly coupled psycho-socio-technical process as a result of the emergency envi-
ronment and the implementation of MEMS. Due to the implementation of MEMS, the decision-
making process is inherently social and relies on communication.
Decision-making is reliant on having situation-awareness and this situation-awareness is gen-
erally achieved via communication with others. This means that the IMT decision-making
process is highly vulnerable to the social and emotive aspects of the emergency environment,
which are generally unfamiliar to typical mining IMT members and can influence their cogni-
tions, emotions and behaviours. The primary mechanism by which non-technical issues influ-
ence decision-making is the influence that they have on communication and consequentially the
acquisition and maintenance of team situation awareness.
Acquisition of IMT situation awareness is more complex than using ones own senses to make
sense of the environment, the mechanism often assumed in psychological literature, and is much
more complex than analysing a set of facts, as is often assumed in the mining industry. Instead,
IMT situation awareness is achieved using communication in a process of social interaction,
negotiation and continual re-evaluation, in addition to any technical data that is available.
Communication is, therefore, critical to the IMT decision-making process.
IMT communication is more than a simple transference of facts during IMT meetings, it
includes the sharing of mental-models and understanding the information that is critical to
developing IMT situation awareness which is the basis for decision-making. This process of
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communicating, developing team situation awareness and making decisions in the IMT is critical
to the success of an IMT, yet this research has revealed that maintaining open communication
is highly dependent on IMT members controlling their emotive reactions to the emergency
situation, their team-mates and other agencies.
This research has presented a decision-making non-technical issues taxonomy that outlines
the key issues, as identified by coal miners with emergency experience, that can impact on
the IMT decision making process. The taxonomy contains the following categories: developing
situation-awareness of the incident and of the emergency management operation; collaboration
and cooperation; trusting others; caring for others; personal strengths and weaknesses; main-
taining open communication in the IMT; and leadership. This taxonomy is the first step in
acknowledging the impact of non-technical issues on mining IMT decision-making and provides
the basis for future research in the area.
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